INCOME SUPPORT
AND WORK INCENTIVES:
IRELAND AND THE UK. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, DUBLIN, 1997 by Callan, Tim
INCOME SUPPORT
AND WORK INCENTIVES:
IRELAND AND THE UK
Copies of this paper may be obtained from The Economic and Social Research Institute
(Limited Company No. 18269). Registered Office: 4 Burlington Road, Dublin 4.
Price IR£12.00
(Special rate for students IR£6.00)
Tim Callan and Brian Nolan are Research Professors at The Economic and
Social Research Institute. Ian Walker is a Professor of Economics at Keele
University. Mark Pearson and Edward Whitehouse are with the OECD, at
the Departments of Social Affairs and Fiscal Affairs respectively. Holly
Sutherland is the Director of the Microsimulation Unit at the Department
of Applied Economics in the University of Canlbridge. Alan Duncan is a
Lecturer at the Department of Economics in York University and a
Research Affiliate at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and Christopher Giles is
Programme Coordinator for Personal Sector Research at the Institute for
Fiscal Studies. The paper has been accepted for publication by The
Economic and Social Research Institute, which does not itself take
institutional policy positions. Accordingly the authors are solely responsible
for the content and the views expressed.
INCOME SUPPORT
AND WORK INCENTIVES."
IRELAND AND THE UK
Edited by Tim Callan
© THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
DUBLIN, 1997
ISBN 0 7070 0171 4
Dedication
Mary McElhone
There is a deep sense of loss at the Institute following the unexpected and
untimely death of Mary McElhone. For many years Mary guided
manuscripts safely to publication. She took great pride in her work, and
rightly so. Her warmth and good humour made what could sometimes be a
troublesome task a brighter one. She will be sadly missed. We dedicate this
paper to her memory.
CONTENTS
Chapter
I
4
5
6
Acknowledgements
Preface
WORK INCENTIVES, TAXES AND TRANSFER
PROGRAMMES
lan Walker
SWITCH: THE ESRI TAX-BENEFIT MODEL
Tim Callan
MAKING WORK PAY: THE OECD STUDY OF
TAXES, BENEFITS, EMPLOYMENT AND
UNEMPLOYMENT
Mark Pearson and Edward Whitehouse
INCOME SUPPORTS IN IRELAND AND THE UK
Tim Callan and Holly Sutherland
MICROSIM ULATION ANALYSES OF TAXES,
BENEFITS AND FINANCIAL RETURNS TO
EMPLOYMENT: UNITED KINGDOM, 1993-94
Alan Duncan and Christopher Giles
MICROSIMULATION ANALYSES OF
REPLACEMENT RATES IN IRELAND
Tim Callan and Brian Nolan
Page
vii
18
32
83
I06
123
Acknowledgements
The papers included in this publication were first presented at a
conference co-hosted by the ESRI and the Foundation for Fiscal Studies in
September 1996. The authors would like to thank the Minister for Social
Welfare, Proinsias de Rossa, for opening the conference, and all those who
assisted in its organisation. Particular thanks are due to Frances Ruane of
the Foundation for Fiscal Studies and to Kieran Kennedy, Brendan Whelan
and John Fitz Gerald of the ESRI for their help. Thanks are also due to
Patrick Honohan, Gerry Hughes and to participants at the conference for
helpful comments.
The organisational burden for the conference fell largely on Mary
Cleary, Patricia Byrne and Charlie O’Regan. Conference documentation
was copied with customary skill and efficiency by Pat Hopkins.
A very special word of thanks is due to Deirdre Whitaker for her
help in bringing this set of papers to publication.
PREFACE
The papers gathered together in this volume were originally
presented at a conference in September 1996, co-hosted by The Economic
and Social Research Institute and the Foundation for Fiscal Studies. The
theme of the conference was to examine the r61e of the tax/transfer system
in providing income supports, while minimising negative consequences for
work incentives - one of the issues highlighted in the recent report of the
Expert Working Group on the Integration of the Income Tax and Social
Welfare Systems (1996). The conference papers focused particularly on
what could be learned from tax-benefit models, which deal with the
consequences of tax and benefit policy changes at individual and family
level; and on what could be learned by comparisons of the Irish and UK
situations.
The rationale for using microsimulation models - i.e., models which
are based on detailed data for a representative sample of households and
individuals, and which simulate the impact of actual or potential tax and
benefit policies on that sample - is set out in Chapters 1 (Walker) and
2 (Callan). ,.qWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model is now capable of very
similar analyses to those undertaken with the most widely used UK models
(POLIMOD, from the Microsimulation Unit in Cambridge, and TAXBEN,
from the Institute for Fiscal Studies). These models represent a major
advance on earlier methods of assessing tax and benefit policy changes,
which relied on a small number of supposedly "typical" cases, but could be
highly misleading. Chapter I illustrates how this approach can be further
developed, to take into account estimates of the labour supply
responsiveness of particular groups to tax and benefit policy changes,
At international level, the recent OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 1995)
highlighted tax/transfer systems as one of the key areas where policy
changes could help to reduce unemployment and stimulate employment. A
further OECD study, examining these issues in more depth, contributed
both directly and indirectly to the present volume. Chapter 3 (Pearson and
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Whitehouse) summarises the overall results, which help to put the Irish and
UK tax-transfer systems into a broader perspective, and provide the latest
insights from OECD work into the complex relationships between taxes,
benefits, employment and unemployment.
The last three chapters undertake more detailed bilateral
comparisons of the tax and transfer systems, and the pattern of work
incentives for Ireland and the UK The work in Chapters 5 (Duncan and
Giles) and 6 (Callan and Nolan) is based on, and develops further, the
contributions from the national microsimulation models to the OECD
project. Chapter 4 (Callan and Sutherland) draws on a work done as part of
the exploratory phase for EUROMOD, a tax-benefit model for European
Union countries (Sutherland, 1996).
The Irish and UK tax/transfer systems have much in common,
reflecting historic and continuing links between the two countries. But the
relative levels of income support provided by the Irish and UK systems
have changed quite dramatically in recent decades. For example, in 1978, a
three-child family on Unemployment Assistance would have received just
under half the average wage in manufacturing in Ireland, while a similar UK
family would have received up to 60 per cent of the average UK wage. By
1994, payments under the UK safety-net scheme had fallen to 43 per cent
of the average wage, while payments under the Irish scheme had risen to
close to 60 per cent of the average Irish wage. Callan and Sutherland
(Chapter 4) set out some of the main changes in tax and transfer policy in
the two countries, and explore some of the issues arising from these
changes.
Much of the analysis in Chapters 5 (Duncan and Giles) and 6
(Callan and Nolan) is based on "static" microsimulation modelling. These
analyses document the pattern of incentives faced by individuals in their
current situation, using "replacement rates" and "average effective tax
rates" - summary measures of the financial incentive to work, based on
simulations of the incomes individuals would receive in and out of work.
Individuals may respond to high marginal tax rates by reducing or
increasing their hours of work to avoid them: under these circumstances,
high marginal tax rates may simply not be observed. But unemployed
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individuals facing high average tax rates (or high replacement rates) cannot
avoid them in this way, and high average tax rates will be observed. Thus,
replacement rates and average effective tax rates can be used, as in these
chapters, to provide a comparison of the financial incentive to work faced
in Ireland and Britain by different sub-groups of the population.
Overall, the results of the bilateral comparisons in Chapters 4, 5 and
6 can be seen as indicating that changes in Irish and UK tax and transfer
policies over the past two decades have tended to increase the relative level
of income support in Ireland, and disimprove the financial incentive to
work in Ireland relative to that in the UK. Unemployment in Ireland rose
more rapidly than in the UK over the past two decades, but rates of income
poverty rose much more sharply in the UK than in Ireland. While the
papers gathered here can contribute to our understanding of such changes,
a great deal of further work is needed - particularly on the responsiveness
of labour market participation, unemployment and employment to tax and
welfare policy changes - to improve our understanding and guide policy
changes in future.
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Chapter 1
WORK INCENTIVES, TAXES AND TRANSFER PROGRAMMESI
lanWalker
1.1 Introduction
The analysis of the impact of tax and welfare reforms has advanced
rapidly in the last fifteen years. In the early 1980s it was typical to evaluate
reforms, if at all, by using simple arithmetic on a small number of
hypothetical households. This first generation approach was shown to be
woefully inadequate by work associated with the Institute for Fiscal Studies
(IFS - see, for example, Dilnot, Kay and Morris (1984)) and the Suntory
Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines
(STICERD) at the London School of Economics (see, for example,
Atkinson, King and Sutherland (1983)). This body of research replaced the
small number of hypothetical households with a large number of real ones
and exploited the power and flexibility of modern microcomputers, and the
availability of detailed household surveys, to achieve a great deal more
sophistication in the analysis as well as a quantum leap in its credibility.
Recent work in Ireland (see Callan et al. (1996)) and Australia (see
Harding (1995)) has replicated this second generation microsimulation
~This paper is based on joint research with Paul Bingley at the Centre for Labour
Market Studies at the University of Arhus. I am grateful to the European Union Training
and Mobility of Researchers programme for supporting a research fellowship that
facilitated the writing of this paper, and the Economic and Social Research Council for
their support for the Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Fiscal Policy at the
Institute for Fiscal Studies which has been a focus for much of my labour market
research. The data has been made available with the permission of the Controller of Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office by the ESRC Data Archive. The usual disclaimer applies.
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methodology pioneered by the IFS and STICERD researchers for other
countries.
However, even this second generation microsimulation approach
has many limitations and these need to be borne in mind when evaluating
their findings. Among other problems the approach makes extreme
assumptions about the incidence of taxes, transfers and subsidies and about
the impact of the induced changes in wages and incomes on labour market
behaviour. Moreover, they will not be able to capture the full complexity of
all potential refornls because of shortcomings in the data, and they typically
make no allowance for possible macroeconomic effects of reforms.
The importance of these shortcomings will depend on the precise
question being asked and the nature of the environment where the reform is
being implemented. In some cases existing simulation routines (such as
ESRI’s SWITCH, IFS’s TAXBEN2 and others) seem likely to yield
reasonable approximations to the effects of reforms - for example, reforms
to relatively competitive economies, which are close to revenue neutral,
and which do not have sizeable effects of the marginal wages and the
relative prices that agents face seem likely to be good candidates for the
likes of SWITCH and TAXBEN2. However, there will be other cases
where reforms are specifically intended to generate incentive effects where
these non-behavioural simulation models are not likely to capture the
effects of the reform very well - unless, of course, the elasticity of
behaviour to changes in incentives is actually small.2
There are several third generation policy simulation models which
are specifically designed to allow for the behavioural effects of the reform -
indeed, these are typically motivated by a desire to measure the magnitude
of such effects in order to evaluate the incentive effects of reforms.3 The
essence of these third generation models is that they embed econometric
2 If that were the case, however, there would not be much point in implementing reforms
designed to address an unimportant problem.
3 While much of the literature has been concerned with direct taxes and income transfer
programmes there are some examples where the methodologies have been applied to
expenditure patterns. An early example is Symons and Walker (1989) which is
concerned with indirect tax reform.
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estimates of some feature of the behaviour of agents which are of interest:
typically this would be an estimated labour supply equation to capture the
effects of income tax (or income support) reforms on work incentives.
While there are many examples in the literature where econometric models
have been estimated and the resulting estimates used to predict the impact
of some policy change (see Hausman (1981) and Hoynes (1996) for
example), there are relatively few examples where the locus has been to
develop a simulation model that could easily be used to analyse any desired
reform. The earliest work that relates to work incentives specifically is the
simulation model known as SPAIN (Simulation Programme for the
Analysis of Incentives) developed in conjunction with Elizabeth Symons
exploiting much of the computer code in an early version of TAXBEN and
econometric estimates provided in Blundell and Walker (1986). Examples
of its use are in Symons and Walker (1986), and Blundell, Meghir, Symons
and Walker (1989). The simulation routine has subsequently been
developed at IFS by Alan Duncan.4 The model we use here as an
illustration is one of the labour supply of lone mothers in the UK.5 One of
the major issues is the analysis of incentives in the UK and US (see also
Callan et al. (1995) for Ireland) is the extent to which in-work transfer
programmes can be used to outweigh the disincentive effects of out-of-
work transfers. Our results provide hard evidence that is encouraging: we
find that the UK in-work transfer (Family Credit) is quite effective at
enconraging lone mothers to work, and has little adverse effect on the
incentive to work long hours. Indeed, Family Credit would be all the more
effective if its low take-up rate could be improved.6
While such third generation work allows, in principle, quite detailed
predictions of the labour market effects of reforms it is important to bear in
mind that these predictions will be subject to considerable uncertainty.
4 Now rewritten in GAUSS and referred to as SPAIN II. An example of its use can be
found in Duncan (1991).
5 See Blundell (1992) for a general review of labour supply issues, including references
to other studies of the labour supply of lone mothers.
6The Irish Family Income Supplement is a similar programme to the UK’s Family
Credit and also suffers from low take-up.
4 INCOME SUPPORT AND WORK INCENTIVES
There is uncertainty associated with using samples of the population which
may be quite small samples in some areas of the population - for example,
minority groups such as high income households, containing taxpayers who
pay high marginal rates, will typically be under-represented in household
survey data. In addition to this, third generation studies are based on
econometric models of individual labour market behaviour and the
estimates in these models are often subject to large standard errors adding
further to the potential for predictions to be imprecise.
Nevertheless, it is the fact that third generation models provide hard
evidence that is important. All too often, policy proposals have been based
on a view of the world based more on prejudice, ignorance or hope than a
detached evaluation of evidence. A recent report of the Social Security
Advisory Committee (1994) concluded that:
Most unemployed people ... are anxious to return to the
labour force at almost any price which does not leave them
poorer than the benefits they received while unemployed.
It is difficult to envisage a statement that is more at variance with the
available empirical evidence (see Atkinson and Micklewright (1991).
Despite their inability or willingness to grasp how the labour market works
the report goes on, on the same page, to add that:
... we do not believe that this [a disregard of maintenance in
Income Support] would have any influence on decisions
about taking employment or remaining on income support.
That such a policy would increase the replacement rate for parents bringing
up children alone because maintenance payments count as income for
purposes of computing Income Support entitlement was acknowledged
earlier in the report.7
The Committee could hardly have been more confusing in its
attempt to argue in favour of its own prejudices for reform. The importance
7The report referred to the decision to allow a maintenance disregard in the Family
Credit (an in-work benefit) rules which would increase the net incomes of FC recipients
(who, by definition, work) as major steps forward in removing disincentives for lone
parents. See Bingley, Lanot, Symons and Walker (1995) for an evaluation of the
incentive effects of child support reform.
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of the third generation methodology is that it clears away such confusions
and prejudice and replaces it with scientific predictions - albeit statistically
imprecise ones.
This strength of the third generation methodology reveals a
weakness in second generation work which is important to realise. That is,
second generation work allows one not only to compute net income pre-
and post-reform, which one might regard as a short-run first round effect,
but also allows one to compute the marginal tax rates (or replacement
rates, in the case of the unemployed) that individuals face. One might then
be tempted to evaluate reforms on the basis of, not just the effects on the
distribution of net incomes, but also on the number of individuals facing
high marginal tax rates. The argument behind this is that the efficiency loss
of a tax is proportional to the square of the tax rate. However, the
argument ignores the fact that, if the labour supply behaviour of individuals
were relatively sensitive to the marginal tax rate, so that disincentive effects
were important, then they would not choose to be in positions where they
faced high marginal rates. Indeed, if we observe that a high proportion of
the population are in positions where they do face high marginal rates then
this would be evidence that their behaviour was actually not very sensitive
to this and therefore the disincentive effects of high marginal rates could be
said to be unimportant.8 Evaluating the incentive effect of reforms by
counting the number of people facing high marginal rates is not a well-
found approach.
Moreover, if it is the case that individuals put some value of their
"leisure" time (which induces then to forgo more of it when the net return
for doing so is higher) then the implications of reforms which change net
incomes and change the amount of leisure that individuals consume for the
well-being of individuals cannot be evaluated by net income alone. One
needs to know how individuals value their time in order to know how to
price the reform-induced change in the amount that they enjoy.
8Second generation studies further confuse the issue since, when labour supply is
sensitive to marginal changes in net wage rates they may chc~se to make non-marginal
adjustments so as to relocate at "spikes" or convex comers in their constraints such as
non-participation or the lower hours limit to FC.
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Thus, a second generation approach to the analysis of tax reforms
should be regarded as a stepping stone towards more sophisticated and
useful work.
1.2 Labour Supply Theory
Computing the impact of tax and benefit reforms on the labour
market behaviour of individuals requires a knowledge of the determinants
of that behaviour. Economic theory9 suggests that individuals are more
likely to work longer hours the poorer they are (for example, the less
unearned income they have) because the need for earned income to finance
an adequate level of consumption will be correspondingly higher. Thus, one
might expect women with poor working husbands to be more likely to
work and more likely to work full-time as opposed to part-time than an
otherwise identical woman with a richer husband (on the assumption that
the wife regards her husband’s earnings as her unearned income~°).
Economic theory also suggests that individuals working low hours would
work longer hours if the wage increased because the return to working
longer had risen; this "incentive" or substitution effect outweighs the effect
that a higher wage has on reducing one’s need for higher income because
earnings at the existing level of hours will have risen (this latter effect is
known as the income effect). On the other hand, individuals working long
hours may find that a wage rise causes such a large increase in earnings at
the existing level of hours that they would rather reduce hours - that is they
would trade some of their additional income for additional "leisure". In this
case the income effect outweighs the substitution effect and labour supply
(hours of work) falls in response to a wage rise.
A change in unearned income induces only an income effect - a rise
in unearned income will induce a fall in labour supply. A change in the
wage induces both substitution and income effects. A wage rise induces a
rise in labour supply via the substitution effect but a wage rise raises
9 See Killingsworth (1983) for an exhaustive, but simple to follow, survey of the labour
supply literature. Recent advances can be found in Mroz (1987) and in Blundell (1992).
~°The implicit assumption made in the overwhelming majority of the existing literature
is that household members pool their resources and act in a collective fashion.
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income at the existing hours (unless hours are zero) and this has an income
effect which tends to reduce hours. Thus the net effect depends on the
relative strengths of these two effects - the income effect will be stronger
at high hours. So at low hours we would expect a wage rise to raise hours,
and at high hours we might expect a wage rise to induce a labour supply
fall, i.e., backward bending labour supply.
These propositions can be derived from the assumption that
individu’..ds do the best they can given the constraints that they face (i.e.,
that they are rational - or at least not systematically irrational). More
precisely, it is assumed that an individual will maximise (or, behave as if
they maximise) a utility function which describes his/her preferences,~ by
choosing the level of hours of work (h) and the level of net income or
consumption 0’) subject to the economic constraint the individual faces that
consumption expenditure equals earned plus unearned income (i.e.,
y=w.h + la where w is the wage per hour and I1 is the level of unearned
income). The utility function describes precisely how willing the individual
is to trade more leisure for less consumption and is therefore a function of
both, i.e., U = U(y,h: Z) and of Z, a vector of characteristics that affect
preferences (such as the number and ages of dependent children in the
household, say).
The solution to this problem defines the labour supply equation,
h = h(w,H; Z) which indicates precisely how hours of work depend on the
economic factors that determine the nature of the economic constraints that
individuals face, and on Z, a vector of individual characteristics that affect
preferences (for example, the number and ages of dependent children).
However, the theory itself does not tell us any more than this. In
particular, it does not tell us how strong these income and substitution
effects might be in practice. This requires that we attempt to estimate the
sizes of these effects by investigating the relationship between hours of
work (and labour force participation) and the levels of the wage and
unearned income for a large sample of individuals. The empirical literature
I L More typically, a househoM utility function would be used which represents the agreed
collective preferences of the household.
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on labour supply is, at least for the US, voluminous. In the UK a relatively
small number of studies have been conducted (see Blundell (1992) for a
short survey). It is traditional to summarise the findings of labour supply
studies in the form of wage and income elasticities, which show the effects
of a 1 per cent change in wage and in unearned income, respectively, on
hours of work. Typically, it is found that the labour supply elasticities for
males are very small (see Pencavel (1986)) while those for women are
somewhat larger.~2
1.3 An Empirical Example
Here we illustrate the theory with empirical estimates of the labour
supply of UK lone mothers. These are an interesting group because: their
numbers have risen dramatically, their attachment to the labour force has
fallen dramatically, and they attract much policy interest in many countries.
The difficulty with this group is that the budget constraints faced by
UK lone mothers are likely to take a complicated piecewise-linear form
with two important non-convexities due to the Family Credit system - one
due to the notch at 24 hours interacting with the 100 per cent tax faced by
those on Income Support, and one arising from eligibility ceasing as
earnings rise.13 There are severe difficulties associated with estimating a
model that allows for the possibility of continuous hours substitution~4 in
~2 However, recent work suggests that the larger elasticity for women arises partly
because of the effect of wages and income on labour force participation rather than on
hours of work for participants. Methods that allow for economic variables to have
different effects on hours than on participation tend to have smaller elasticities compared
to methods which restrict participation and hours to have the same responsiveness to
economic variables. See B lundell (1992) and M roz (1987).
~3 Moreover, we find strong evidence of non-convexity in the gross budget constraint
induced by a marked differential between the wages of full- and part-time workers.
14 See MaCurdy et al. (I 990) for an approach based on a quadratic approximation of the
budget constraint. However, the possibility of finding a suitable continuous
approximation to the constraint faced by UK lone mothers is remote. Blundell et al.
(1992) take another approach, sidestepping the problem by a "deep selection" of high
earning women, correcting for the resultant bias using some reduced form. The
weakness of this approach is the absence of valid exclusion restrictions to achieve
identification.
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the face of such complex budget constraints. Our approach follows much
of the literature on sit’nultaneous labour supply and programme
participation modelling and approximates the continuous choice with a
choice among discrete alternatives. Each alternative is characterised by
some specific hours level and individuals choose between these alternatives.
Though obviously an approximation, one could argue that choice between
discrete hours offers is an empirical regularity, and modelling hours as a
continuous choice may, in fact, be a mis-specification.
The model applied here is an extension to the Random Utility
Model introduced by Hausman and Wise (1978) and is detailed in Bingley
and Walker (1996). Labour market behaviour is driven, in our modelling,
by the level of net income corresponding to each labour market state.~5 The
estimates allow us to compute probabilities of being in each labour market
state for each individual, which then allow us to evaluate refomls by
computing these probabilities pre- and post-refon’n.
In order to address the question of the effects of economic
opportunities on labour market behaviour we need to compute exactly
what these opportunities might be. We use predicted gross wages to
generate income levels at each labour market state via a version of the IFS
tax/benefit program which also computed out-of-work income. The
essential structure of the model is that the probability of choosing a
position is a cumulative Normal transformation of the utility differences
between labour market states - and these, in turn, are assumed to be a
linear function of the income differences. In contrast to ’all of the existing
published work we also allow for there to be non-takeup of Family Credit
~SSince we only observe the net income for the actual observed labour market state for
any one individual we need to introduce a model of the determination of income that
allows us to predict income in other states. Thus, we run separate wage equations for
full-time and part-time workers, since experience has shown that the responsiveness of
wages to its determinants is different for the two kind of jobs. However. this requires that
we correct our wage modelling for the selection bias associated with individuals
choosing the job type according to their comparative advantage. We do this with a
bivariate probit extension to the usual Heckman selectivity model.
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and for non-workers to be involuntary unemployed as well as voluntary
non-participants.
We approximate the budget constraint by just four discrete points
which we think of as labour market non-participation (NP), part-time work
(PT) and full-time (FT) work~6 where part-time workers may choose to
participate in FC (PT(I)) or not (PT(0)). Since FC entitlement at zero
hours is zero and is typically small at full-time hours, and since the
participation rates for IS and HB are close to 100 per cent for lone parents
we assume that FC participation is the only welfare participation issue, and
even then only at the part-time position.
The Family Expenditure Survey (FES) asks those with zero hours in
the labour market whether they are actively looking for a job and we use
this infomlation to discriminate between voluntary non-participation and
involuntary unemployment. This is important because individuals who are
involuntary unemployed are not observed to be in their most preferred
state, and must be classified appropriately in a choice model. This group is
assumed to reveal that some positive hours state is preferred to zero.
Individuals observed in zmy positive hours labour market state are assumed
to prefer their observed state to all alternatives and are not rationed in
exercising this preference.
Selected results are given in Table 1.1.~7 PT(0) is part-time with FC
non-participation, PT(I) is part-time work with FC participation. The
maintained hypothesis is that individuals know what their budget
constraints look like. Despite the importance of this assumption, it has
proved difficult to test and attempts to allow for it have been made in the
16We define these as: usual weekly hours less than 15, between 15 and 34, and 35 or
greater, respectively. We then compute their incomes at zero hours, 24 hours and 40
hours. An important criticism of discrete choice modelling is the arbitrary nature of the
definition of the alternatives. Sensitivity of the estimates to different definitions of what
constitutes part-time and full-time was tested. The parameters were not significantly
affected by the definition of part-time but the full-time criteria of 35 hours is obviously
more crucial since increasing this brings the "full-time" hours peak into the pan-time
definition.
17 Full estimates are given in Bingley and Walker (1996).
WORK INCENTIVES, TAXES AND TRANSFER PROGRAMMES I I
simplest of cases. Thus, it is important to bear these points in mind when
interpreting the parameters.
Indeed, leaving these issues aside, the interpretation of the
parameters is less than transparent since they tell us about the impact of
characteristics on the probability of choosing one state rather than the
default (of voluntary non-participation). Thus the constant terms tell us
what the utility rise would be of a move to voluntary non-participation for
the defauh individual, while the coefficients on the characteristics tell us
how different individuals depart from this default.~8 Thus, denoting utility
as uO,,h, PP) where y is income, h is hours of work, and PP is an indicator
of FC programme participation, it is interesting to derive the utility
difference associated with FC programme participation as
U(y, PT, I ) - U(y, PT,0) = I U(y, PT, I ) - U(y, NP, O)] - I U(y.PT;O) - U(y.NP.O)]
which for the default individual is 0.274 (=0.732-0.458). In order to put
some perspective on this figure we need to compare it with the utility gain
associated with an additional pound on income (the coefficient on Y in
Table I.I divided by 100) which is estimated to be 0.077. Thus, we can
infer that the utility loss associated with participating in FC is, for given
income, the same as the utility loss associated with a reduction in income of
£3.56 (i.e., 0.274/0.077) which can be thought of as psychic (stigma) costs
or real (transaction) costs. The association between low take-up
probabilities and low entitlements is generating this resul! and our
interpretation is consistent with the maintained hypothesis that individuals
do not suffer from any imperfect information with respect to their budget
sets. If imperfect information were the problem behind low take-up we
would not expect a correlation with the level of entitlement (unless
imperfect information is endogenous in which case it begins to sound like a
transactions costs explanation). We can compute this figure for ’,all
individuals in the data and we find that the average utility loss from FC
participation is £5.91 (s.d. = 1.47).
ts More than the usual degree of heroism is required to make welfare inferences from the
estimates. In particular, in addition to cardinal comparability we maintain that utility is
linear in income.
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We can also use the estimates to infer the utility loss associated
with working. That is, we can compute the loss associated with part-time
work as U(y, PT, O) - uO,,NP, O) which, again by comparing it with the utility
gain associated with an additional pound of income, implies that part-time
work reduces utility by an average of £16.34 (s.d. = 2.77). Similarly, full-
time work reduces utility by £26.93 (s.d. = 4.86), and the average utility
loss from rationing is £10.67 (s.d. = 3.50). Note that although the standard
deviations around these estimated means are high the distributions are
highly skewed and there are, in fact, no instances where the value falls to
zero.
Table 1. I: Labour Supply, Famil), Credit Participation and Rationin~ Estimates
Choice Ration
Variable PT(O) ~ NP    PT( I ) ----) NP FF ---) NP
Constant
Child 0-4
Child 5-10
Regional
unemploy-
ment
0.458 (0.218) 0.732 (0.062) 0.041 (0.345) -0.818 (0.300)
0.934 (0.072) 1.557 (0.223) 1.865 (0.296) 0.427 (0.057)
0.296 (0.048) 0.496 (0.108) 1.028 (0.165) 0.199 (0.038)
0.233 (0.116)
7.687 (0.944)
1.812 (0.207)
Observations 4248
Mean log L -0.95853
Thus the estimates suggest that the economic framework appears to
be broadly supported by the data in that there is a utility loss associated
with FC programme participation, there is a gain associated with additional
income, and there is a loss associated with additional work.
Our results suggest that FC possesses the two most desirable
features of an in-work transfer programme - it strongly encourages
individuals to work, and it has little adverse effect on the incentives of
those already in work. Thus it is interesting to see if the extent of FC
support is set at the most appropriate level. Thus we simulate the impact of
changes in the level of the Maximum Family Credit (MFC) (just for this
sample of lone mothers): when the MFC is set to zero all FC entitlements
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disappear, and as MFC increases more and more individuals become
entitled and the levels of entitlement rise. In Figure I.I we show the effect
of variations in the MFC on the proportion of individuals in each category.
Doubling the MFC effectively: reduces voluntary non-participation
by about 10 percentage points from a base of 66.1 per cent, increases the
involuntary unemployed (because more individuals wish to work the higher
is FC), reduces PT workers who do not participate in FC (PT(0)) because
participation is more attractive the greater is the level of entitlement,
increases PT(I) for the same reason, and FT also rises (even more so than
PT(1)) because of greater income at FT hours (as well as at PT hours).19
Eliminating FC by setting MFC to zero has the opposite effects although
not symmetrically so.
One might hope that, by reducing expenditure on IS, increasing the
MFC would be relatively inexpensive. Figure 1.2 shows that FC
expenditure rises (falls) steeply as MFC rises from its existing level and that
this offsets the additional cost by around 40 per cent through rising income
tax and NI and falling IS. Note that abolishing FC altogether reduces FC
expenditure to zero from its current (1992 on lone parents) cost of
approximately £350m. However, the impact of reducing the MFC on total
government expenditure (tax and NI less benefits payments) leads to a
reduction in total expenditure as MFC falls to around £35 per week but
that governlnent expenditure rises as MFC falls below this point. The
reason for this is that a small reduction in MFC causes a large rise in non-
participation and hence additional Income Support expenditure, while a
larger drop causes full-time work to begin to rise and FC participation falls
steeply as entitlements get very small.
191n simulations we assume FC participation at full time. This is consistent with the
estimation since full-time FC entitlements are found to be relatively small in the data.
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Figure I. I : Simulated Labour Market and Programme Participation
Effects of Variations in Maximum Family Credit
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Figure 1.2: Simulated Effects of Variations in Maximum Family Credit on
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1.4 Conclusion
This paper was motivated by the desire to demonstrate the power of
third generation methods for analysing tax and welfare reforms. The
essential ingredient is some model of labour market behaviour. The results
are extremely important for public policy and could only have been
demonstrated with third generation methods.
There are two important findings. First, we show that an increase in
FC has a large impact on the probability of taking up part-time work and
some impact on wanting (but not being able) to participate but essenti~ly
no adverse effect on the probability of working full-time. Thus, FC seems
to contribute to overcoming the unemployment trap without inducing a
serious poverty trap problem for those already in work. Second, however,
we find evidence of not inconsiderable "stigma" (and/or other costs) which
implies that FC is not as effective at countering the disincentive effect of
the Income Support programme or at countering poverty amongst the
working poor as it might otherwise. If it were possible to simply eliminate
the costs associated with claiming FC this would have an important impact
on the labour force non-participation rate for lone mothers and would
imply large savings in government expenditure on Income Support for non-
working lone mothers.
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Chapter 2
SWITCH: THE ESRI TAX.BENEFIT MODEL
Tim Callan
2.1 Introduction
The publication of a report documenting SWITCH, the ESRI tax-
benefit model (Callan, O’Donoghue and O’Neill, 1996) marked the
culmination of a long-term programnle of work on microsimulation
modelling at the Institute. The release of the model software to academic
users and government departments represented a new phase of the ESRI
model’s development. This chapter takes stock of the current state of the
model - used in new ways in later chapters in this volume - and outlines
potential future developments, some of which are already under way as part
of a new research programme.
The need for a tax-benefit model was identified at an early stage in
the design of the ESRI Project on Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage
of State Services. Section 2.2 briefly sunamarises the key reasons why a
tax-benefit model is needed. The ESRI’s 1987 Survey included detailed
information on incomes, family composition, labour market participation,
and social welfare receipts designed to allow the construction of a tax-
benefit model. An initial project, focusing primarily on taxation modelling,
was co-funded by the Foundation for Fiscal Studies and the ESRI. A
programme of work leading to the construction of a full-scale tax and
benefit model was then sponsored by the Department of Social Welfare,
and it is this model which is described in Callan et al. (1996). An outline of
the model structure is given in Section 2.3, and an illustration of its use in
exploring alternative forms of tax cut is given in Section 2.4.
Section 2.5 deals with future developments. A new model, based on
data gathered in the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey, is currently being
constructed. The redesigned model will have greater capabilities, and
substantially greater flexibility than the current version. There is potential,
18
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too, for extensions to the new model which could incorporate estimation
and simulation of behavioural responses, along the lines discussed in the
previous chapter (Walker, 1996).
2.2 The Need for a Tax-benefit Model
During the past 20 years, few areas of public policy have received
such a high and sustained level of interest as the reform of the income tax
and social welfare systems. However, much of the debate on tax and
welfare reforms has had to proceed on the basis of rather restricted
analyses. Usually, these analyses have looked at the effects of tax and social
welfare policy changes on a small number of supposedly "typical" families.
While this approach can help to understand the nature of a policy change, it
can also be highly misleading. The most commonly analysed "typical"
family at Budget time is a one-earner couple, with 2 children, taxed under
PAYE. Less than 1 family in 20 actually falls into this category, and those
who do differ widely in terms of income, housing tenure and other
characteristics relevant to their social welfare entitlements and income tax
liabilities.
Concentration on the effects of a policy change on a small number
of hypothetical households cannot provide an overall picture of the gains
and losses associated with complex reform packages; and by concentrating
on a small number of supposedly "typical" families may lead to the neglect
of effects which are important for significant groups. Carefully chosen
hypothetical examples may be constructed "to prove almost anything"
(Johnson, Stark and Webb, 1990).
Microsimulation models, simulote the tax and benefit position of a
large-scale sample of families, using micro-level data on individual and
family incomes and other characteristics. These microsimulation models
have a number of advantages. A tax-benefit model based on a large-scale
representative sample of the population automatically takes account of the
wide diversity of circumstances in the population; can help to identify the
overall pattern of gains and losses; and can help to assess the impact of
policy changes on financial incentives to work.
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2.3 An Overview of SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-benefit Model
SWITCH, a model for Simulating Welfare and Income Tax
CHanges, is the tax-benefit model constructed by the ESRI, as part of the
programme of research sponsored by the Department of Social Welfare. It
simulates the amounts of social welfare entitlements and tax liabilities at the
individual and family level for a large scale national sample of [fish
households on a "static" basis, i.e., it does not incorporate behavioural
responses to the policy change. The usefulness of static microsimulation
models in analysing tax and social security policy has been amply
demonstrated by international experience. Tax-benefit models have been
constructed for most OECD countries, with the US and the UK having a
particularly rich experience in their construction and use. (For a recent
cross-country survey, see Sutherland, 1995.) In many instances, models of
this type are the only way in which aggregate costing of complex changes
to taxes and benefits can be derived. But the more fundamental advantage
of such models is that they permit a representative picture to be
constructed of the overall effects of a policy change, from which it is
possible to identify the characteristics of gainers and losers from a policy
change, the overall impact of a change on the distribution of income, and
the impact on financial incentives to work.
A tax-benefit model requires a dataset containing detailed
information on the characteristics relevant to taxes and benefits of a large-
scale representative sample of individuals and households. The database for
SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, comes from the ESRI’s 1987
Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services. The
1987 Survey contains information on the incomes, labour market
participation and other relevant characteristics of almost 3,300 households,
containing almost 8,500 adults and over 4,600 children. While the original
survey data refer to 1987, these data have been uprated to take into
account the most important changes since that date, including increases in
employment and in registered unemployment, the fall in average family size,
growth in incomes, and, of course, changes in income tax and social
welfare policies. The procedures used in uprating the data are described in
more detail in Callan, O’Donoghue and O’Neill (1996, Chapter 3).
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The tax-benefit model groups these individuals into almost 6,000
"tax units" - a sub-household level comprising single persons or married
couples, together with their dependent children, if any.~ Given the structure
of the current income tax and social welfare systems, this "family unit" or
"tax unit" is fundamental to the operation of the tax/transfer system.
The other main component of a tax-benefit model is a suite of
programmes which calculate the social welfare entitlements and tax
liabilities of the sample households. Figure I.I gives an overview of how
these programmes work. The operations performed by the programme can
be broken down into three main stages. The first stage involves setting the
policy parameters for the baseline simulation and for the policy change of
interest. In most cases, an up-to-date baseline simulation, setting policy
parameters such as social welfare rates, tax rates and tax bands equal to
their current values is of greatest interest. The reform policy could be a
simple change to income tax rates and bands, or a more complex package
involving substantial changes to the income tax and social welfare systems.
The second stage is to read in the information referring to all the tax
units in an individual household, and calculate the tax-benefit position for
each tax unit under both the baseline and reform policies. As shown in
Figure 1.1, this involves reading the household data; and then simulating
the social welfare entitlements and tax liabilities for the tax units in that
household, first under the baseline policy and then under the reform policy.
This calculation yields the level of disposable income for each tax unit in
the household and the marginal income tax rate it faces for each policy
regime. At this stage, the model also calculates the changes which are
brought about by the policy change of interest (the gain or loss in
disposable income for each tax unit; and the increase or decrease in the
marginal tax rate faced by each tax unit). These detailed calculations are
repeated for each tax unit in the sample.
I Children aged 15 or under, or children of any age who are in full-time education.
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Figure 2. I: Structure of the ESRI Tax-benefit Model
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The final stage is to summarise the detailed information now
available for each tax unit in order to show the pattern of gains and losses
across family types and across the income distribution, e.g., the average
gain or loss in disposable income classified by ranges of disposable income
under the baseline policy; the change in marginal tax rate classified by the
initial marginal tax rate; or the aggregate net cost to the exchequer of the
policy change, given by aggregating the gains in disposable income across
all tax units.
SWITCH: THE ESRI TAX-BENEFIT MODEL 23
The information gathered in the survey is sufficient to predict or
"model" current receipt of most social welfare benefits.2 For social
insurance (contributory) benefits, we model the amount of the payment,
which depends on farnily circumstances including the earnings of a spouse.
For social assistance (non-contributory) benefiL% the model uses
information from the survey to establish whether the individual falls into a
category covered by a particular scheme; and then whether the individual is
entitled to any payment, based on the means test applicable to that scheme
or broad group of schemes. Similarly, information gathered in the survey is
used to estimate gross income for tax purposes, allowances depending on
age, employment status and family situation, deductions for mortgage
interest and medical insurance premia. This allows simulation of income tax
liabilities for each tax unit. PRSI contributions are also modelled,
distinguishing between private sector employees, public sector employees
on the modified rate, and the self-employed.
The usefulness of the model depends largely on the
representativeness of the data which underlie it, and the accuracy of the
model’s procedures in capturing the key features of the tax and social
welfare systems. A battery of checks and cross-checks on the 1987 survey
(see Callan, Nolan et al., 1989) has already shown that the database is
generally representative of the national situation. More specific
investigations (Callan, 1991) have attested to the model’s capacity to
represent the income tax base and the broad social welfare client population
in 1987 temas, despite underrepresentation of some of the smaller schemes.
The size of the sample (about 3,300 households) does, of course, impose
limits on the the analysis of policy changes to small schemes, or policy
changes which affect only small groups of people. The fact that the data are
drawn from 1987 is a further limitation, but Callan, O’Donoghue and
O’Neill (1996, Chapter 3) outline the procedures used to adjust or "uprate"
the data to represent the 1994 situation, and present some additional
checks of the model’s representativeness. These suggest that it is
2 It is not sufficient to predict receipts of social welfare payments during the past year;
for this reason, current income rather than estimated annual income is at the heart of the
model.
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reasonable to continue to use the model to investigate incentive and
distributional issues, while cross-checking aggregate costs of policy
changes against official estimates.
The trade-offs which are at the heart of many policy debates can be
explored using this uprated model. The capabilities of the model include:
¯ Estimation of the net budgetary cost of packages of tax and
welfare changes. Alternative reform packages with the same
budgetary cost can therefore be constructed.
¯ Estimation of the pattern of gains and losses from a policy
change. The numbers of families gaining and losing and the
size of their gains and losses can be estimated, and the
distribution of gains and losses across family types and
income levels can be investigated.
¯ Investigation of the effects of a policy change on work
incentives, focusing in particular on the impact on marginal
tax rates for employees, and, with some additional
modelling effort, on replacement rates and average effective
tax rates for employees, the unemployed, and those not in
the paid labour force.
Model results can be tabulated to show the patterns of gains and
losses over the income distribution, or by family type, and to give an
indication of the changes in marginal tax rates over the working
population.3 The policy change under consideration could be a simple
change in one tax rate; or a complex programme of tax and welfare reform.
The model can be used to explore Iong-tem~ packages of reforms, and then
examine alternative paths towards the selected long-term objective.
A more detailed description of the model database and model
structure, together with the validation and uprating of the model are given
in Callan, O’Donoghue and O’Neill (1996, Chapters 2 and 3). But the
power of the model is perhaps best illustrated by considering some of the
3The model can also be used to explore the impact of policy changes on replacement
rates for the unemployed, although this cannol be undertaken as part of the user-friendly
package.
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uses to which it has been put. To date, SWITCH has been used to explore
policy options such as a shift away from child dependant additions in the
social welfare code towards a (taxable or non-taxable) child benefit
payment (Callan, O’Donoghue and O’Neill, 1994); reforms to the Family
Income Supplement scheme, or its replacement by a Child Benefit
Supplement (Callan, O’Neill and O’Donoghue, 1995); and the evolution of
work incentives facing the unemployed (Callan, Nolan and O’Donoghue,
1996). In the next section, we give a further illustration of how the model
can be used.
2.4 An Illustration: Alternative Forms of TtLr Cut
Tax rate cuts, band-widening and allowance increases can,
potentially, have quite different effects on the incentives facing particular
groups and on the distribution of gains from the tax cuts over the income
distribution. When, as in recent years, tax cuts are being contemplated,
budgetary policy must decide on what mix of these or other routes will be
used. In recent years, there have been some quite substantial changes in
each of these areas: the standard and top tax rates have fallen from 35 and
58 per cent to 27 and 48 per cent respectively; the standard rate tax band
has been substantially widened; but personal allowances have not kept pace
with earnings or with price inflation in the 1987 to 1994 period. A detailed
analysis of the impact of policy changes over that period will be the subject
of another report. Here we simply illustrate some of the differences
between alternative fomas of tax cuts, each involving similar total cost to
the exchequer. The analysis is undertaken from a baseline which represents
the 1994/5 situation.
The model suggests that a cut in the standard rate of tax of 2
percentage points would cost in the region of £140m per annum on a full
year basis.4 Alternatively, it is estimated that such a sum could finance an
increase in the personal allowance of approximately £350, or a widening of
the standard rate band by roughly £1,400.
4This is in line with official estimates, as discussed in Chapter 3.
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Figure 2.2: Distributive hnpact of Alternative Ta~" Cuts
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Figure 2.2 illustrates the distributive impact of these alternative forms of
tax cut. It shows the percentage change in disposable income for tax units
ranked from the lowest to the highest incomes, adjusted for family size and
composition, in ten groups of approximately equal size (deciles). The
lowest income groups see little or no change in their income,s as most tax
units at these income levels are below the income tax threshold. The middle
income groups (deciles 4 to 6) gain more from an increase in personal
allowances than from either a rate cut or a widening of the band. For both
rate cuts and allowance increases the greatest proportionate gains are in the
upper middle reaches of the income distribution (particularly deciles 6 to 9)
with substantial proportionate gains also at the top.6 Widening of the
standard rate band is of greatest benefit to those towards the top of the
5 Some people - mainly young, unemployed and living with their parents - could actually
lose from a tax cut: the results above abstract from this factor, which is dealt with in
Chapter 4 of Callan, O’ Donoghue and O’ Neill (1996).
nGreater differences in the distributive impact of a standard rate cut as against
allowance increases have been found in the UK; an investigation of the reasons for this
would be of interest, but is not within our scope here.
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income distribution. A widening of the standard rate band gives no
immediate benefit to those who are already standard rate taxpayers (though
it may help to avoid increases in income moving them into the top rate
band). Its immediate impact is on those who are top rate taxpayers, who
are concentrated in the top third, and particularly in the top fifth of the
income distribution. For those who remain top rate taxpayers, the absolute
amount of the gain from the widening of the band is a fixed amount; this
explains why the greatest proportionate increase does not occur at the very
top of the income distribution, but among those close to the top (in the
ninth decile of income).
Some indication of the differences in incentive impact can be
gleaned from the model’s estimates of changes in marginal tax rates. The
standard rate cut leads to a fall in the marginal tax rate of 2 percentage
points for over 400,000 tax uniLs; a further 20,000 see a more substantial
fall as they move off the marginal relief rate of 40 per cent on to the new
standard rate of 25 per cent. An allowance increase sees a fall of more than
10 percentage points for over 60,000 tax units: some top rate laxpayers are
drawn onto the standard rate, while others, at lower incomes, are taken out
of the income tax net or move off the marginal relief rate and on to the
standard rate. A widening of the standard rate band would see over 70,000
tax units move from the top rate of tax to the standard rate of tax - a fall of
13 percentage points.
Our concern here is not to attempt a comprehensive evaluation of
income tax strategy. But the illustrative figures given above indicate how
the model can be used to gain insights into the relative advantages and
disadvantages of different approaches. The model has also been developed
to allow analysis of the impacts of policy changes on replacement rates
(see, for exanaple, Callan, Nolan and O’Donoghue (1996); and the recent
report of the Expert Working Group on the Integration of the Income Tax
and Social Welfare Systems (1996)). Taken together, such insights can help
to infoml choices as to the long-tema structure of the income tax system,
and the short- and medium-term adjustments which will move the system in
the desired direction.
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2.5 Current and Future Developments
SWITCH now constitutes a valuable tool in the analysis of
budgetary options for income tax, PRSI and social welfare changes. It
allows analysis of long-term strategic changes, and possible phasing-in of
changes over a number of years. In order to realise the full potential of the
model for policy analysis within government departments and other public
sector bodies, and to allow these bodies to understand and interpret results
generated by independent users of the model, a Microsimulation Forum
has been established. This is a group comprising government departments
and institutions with a central interest in tax and social welfare policy,
including the Departments of Finance, Social Welfare, Enterprise and
Employment, as well as the Revenue Comissioners, the Combat Poverty
Agency and the ESRI.
A new model is currently being developed. It will use the 1994 data
gathered as part of the Living in Ireland Survey - the first wave of the Irish
element of the European Household Panel Survey. This work forms part of
a programme of research sponsored by the Department of Social Welfare
and the Combat Poverty Agency. The redevelopment of the model involves
much more than simply updating the data on which it is based. Many
enhancements to the power and flexibility of the model to undertake policy-
relevant analyses are also being developed. For example, it will be possible
to analyse the impact of policy changes on the effective marginal tax rates
facing different groups in the population and on the "replacement rates" - a
measure of the balance between incomes in and out of work - facing
employees and the unemployed. A number of applications of the model-
based analysis will be undertaken as the model’s capacity is developed.
These will begin with an examination of the rate of take-up for the Family
Income Supplement; and will include an assessment of policy changes in
the 1987 to 1994 period.
Some work on econometric estimation of the labour supply
decisions of married women was undertaken using the 1987 data (Callan
and Fanell, 1991). Callan and Van Soest (1996) present a more extended
and sophisticated analysis. This is based on a simplified representation of
the tax-benefit system, which captures some of the key features relevant to
SWITCH: THE ESRI TAX-BENEFIT MODEL 29
labour supply decisions - a high withdrawal rate on benefit income, and the
high effective tax rates on second earners which arise from the income-
splitting provisions of the tax code. It also uses the type of infornlation
gathered on work search for ILO definitions of unemployment to
distinguish between those who are involuntarily unemployed - or "rationed"
at zero hours, as in Walker (1996) - and those who choose not to seek
work. Married women’s labour supply decisions are found to be more
sensitive than those of their husbands to wage rates, in line with findings
elsewhere. A revenue-neutral change in the tax structure, involving greater
independence of taxation between husbands and wives, is found to have a
positive effect on married women’s labour supply which greatly outweighs
any negative effect on the labour supply of married men.
The 1994 data and model have the potential to support more in-
depth analysis of labour supply responses than was undertaken with the
1987 data. A full-scale "third generation" model, along the lines outlined by
Walker (1996), is an ambitious target, but something close to this could be
achieved, given the type of data gathered in the Living in Ireland surveys,
and the flexibility of the new model structures.
Some of the chapters which follow will show how irish and UK
models can be used, with some adjustments, to provide useful comparative
analyses. But there can be considerable difficulties in widening the
comparisons to include other countries or in deepening the analysis to deal
with some obstacles which are currently "side-stepped" e.g., the nature of
housing supports in Ireland and the OK.7 A proposed European-wide tax-
benefit model (EUROMOD) aims to overcome many of these problems.
The design of EUROMOD - a tax-benefit model for most EU countries -
would take these inter-country comparability issues into account. This
would involve a degree of harmonisation of data, of methods of describing
taxes and benefits, and of modelling structures. The end result would be a
model which would greatly facilitate cross-country comparative modelling,
and would, uniquely, allow an exploration of the impact of common policy
changes (e.g., some form of common minimum income standard) on a
7See Callan and Sutherland (1997) and Pearson and Whitehouse (1996) for further
details on the difficulties involved in widening and deepening comparisons.
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Europe-wide basis. A feasibility study for EUROMOD is currently under
way, including the assembly of information on data and policy structures,
and the construction of a prototype model for a small selection of
countries. A conference in April 1997 will report on the results of this
work, and will assess the potential benefits of EUROMOD as an ,analytic
tool.
The wider release of the current version of SWITCH, and the
planned future developments to its capabilities, mean that the ESRI tax-
benefit model can help to move the policy debate on income tax and social
welfare issues onto a new plane. Proposals can be developed, investigated
and refined quite rapidly using the model. Information on the cost,
distributive and incentive implications of alternative refomls can
complement existing analyses of policy changes to provide a much fuller
picture of the likely impact of a reform package. Model-based analyses can
be of enormous assistance in analysing the strategic choices for the income
tax and social welfare systems, and in planning the implementation of a
long-term strategy. It is our hope that the potential of the model in these
areas will be fully exploited by policy makers and by academic analysts; and
that future developments will enhance the contribution made by the ESRI
model to the policy debate.
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Chapter 3
MAKING WORK PA Y: THE OECD STUDY OF TAXES, BENEFITS,
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Mark Pearson and Edward Whitehouse’
3.1 Introduction
Taxes and benefits are the most direct way in which governments
can affect the financial incentives for individuals to work and for employers
to hire them. But current tax and benefit systems owe many of their
features to a bygone era and have failed to keep pace with recent changes
in the labour market. The OECD Jobs Study highlighted tax and benefit
systems as a cause of some labour market problems. Taxes increase the
costs of employing workers, particularly low-wage workers; and benefit
systems may leave little incentive to work, especially for low-wage families.
Restructuring tax and benefit systems to improve work incentives
must be consistent with the fundamental purpose of the systems. Taxes
must raise revenues and benefits provide for those with insufficient
incomes. Nearly all reforms which "make work pay" involve trade-offs
between these fundamental objectives.
Financial incentives to work are important for three reasons.
Although many people will seek work even if they would get more money
receiving benefits, still more will seek work when there is a financial
incentive to do so. Second, taking up work involves costs for travel, work
clothing and equipment and possibly child care. If work does not pay, those
with very few resources may not be able to afford to undertake it.
Employers will not offer jobs at wages which they know no job-seeker
could accept without being worse off than they would be were they to
’ Social Policy and Fiscal Affairs divisions respectively, Organsisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Paris. The authors would like to thank Delegates to the
OECD Working Parties on Social Affairs and on Tax Policy Analysis and Tax Statistics
and John Martin, Jeffrey Owens and Peter Scherer of the OECD Secretariat for their
contributions. The authors express a personal view.
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remain unemployed. Finally, empirical studies suggest financial incentives
to work matter (see OECD (1994b)). This is not to deny the importance of
other factors which influence whether people work or not. A low-paid job
is often the first step on the ladder towards higher earnings or there may be
non-pecuniary, for example, social benefits to working.
Section 3.2 outlines some of the main changes in the labour market
since unemployment benefit schemes first appeared in something like their
modern form. Section 3.3 considers in more detail the level of incomes
available to those without jobs relative to the incomes they might receive
were they to be employed, and notes some recent policy changes to
systems of income support. Section 3.4 looks at the rate at which benefits
are reduced and taxes increase as family incomes rise. Particular attention is
given to two areas where there has recently been a great deal of interest
among policy makers: employment conditional lax credits or benefits, and
the interactions of the tax and benefit system with part-time work.
Conclusions are drawn together in Section 3.5.
3.2 Taxes, Benefits and the Changing Nature of the Labour Market
The 1994 Australian White Paper recently stated, in proposing
major reforms, that
Social Security arrangements for unemployed people still
largely reflect the unemployment benefit system introduced
in the 1940s, around the time of the release of the White
Paper on Full Employment [in 1945]. (Australia, 1994,
p. 143).
This applies with equal justification to most OECD countries; there
have been major changes to OECD labour markets since benefit systems
were first designed.
- Unemployment is at a much higher level than when unemployment
insurance schemes were put in place after 1945.
- One-third of the unemployed are out of work for more than a year in
around half of OECD countries. Many who lose jobs suffer extended
bouts of unemployment and as a result exhaust their basic
unemployment benefit entitlement.
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- Youth unemployment is high and has increased in m.’my countries.
Youths have limited or no work experience: they have not contributed
to insurance schemes and so are often not entitled to these benefits.
- The labour force participation of adult men has declined with many of
those withdrawing on benefits for invalidity, sickness or early
retirement. Female participation has grown. Two-earner couples are
more common, as are lone-parent families.2 Insuring individuals
against loss of wages is less effective in ensuring adequate family
incomes when increasing numbers of households of working age are
not part of the labour force.
- Part-time work has grown in most OECD countries. Not all part-time
workers have rights to insurance benefits, leaving a gap in benefit
coverage.
- The dispersion of income before taxes and transfers has widened since
1980 in Australia, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, the United
Kingdom and the United States, but in some cases tax and benefit
systems have meant that changes in the distribution of disposable
incomes have been small.
As working and family patterns have become more diverse, so have
the types of benefits received. Although unemployment benefits are the
largest single form of social expenditure directed at people below
retirement age, they account for less than 25 per cent on average across the
OECD.
3.3 The Unemployment Trap
The unemployment benefit system provides insurance against job
loss which individuals would find extremely difficult to obtain privately.
Benefits allow the unemployed to search for a job which matches their
2 In the United States, the proportion of "traditional" households (couples with the
husband as sole earner) has declined from 70 to 20 per cent since 1940. Two-earner
households have increased from 9 to 40 per cent (Hayghe, 1990). The number of lone-
parent families has doubled in almost all OECD countries since the early 1970s and
accounted for 15 percent of all families with children in 1990-1991 (OECD, 1993;
Ermisch, 1990; Earostat, 1995).
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abilities. Having the right people in the right jobs raises productivity and
reduces the chance of them becoming unemployed in future. Although
unemployment benefits can help labour markets work more effectively, they
can also have negative effects. By freeing the unemployed from having to
take less ideal jobs, they increase the duration of unemployment spells.
They alter incentives in wage bargaining. If the financial consequences of
unemployment are harsh, workers will be wary of pushing tip wages and so
risking their jobs. Unemployment benefits can subsidise seasonal
employment patterns. Without countervailing factors, the higher benefits
are relative to earnings (the so-called "replacement rate"), the higher
unemployment will be.
Have unemployment benefit systems become more generous?
The OECD Jobs Study found that gross (before-tax)
unemployment benefit entitlements relative to gross earnings increased
from an OECD (unweighted) average of 16 per cent of earnings in 1961 to
29 percent in 1991. This rise could have contributed to the increase in
unemployment over that period, but long time-lags are likely before the full
effects were felt.3 Figure 3.1 updates the analysis to 1995. Governments
have not cut benefits in response to high and persistent unemployment
(Box I). Indeed, the OECD-wide summary index has risen slightly since
1991, to 31 percent in 1995.
3 "This comparison [between unemployment benefits and aggregate unemployment
rates] suggests that, although there is not an immediate statistical link between
unemployment rates and unemployment benefit emitlements, the hypothesis of a
longer-term link is plausible (OECD. 1994b)." However, using the same data, Blondal
and Pearson (1995) find that the index is also statistically linked with labour force
participation. Higher benefits encourage labour force participation. Hence, there is no
statistically significant effect of the index on the employment to population ratio.
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Box 1
Recent changes in unemployment benefit systems and
their impact on the index of benefit entitlements
The index is an average of replacement rates, calculated at average earnings and two-thirds
of average earnings, for people unemployed for one year. for 2 to 3 years and for 4 to 5 years,
and for single people, married people with an employed spouse, and married people with an
unemployed spouse. The index does not give an average level of actual unemployment benefit
receipts. For example, a cut in entitlement in the fourth and fifth year of unemployllmnt would
affect very few of the actual unemployed, but would have a relatively large effect on the index.
The index is, on the other hand, a good indicator of the generosity of a country’s unemployment
benefit system. If high benefits were paid in the first months of unemployment but nothing
thereafter, most people, actual and potential recipients, would conclude that it is a less generous
system than one which paid a lower level of benefit indefinitely. However. average benefit
receipt would be higher in the former system than in the latter. It is also perfectly possible for
changes in the benefit system to have resulted in budgetary savings while at the same time
increasing the index of unemployment benefit emitlements. (For more discussion, see Annex 8a
of the OECD Jobs Study: Evidence and Explanations, Part II, (1994).)
Some recent changes in benefit systems and their effects on the index are as follows:
Australia: A shift to independent entitlements for husband and wife and reduction in
benefit withdrawal rates in 1995. Both changes make it easier for a member of the household to
have some earnings without losing all benefit entitlements. Earnings are assumed to be high in
the "working spouse" case in the index, so the changes have had no effect on the summary
measure.
Austria: Reduction in maximum benefit levels in 1993. Minimum contribution period
increased to 26 weeks in 1995.
Belgium: Recent restrictions in access to benefits and tighter policing of job search are not
captured by the index.
Canada: A reduction in benefit amounts for couples in 1993.
Denmark: Extensions in the legal duration of benefit entitlements to seven years in 1994
have increased the index markedly. However, as it was relatively easy in the 1980s to re-qualify
for the benefit through public work and training programmes, the de jure change has appeared to!
increase the generosity of the scheme whereas the de facto outcome may have been to reduce it.
Finland: Means-testing of the basic unemployment allowance was ended in 1994. The
Labour Market Support benefit thtroduced in 1994 has increased gross benefit entitlement.
France: The level of benefit declines the longer someone is unemployed. Benefit
reductions are now smaller, but more frequem, than previously. The system is more generous in
the second year of unemploylnent, less generous in years 4 and 5 of unemployment than
previously. But the net effect of these changes has been to raise the index slightly.
Germany: Insurance benefit was reduced in 1993 by 3 percentage points for single people
and 1 percentage point for couples.
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Greece: Eligibility conditions changed making it easier to get longer UI benefits in 1989
and UA benefit entitlement was extended in 1991. increasing the index.
Ireland: Benefits were increased more rapidly than inflation until 1993; in 1995 the
i earnings-related element was abolished.
Italy: In 1991, a mobility benefit was introduced for certain categories of the unen’tployed.
Mobility benefit is included in the OECD index, unlike the benefit for short-time working, the
Cass;+ Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria, which is not included because its recipients are not
formally counted as unemployed. The basic unemployment benefit was increased in stages to
30 per cent and then to 40 per cem of average earnings over the previous three years. An average
of the mobility benefit and the ordinary UI benefit, based on the number of recipients of these
two benefits has been used to compute the index post-1990.
Tire Netherlands: Conditions for receipt of earnings-related insurance benefits were
tightened in 1993. The work tesl in social assistance was tightened in 1996.
New Zealand: In 199 I, benefits were reduced (for example, by 25 per cent for young single
adults). Tests and sanctions were tightened and waitir, g periods increased.
Portugal: Increased benefit entitlement.
Spain: A reform in 1993 altered contribution periods and rate structures. The index
decreased.
Sweden: Unemployment insurance was reduced first to 80 per cent of previous earnings,
and more recently to 75 per cent.
Switzerland: Duration increased in 1993 with a small cut in the replacement rate. The
overall effect of the changes has been to increase the index.
The index does not capture all changes in unemployment benefit
generosity and (its limitations are discussed in detail in OECD, 1994b). In
particular, it focuses on changes in benefit levels and durations, not on
eligibility or administrative controls on job-search requirements.
Typical net replacement rates
Gross replacement rates of 30 to 40 percent (Figure 3.1) would
suggest that benefit systems do not impose large work disincentives. But
this conclusion is premature. Taxation, including social security
contributions, benefits to children, social assistance and housing benefits,
are not included in Figure 3.1, yet can have large impacts on the level of
replacement rates. Table 3.1 presents a comparison of gross and net (after-
tax) replacement rates which different families might face in different
circumstances. Columns 1 and 2 are sitrfilar to two of the three cases which
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make up the index of Figure 3. I ;4 the other columns are refinements of that
measure. (See OECD (forthcoming), for a more detailed discussion of
replacement rates facing a wider variety of family types than are considered
here.) Gross earnings are related to those earned by the average production
worker (APW) in each country (see OECD (1995c) for a description). The
main conclusions are:
- Taxation means that net replacement rates are higher than gross
replacement rates. Benefits are sometimes untaxed and are usually not
subject to social security contributions. Even when they are taxed,
credits, allowances and progressive marginal tax rates usually ensure
that earners face a higher average tax rate than those out of work.
Comparing columns 2 and 3, it can be seen that the difference is
particularly large when benefits are not taxed (as in Germany and
Belgium).
- Benefits paid to families with children are often higher than for those
without children, so in countries like Australia, Germany, Ireland and
the United Kingdom, replacement rates are higher for these families.
In other countries, such as Belgium and France, provisions in the tax
system mean that net incomes in work are also relatively high for
families with children. In these countries, replacement rates for
families with and without children are similar.
- Fourteen countries have some fornl of income-related housing benefits
payable to the unemployed and those on low incomes.5 Column 5
indicates that replacement rates appear relatively low in the United
Kingdom compared with other countries unless housing benefits are
taken into account.6
4 Table 3.2 considers the first month of unemployment. The index in Figure 3,2 relates
to an average of replacement rates over time. Otherwise, the benefits included and their
calculation are the same.
Countries with no benefit payments for housing costs are Belgium, Ireland (although
an element can be added to Social Welfare payments), Italy and the United States
(although local schemes exist).
6 It is assumed that housing costs are always 20 per cent of gross APW earnings
regardless of the income level or family type. This approximates to actual average
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- Net replacement rates at two-thirds of APW earnings are sometimes
little different from those at APW earnings in the first month of
unemployment (compare panels A and B). The exceptions are
countries with either flat-rate benefits (Australia, Ireland, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom), or minimum benefit levels
(Belgium and France) which have a strong effect on replacement rates
at this level of earnings. Families with children in the United States
can receive food stamps even when they are working. Replacement
rates are lower for low-earning families with children than for higher-
earning fmnilies.
-After 60 months, unemployment benefits are often lower or
sometimes not paid at all (compare column 6 with column 2).
However, if the individual who has been unemployed for 5 years is
eligible for social assistance, replacement rates can still be relatively
high, except in Italy and the United States (compare column 7 with
column 5). Indeed, in eight countries, the estimated net replacement
rates exceed 90 per cent.
Social assistance complicates the pattern of employment incentives.
Columns I to 5 are calculated for the main unemployment benefit, usually
unemployment insurance. However, social assistance rates can be higher
than the unemployment insurance level: they can even be higher than the
two-thirds of APW earnings level assumed in the lower panel of Table 3.1.
Cases where social assistance is payable at a higher rate than
unemployment benefit are highlighted in italic in Table 3.1. However,
eligibility for social assistance is circumscribed to some extent by income
and asset tests which, in some cases, are very restrictive. In Sweden, for
housing costs across the OECD area, but may not be representative of the housing costs
of families on benefit in any one country. Replacement rates are expressed before
housing costs. In this respect, the income definition differs from that adopted by the
Seven Country Study (1996) which uses an income concept net of housing costs
including utility costs, and that of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (1995), which
uses an income concept net of housing costs and private medical insurance. As
discussed in Martin (1996), these differences in the income definition account for nearly
all the large variation in net replacement rates reported in the different studies for
certain countries.
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example, the social assistance rate suggested by the government (the
benefit is administered by local authorities) for a family with two children
exceeds the APW level of income. In order to receive this benefit for more
than a short time, all assets must be sold, including owner-occupied
housing if alternative rental accommodation is available.7 In other
countries, social assistance is discretionary. Finally, where employment
rates remain high and unemployment is low, fewer households need
assistance. Although the level of social assistance may be high in some
countries, relatively few people of working age may receive such benefits
for one or more of these reasons (for example, Switzerland and Japan).
This contrasts with other countries, such as Finland, where access to social
assistance is easier.
Benefits supplementing incomes of families with low earnings are
used to raise work incentives in Australia, Canada, Ireland, Italy, New
Zealand (where a new Independent Family Tax Credit was recently
announced), the United Kingdom and the United States. These benefits are
often focused on groups who would otherwise have high replacement rates,
particularly families with children. In most cases, the upper limits for
earnings eligibility mean that most full-time employees do not receive such
benefits. However, they can make a dramatic difference to replacement
rates for groups not included in Table 3.1, such as part-time workers (and
in particular for lone parents),s
7 Even so, countries have recently recognised the problems caused by having social
assistance at a level higher than unemployment insurance. The maximum in Denmark,
for example, is limited now to 90 per cent of the maximum UI benefit.
For example, in the United Kingdom, someone working 16 hours per week at £5 per
hour would earn £80 gross. A lone parent would typically be entitled to benefit income
of £133 per week, so there would be little incentive to work. However, with the
employment-conditional benefit, Family Credit, worth in this case £68 per week, the
replacement rate drops dramatically to 65 per cent. Employment-conditional benefits
must be withdrawn from those with higher incomes leading to high marginal tax rates
(in the United Kingdom case above, the marginal tax rate would be over 86 percent).
See United Kingdom Department of Social Security (1995) for full details of the United
Kingdom tax and benefit system
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Duration of benefits
The likelihood of an unemployed person leaving unemployment
increases markedly in the period before a fall in benefit entitlement
(Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991). But the destination can be either a job
or inactivity (including another benefit, such as invalidity or early
retirement). Unemployment benefit systems often have limited durations of
entitlement. Figure 3.29 summarises the major benefit transitions over an
eight-year spell of unemployment. Unemployment insurance duration often
varies by employment record (Germany, Greece, Japan, The Netherlands,
Spain and Switzerland) or by age (Austria, Germany,~° Luxembourg and
Portugal), or by family type (Belgium). In Sweden, benefit entitlement can
be renewed by participation in labour market programmes. With durations
ranging from 3 months (Japan) to unlimited (Belgian familiesll ), the initial
replacement rate upon entry into unemployment is an inadequate guide to
benefit generosity.
The distribution of work incentives over the population
Microsimulation models can be used to calculate labour market
incentives by comparing the incomes of those currently employed with
what they might expect to receive if they became unemployed. The labour
market incentives are hypothetical - based on assumptions about what
might happen if employed people lose their jobs, or those without jobs find
them.n The tax and benefit system can have particularly large disincentive
effects on some of the latter groups.
9 For more detail on benefit transitions in some countries, see the Seven Country Study
(1996).
’° Those aged over 45 also have a longer duration of benefit.
~t Although theoretically unlimited, in practice unemployment insurance in Belgium
may be limited to one-and-a-half times the average duration for similar unemployed
people.
’: There is relatively little evidence on what happens when people actually change
labour force status. The results of a study of how much people actually gained when
they moved into employment from being without work in the United Kingdom showed
that most gained a large amount, the mean difference between earnings and benefits
being £69 per week. However, 3 per cent of the sample were worse-off in work than
when unemployed, and a third of females earned less than 20 per cent more than they
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Incentives of employees
The pattern of incentives found using microsimulation models for
12 OECD countries,~3 summarised in Figure 3.3, broadly confirms the
picture from the hypothetical cases in Table 3.1.~4 In Australia and the
United States, the most common replacement rate~5 is in the 21 to
40percent range. In Denmark and Sweden, replacement rates are
concentrated in the 81 to 100 per cent range. In Germany, Ireland, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom, the most common replacement rates are
in the range 41 to 60 per cent and in Belgium, Canada, Italy and Norway
they are between 61 and 80percent. Few workers in any country will
benefit financially from moving into unemployment.~6
received in benefit. When considering the benefit/earnings ratio (approximately the
same concept as replacement rate), high ratios were predominantly found in those
families with children and who get housing benefit.
’~ Definitions of employment status, family type, earnings and taxation have been
standardised as much as possible. Nevertheless, in so far as sample sizes differ; the year
of the data underlying the models differ; and other features of the models cannot be
made identical, the estimates are not strictly comparable. For more details of the models
and the procedures followed, see OECD (forthcoming).
~’ Italy is an exception: microsimulation analysis points to much higher replacement
rates than in the stylised cases. This reflects both the complexity of the Italian benefit
system and, in particular, the treatment of the mobility allowance, the Cassa
lntegrazione Guadagni Straordinaria and employers’ social security contributions (see
OECD, forthcoming).
’~ The replacement rates are "individualised" (otherwise known as average effective tax
rates). They are the change in net family income as a percentage of the change in
earnings as employment status changes. The replacement rate is calculated for the first
week of unemployment, ignoring waiting periods. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it is assumed that previously employed individuals qualify for unemployment
insurance (see OECD, forthcoming).
,6 Very high (over 100 percent) replacement rates are often the result of special
provisions in the benefit system. For example, in Norway the benefit level is based on
income in the previous year or the average of the income over the past 3 years. A
decline in earnings can leave the benefit based on the latter rule appearing to be
relatively high. Furthermore, older workers are entitled to a minimum benefit based on
a wage level which may be higher than their current earnings, again resulting in high
replacement rates.
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h~centives of those out of work
The incentive to work for the unemployed of course depends on the
expected wage. At the median full-time wage, the replacement rate is under
40 per cent for most Australians and Americans who are not currently
working,~7 much higher for non-working Danes and Swedes, and
somewhere in between for other countries. If only low-wage jobs are
available (at the lowest decile of earnings), at least a third of people
without jobs in Canada and the United States would face replacement rates
of over 100 per cent. Ill Sweden, the proportion of those unemployed with
replacement rates below 80 percent is much higher in the bottom
household income decile than for those with higher incomes. This is
because unemployment insurance is voluntary and a higher proportion of
those in the bottom decile are not insured. Those unemployed who are not
covered by insurance receive lower benefits and, as a result, have rehttively
low replacement rates
Generally, the unemployed face higher replacement rates than
others without jobs. For example, two-thirds of the unemployed in
Denm,’u-k face replacement rates of 80 per cent or more. In Italy, the
unemployed have replacement rates of 61 to 80 percent, whereas others
without jobs are found predominantly in the 41 to 60 per cent region. In
New Zealand, around half of the unemployed have replacement rates of 61
to 80 per cent, whereas other without jobs have much lower replacement
rates.
Incentives facing different family types
Figure 3.4 shows how high replacement rates are concentrated oil
particular fmnily types. If the bar is above the line, a disproportionately
large proportion of that family type has replacement rates of over
80 per cent. For example, in Denmark, Germany, Italy and New Zealand
there are fewer single people and couples with no children with high
replacement rates than lone-parent families and couples with children. In
Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the
~7 Those not working include the unemployed and those who are non-employed but who
are in a position to work. They exclude students in full-time education and those in
receipt of invalidity or early-retirement benefits.
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pattern is different. Although benefits to families with children in Canada,
Ireland and the United Kingdom are higher than for families without
children, these countries also provide benefits and tax concessions targeted
to families in employment, reducing replacement rates for this group. High
replacement rates in Belgium and Norway are concentrated on single
people, with or without children. Replacement rates for couples with
children are relatively low because the tax system is relatively generous to
spouses and dependent children.
Are replacement rates "too high "?
The question of whether benefits paid to those out of work are "too
high" or not is more complex than a simple trade-off between economic
efficiency and social preferences. For example, the r61e of the public
employment service and active labour market policies should also be
considered when setting benefit levels. People may work despite high
replacement rates for a number of reasons, but, in the medium term, high
replacement rates will undermine work incentives. Systems have been
reformed in some countries with the highest replacement rates (see Box I).
In many cases, the main reason for reform has been the high budgetary cost
of the benefits, although the subsidiary effect has been to improve work
incentives. But some of these apparent reductions in generosity are illusory.
In Finland, social assistance can be used to "top-up" incomes below the
social assistance level, and, while unemployment insurance has been
reduced, social assistance has not. There was a large rise in the number of
social assistance recipients (from 165,000 households in 1989 to 333,000 in
1994). Although higher levels of unemployment amongst those not eligible
for insurance benefits and increased take-up as a result of greater
awareness of social assistance contributed to this increase, the "top-up" of
the insurance benefit was the main cause. In 1989, 18 percent of social
assistance recipients were also receiving unemployment payments. By
1994, the proportion had risen to 52 percent. Benefit reforms nmst take
account of these kinds of system-wide interdependencies.
Other out-of-work benefits and unernployment benefits
In many OECD countries more people of working age receive
benefits which do not require any job search than are supported by
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unemployment benefits or active labour market programmes. Recipients of
invalidity benefits outnumbered the registered unemployed in 1990 in 12 of
the 23 OECD countries for which data 18 are available. Their nmnber has
been growing rapidly, increasing by over 50 per cent since 1980 in Greece,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Blondal
and Pearson, 1995). Along with early retirement schemes, invalidity
benefits remove a substantial part of the working-age population from the
labour force.
If invalidity benefits were restricted to those incapable of work,
there would be few grounds for concern. However, there is evidence that
invalidity and other out-of-work benefits substitute for unemployment
benefits. These benefits are usually unlimited in duration, do not require
evidence of job search and are often at a higher level than unemployment
benefits. Blondal and Pearson (1995) compare gross invalidity, sickness
and early retirement benefits with the index of uneulployment benefit
entitlements shown in Figure 3.1. Under similar assumptions about earnings
before receiving benefit, they found replacement rates for the partially
disabled were usually much higher than for the unemployed, and for those
fully disabled were on average 25 percentage points higher. A range of
early-retirement benefits was found to have even higher replacement rates,
especially where the beneficiary had been in employment for a long period
before benefit receipt.
From the individual perspective, it is better to receive one of these
benefits rather than unemployment benefit. Governments reap the political
gain from lower headline unemployment rates and employers may find it
easier to reduce their work forces if those losing their jobs receive relatively
generous benefits.. Medical requirements for invalidity benefits, either as
explicit government policy or by default, appear not to have been rigidly
enforced in Austria, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom.
Some early retirement schemes allow individuals to retire on
actuarially reduced pensions, giving individuals control over their own
~z Austria, Finhmd, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.
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labour supply. More controversial are schemes explicitly designed to
remove from the labour force those who might otherwise be unemployed.
They may reduce measured unemployment temporarily, but do nothing
about the number of families relying on benefits.19
Incorne support for lone parents raises similar issues. In some
countries, lone parents are not required to look for work until their
youngest child reaches a certain age (16 in Australia and the United
Kingdom).
Incomes and expenses in and out of work
Sometimes benefits in-kind supplement cash transfers and help may
be restricted to those in receipt of benefits (Table 3.2).20 The most
substantial of these payments is probably Medicaid in the United States,
which covers health care costs for some low-income groups. Since 1991,
more has been spent on Medicaid for the 12.1 million recipients of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) ($21.9bn in 1991), than was
spent on AFDC cash benefits themselves ($20.9bn) (US House of
Representatives, 1994a). Medicaid is received until AFDC entitlement is
exhausted. In order to reduce the disincentive to work which this rule
implies, Medicaid entitlement is kept for 9 to 15 months after losing AFDC.
Ireland has introduced a similar scheme whereby the long-term unemployed
continue to receive health-care cover for three years after taking a new job.
A recent reform of non-cash benefits in New Zealand increased the
qualifying income for a Community Services card by 7.7 per cent, thereby
extending benefits to more low-income working families and smoothing the
transition from unemployment to work.
There are also increased costs for those in work, including
commuting expenses, special clothing and tools, trade union dues and child
’9 See Blondal and Pearson (1995) for an econometric examination of the effects of non-
employment benefits on unemployment, employment and labour force participation
rates.
An Irish study suggests that the value of the non-cash benefits (medicard, butter,
footwear and fuel) is nearly IR£12 per week for a couple with two children. This is
10 percent of the cash assistance the family can receive (Ireland, Department of
Enterprise and Employment, 1996).
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care.2~ Fourteen OECD countries report deductions for work-related
expenses in the personal income tax (OECD, 1995c) at the earnings of the
average production worker, although they vary enormously in value.22
Although the cost of providing such deductions is difficult to assess, tax
expenditure accounts give an indication. Ill France, for example, identifiable
revenues forgone for work-related expenses in 1992 include contributions
to trades unions (FF 190m), child-care costs (FF Ibn for the purchase of
such care; providers also receive concessions on the social contributions
they are required to make): food vouchers or work canteens (FF 650m):
holiday vouchers (FF 25m): and transport costs (FF 255m) (France,
Ministbre des Finances, 1993).
As these data on revenues forgone indicate, child-care costs are
often the most substantial in-work expense. They are commonly identified
as a barrier to taking employment, especially for lone-parent fanailies or
when one partner is already working. Public policies to provide access to
affordable child-care facilities are diverse, such as day-care facilities
subsidised by central or local government, with only nominal charges to
users.
Other countries, including Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, New
Zealand and Norway allow some or all of expenses on formal child care to
be deducted from personal income tax liabilities.23 Although
administratively straightforward, these deductions may be worth more to
people paying higher tax rates, and nothing for those earning below the tax
threshold. They have little effect on replacement rates of the low paid.
2t Garman et al. (1992) found that two-thirds of the unemployed in the United Kingdom
reported average travel-to-work costs of nearly 7 percent of earnings. Of the
unemployed moving into a job, 18 per cent reported increased expenses, mainly one-
off, "back-to-work" costs, such as tools or clothing.
22 The largest deduction is in Norway (nearly 14 per cent of APW earnings). Generally,
deductions are 3-7 per cent of APW earnings (OECD, 1995c).
z~ For example, in Canada these are limited to two-thirds of earnings and C$5,000 for
children under 7 and C$3,000 for children aged 7 to 14 (1994 figures). In the United
Kingdom, employer-provided child care has not been taxed as a benefit-in-kind since
1990.
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Table 3.3 underlines the fact that child-care costs can be a serious
barrier to work. Columns 2 and 5 show the gain in net income a one-earner
couple receives from working compared with being unemployed (it reflects
the fi~t-month unemployment assumption of Table 3.1, including all
benefits). At both APW and two-thirds of APW earnings, there is a clear
financial gain from working in all the countries included in the table.
Columns 3 and 6 show the gain in net income if the child-care costs of
column I are taken into account (it is assumed that child care is purchased
only when employed). Work no longer brings significant financial reward:
on the contrary, in some of the cases in Table 3.3, the family would be
better off remaining on benefit than working. Columns 4 and 7 show that
special provisions in tax and benefit systems can substantially reduce the
barriers to work from child-care costs.
Such barriers will be particularly important where informal
arrangements for child care are unavailable, in particular for lone-parent
families and families where both earners wish to work.24 Australia has
increased the level of support for child care through subsidising provision
and through cash rebates and benefits. In the United Kingdom, up to £40
per week of child-care costs are disregarded when determining benefit
receipt. It is estimated that 40,000 extra lone-parents will work as a result
of this change in the rules (Duncan et al., 1994).
Policy responses to promote employment
Cutting replacement rates. General reductions in replacement rates
have been rare and most reforms have been targeted. Denmark in 1994 and
1995 restricted the maximum amount of social assistance compared with
lost earnings25 and the period over which high levels of social assistance
can be received. Maximum rates of housing benefit in the United Kingdom
~’ These family types were not included in Table 3.3 in order to retain comparability
with the single-earner family cases discussed in more detail in Table 3.1. However, the
size of the barriers to work caused by child-care costs are similar to those indicated in
Table 3.3.
The rule pre-exists 1994, but it was possible to receive more than 90 per cent if total
income was less than 80 per cent of the maximum unemployment benefit.
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will be reduced.26 In addition, some countries have up-rated their benefits
or the minima and mm, dma in the insurance benefits in line with price
inflation rather than earnings. This led to a slight increase in replacement
rates around 1992-1993, as real earnings fell. Over a longer period of time,
however, this has more often led to a reduction in replacement rates (e.g.,
in the United Kingdom). Young people have been the focus of a general
trend, with removal of rights to benefit for 16- to 17-year-olds in Canada
and New Zealand, restrictions on the amount of benefit paid to young
people in The Netherlands and the duration of benefits for young people in
Denmark.27
Reinforcing the insurance principle. Canada is considering a
reform which would reduce entitlements to those who repeatedly become
unemployed. Austria may experience-rate employers’ social security
contributions to reflect the numbers they lay off. Other countries are
reducing entitlements to unemployment insurance benefits (Belgium and
Norway have reformed unemployment insurance for part-time work; longer
contribution periods before receipt of unemployment insurance benefits are
now required in Spain and Sweden). In Finland, access to the basic
unemployment insurance for those without work experience was restricted
in 1994, with a new means-tested benefit introduced for those who no
longer qualify. In The Netherlands, access to wage-related benefit has been
tightened.
Encouraging job search. Belgium has tightened the administration
of the requirement to search for work. As a result 35,000 people lost their
unemployment insurance entitlements in 1993. A similar tightening has
recently taken place in Denmark and the United Kingdom. In The
Netherlands, 90,000 recipients of unemployment insurance were
"sanctioned" in 1993 compared with around 40,000 in 1990. In 1996, more
detailed proof of job-search activity was required to gain access to the
z~ Maximum rents covered by housing benefit for new claimants will be restricted to the
average for the type of accommodation and area.
27 An exception to the trend is Belgium, where benefit receipt has been extended to 18-
21 year olds.
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means-tested benefit in The Netherlands. Job-search requirements were
tightened in Spain in 1992.
hnproving access to child care. Some countries with relatively poor
records in providing child care have recently focused more attention on this
area. In Australia, child-care costs are refunded in part according to
parental income, suppliers are subsidised and a third of remaining
expenditures is granted a cash rebate. Some families pay as little as A$19
for a full week of child care (12 percent of the cost of provision).
Government expenditures on child care now amount to A$1bn (12 per cent
of expenditure on unemployment benefits). The United Kingdom increased
the earnings which are disregarded for expenditure on child care and has
started a programme giving vouchers to parents of young children which
can be used to purchase nursery school places.
h~creasing in-work incomes. Tax reductions for those on low
incomes can increase net incomes in work, although the effect on
replacement rates depends on the tax treatment of benefits and the
financing of the tax reduction. An area of tax and benefit policy which has
received much more attention is the payment of benefits or income tax
credits on condition that the recipient is in employment. But they raise
another labour market problem, that of high marginal effective tax rates,
which is considered next.
3.4 The Poverty Trap and High Marginal Effective Tar Rates
If benefits were withdrawn as soon as earnings rose above zero,
there would be a severe disincentive to work. Hence, countries withdraw
benefits gradually as earnings rise. The rate at which benefits are
withdrawn and taxes and social security contributions are increased as
earnings rise is the marginal effective tax rate (METR). People facing very
high METRs have very little financial reward for increased work hours and
effort, and lose very little if they work less.
Table 3.4 shows that many examples of high METRs arise from
policy towards families (as in Australia, Germany, Ireland, the United
Kingdom and the United States). Child tax-allowances and universal child
benefits are paid in most OECD countries but the budgetary cost means
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that they are usually not very high. In those countries where unemployment
benefit levels are low, such payments are insufficient to prevent child
poverty, and as a result additional child payments are sometimes made to
families receiving benefits.
To avoid the sudden loss of family income on entering employment,
two policies have been followed. In some countries - Australia, Germany
and New Zealand - the family payment is withdrawn gradually as income
rises (although the means tests for family payments were eliminated in
Germany in 1996). In Ireland and the United Kingdom, a separate benefit is
paid to families in employment, which again is withdrawn as incomes
increase. In each case, the withdrawal of the benefit leads to high METRs.
High METRs are more general, both in these and other countries.
Payments which are means-tested on family income are often redtlced by
the amount of all other income, i.e., the METR is 100percent. The
numbers of benefit recipients who have exhausted their unemployment
insurance benefits or have never contributed to unemployment insurance
schemes have risen, leading to greater reliance on means-tested benefits.
Some of the more dramatic increases are noted in Table 3.5. In addition,
most special benefits for lone parents are means tested.
High METRs and the labour market
Most labour market decisions are not marginal in the sense of
working only a few more hours, or trying to earn a slightly higher wage.
Instead they consist of large, discrete changes in status, for example, from
not working to working full-time. Where high METRs exist for only a
short range of earnings, they are unlikely to distort labour market
behaviour. But there are cases where high METRs do matter. Where the
marginal rates are high over a relatively wide range of earnings they
indicate a breaking of the link between effort and reward which reduces
work incentives.2s
z~ Means tests can have effects outside the labour market as well. Assets can be held in
such a way as to ensure that incomes are minimised, so avoiding the means test.
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The poverty trap
The most common source of high METRs is the receipt of benefits
which are reduced as family income rises. Small changes in work effort may
bring little or no increases in net family income, and sometimes even reduce
it. As benefits which are reduced in this way are often "last resort" benefits,
such as social assistance, the effect is to create a "poverty trap". Part-time
or low-paid work for those in receipt of such benefits may bring no reward.
A study of AFDC recipients in the United States concluded that, after
taking account of work expenses, METRs can be more than 100 per cent,
with "pernicious" effects (Giannarelli and Steuerle, 1994).
A second problem the interaction between people’s work incentives
and the labour market position of other members of their family. The
earnings of one spouse reduce the benefit entitlement of the other. This has
long been recognised as a problem in countries with extensive means
testing, such as Australia and the United Kingdom (Scherer, 1978).
Disincentives in the benefit system are not the sole cause of the strong
correlation between spouses’ employment. Spouses usually have similar
educational profiles and, of course, are usually searching for jobs in the
same local labour market. However, econometric analyses in Germany, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom,29 controlling for characteristics
which might explain wives’ participation rates, suggest that the shortfall in
employment rates of women married to unemployed men cannot always be
explained by these factors alone.
If earnings’ potential is low, more than one wage may be necessary
to lift families off benefit income. But the structure of the benefit system
may mean that, if one member of a household is unemployed, other
members may have little incentive to work. To get out of this trap, both
members of a couple must find a job simultaneously. Hence, poorly
:9 For Germany, see Giannelli and Micklewright (1995); for The Netherlands, see
Kersten et ol. (1993); and for the United Kingdom, see Kell and Wright (1990) and
Daviesetal. (1992). However, a recent Australian study (BradburyetaL, 1995)
suggests that all the differences in employment rates of married women can be
explained by differences in background characteristics.
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designed means-tested benefits run the risk of polarising the population into
so-called "work-rich" and "work-poor" households.
Recent reforuls in Australia have addressed this problem by giving
each partner in a household where neither panner has a high level of
earnings an individual benefit entitlement and reducing the METR below
100 per cent.3° Tile Australian White Paper (1994, p. 187) put it thus: "The
major rationale for moving towards individual entitlement is that it would
encourage greater and more effective job search by both partners of a
married couple. This would respond to the fact that many of the job
opportunities are more likely to be gained by women than men given the
increase in part-time work and the greater increase in jobs in traditionally
female areas of the labour force." Similar effects can be achieved by
employment-conditional benefits paid to those with low incomes.
Increasingly, recipients of Family Credit in the United Kingdom are not the
unemployed finding low-paid jobs, but spouses in two-earner couples when
one partner loses a job (Marsh and McKay, 1993).
Employment-conditional benefits and tax" credits
These benefits are designed to shift the balance between incomes in
and out of work to encourage labour force participation. By phasing out
the benefit as earnings rise, resources are wholly targeted on low-paid
workers. This is difficult to achieve with other policy instruments such as
changing the structure of income tax or social security contributions. This
phasing out means higher METRs reach further up the earnings’ scale,
reducing work incentives for those already in work. Table 3.6 gives a brief
description of the main examples of such benefits in OECD countries.
In the United States, the value of the EITC (Earned Income Tax
Credit) increases as gross earnings rise, reaches a plateau at the naaximum
credit and is then phased out at higher earnings. Around 3.5 million families
will lie in the phase-in range when the extensions of the credit envisaged in
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1993, are fully implemented. The
mean marginal rate from the federal income tax and social security
~* Individual income testing cannot in itself promote participation in part-time work by
the wives of unemployed men unless means tests are structured to permit this, as in
Australia (Heady and Smyth. 1989: Moylan et al., 1984).
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contributions will be minus 21.3 per cent (i.e., a credit). For the 2.5 million
families on the plateau, the marginal rate is unchanged (averaging
17 percent), but marginal rates for 9.8 million families in the phase-out
region are increased to around 44 per cent (Holtzblatt et al., 1994). Many
more families face higher marginal rates than lower as a result of the EITC.
This creates an incentive for workers to reduce their hours of work.
However, by increasing net income in work at all levels of earnings up to
the end of the phase-out, the effect on the incentive to take a job is
unambiguously positive. Canada introduced a more modest tax credit for
working families with children as part of a more general refon’n of child
support in 1993.
The Irish employment-conditional benefit, Fanaily Income
Supplement (FIS), in contrast to the American one, tends to be received by
those in the middle of the income distribution. As a poverty-prevention
measure, it is less well targeted. Because of this, FIS raises METRs
substantially. Its interaction with income tax and social security
contributions allows METRs to exceed 100percent. But FIS also
enhances the incentive to take a job. Microsimulations which assume full
take-up of FIS, suggest that replacement rates are reduced substantially (by
over 10 percentage points) for 8,200 families; 6,400 see a reduction of 5 to
10 percentage points and 11,900 see a smaller reduction compared with a
system without this benefit.3~
The employment-conditional benefit in the United Kingdom
requires claimants to work 16 hours or more, while social assistance is
restricted to those working fewer than 16 hours. The net cost of Family
Credit, taking account of reduced receipt of other benefits, is two-thirds of
the gross expenditure shown in Table 3.6. The effect of Family Credit on
incentives follows the pattern in Ireland and the United States. METRs are
increased for four-fifths of the 0.5 million recipients to 70 per cent or more.
Replacement rates are reduced for nearly all recipients. However, about
250,000 two earner couples who together earn just too much to be eligible
for Family Credit have a reduced incentive to work. If one of them were to
~’ Results provided to the Secretariat by The Economic and Social Research Institute,
Dublin. See OECD (forthcoming) for a discussion of the microsimulation models.
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leave their job, the family would be entitled to Family Credit and net family
income would be little reduced. Incentives for those out of work to take a
low-paid job are increased.
Employment-conditional credits and benefits (and indeed all benefits
paid to those in work) involve a trade-off between increasing the incentive
for people to take a low-paid job and encouraging those in work to reduce
their hours of work. Evaluating this trade-off is an empirical question.
Simulations by Scholz (1996) suggest that the increase in employment as a
result of the EITC in 1996 will be around 350,000. The proportion of lone
parents working will increase by 6.6 percentage points (see also Dickert,
et al., 1995). A smaller, 0.4 percentage point, rise is predicted for married
couples, since one partner in most couples already works. For secondary
earners, a small reduction in participation results because their additional
earnings often take a family into the phase-out range, thus reducing the
credit received. Scholz also estimates the reduction in hours among those
working in response to the higher METR. With an assumption about the
hours of those encouraged to take jobs, he estimates that the negative
effect on current workers offsets around one-third of the effect of increased
participation. On balance, the EITC increases aggregate hours worked (by
around 90 million hours in aggregate).
Policy reforms are often discussed on the basis of their aggregate
effects. If the hours worked by those entering employment as a result of a
policy reform exceed the reduction in hours worked by those already in
employment, a policy reform is judged to be a good one. The above
discussion suggests that existing employment-conditional benefits and tax
credits probably would pass a criterion of success defined on this basis, but
only just. However, using aggregate hours as a way of determining policy
desirability implies that the distribution of hours worked is of no interest.
For both social and labour market reasons, it may be desirable to introduce
reforms which promote employment of those who would otherwise be
excluded from the labour market, even if the net effect is to reduce total
labour supply. On this latter basis, it is rather clearer that such policies can
be desirable.
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There are grounds for believing that employment-conditional
benefits have had positive effects in the countries where they already exist.
Whether this means that they can be introduced in other countries with
equal success is far less clear. To be worthwhile, the benefit must raise in-
work incomes for low-wage families significantly above out-of-work
incomes. But on grounds of cost and because of the effects of high
METRs on work incentives, the benefit must be fully withdrawn from
earnings which are received by the bulk of the working population. These
constraints suggest that employment-conditional benefits will be most
successful in countries where benefits are low relative to average earnings
and/or the earnings’ distribution is wide. Finally, the design of the
employment-conditional payment is crucial to the success or otherwise of
the policy (Box 2).
MAKING WORK PAY 57
Box 2
The design of employment-conditional tax credits and benefits
Transparency: The impact of employment-conditional benefits depends on
workers correctly perceiving the change to their net income received at a particular
level of earnings. In the United States, fewer than I per cent of recipients use the
advance paymeut option enabling their employers to pay the credit through the year.
The credit is therefore mainly received as a tax refund after the year end. Although this
occurs in part due to ignorance of the option, in many cases people were unwilling to
ask their employer for a regular payment or were concerned that they mighl have to re-
pay the credit at the year-end if their circumstances changed (US General Accounting
Office, 1992). Given the marginal rate structure resulting from the credit, tluctuating
income and non-cumulative withholding of income tax, the fear of over-payment is
justified (AIstott, 1994, 1995; Holt, 1992). Over half of EITC (Earned Income Tax
Credit) recipients also rely on professional assistance in preparing their income tax
returns, so may not understand the relationship between their work effort and net
incomes (Olson and Davis, 1994). The new Independent Family "Fax Credit in New
Zealand will either be received fonnightly with Family Support or paid at the end of the
year as a lump-sum tax credit. The link between the end-of-year credits in these
schemes and v, ork,, experience during the year is not likely to be clear. In contrast,
payments made through the benefit system may be more transparent although there may
be a trade-off with benefit take-up (Whitehouse, 1996).
Take-up: If people do not claim their in-work benefit entitlement, due to stigma,
costs of claiming or ignorance, then again the beneficial effect on incentives is lost.
Assessment for taxation is automatic and private compared with claiming means-tested
benefits. In the United States, a taxpayer will be informed by the Internal Revenue
Service if they have filed a return appearing to be eligible for the EITC but have not
claimed it. Empirical studies tend to show EITC take-up of over 80 per cent (Scholz,
1990, 1994). The figures for means-tested benefits are much lower: for food stamps, the
rate is 59 per cent (US House of Representatives, 1993). Similarly, Family Credit and
Family Income Supplement suffer from less than full take-up. The take-up rate is
around 25 per cent in Ireland (Callan et al., 1995). In the United Kingdom, it has risen
from a little over 50 per cent when Family Credit was introduced in 1988 to over
70 per cent now by case-load and over 80 per cent by expenditure,j2
Non-compliance: Take-up of the EITC exceeds the number of families eligible.
The IRS (Internal Revenue Service) conducted a study of 1,000 EITC claimants who
filed electronically in a two-week period in January. (These taxpayers may not be
typical, because the majority file paper returns and the filing season extends into April.)
The study found that the total credit paid out exceeded entitlements by 26 per cent. The
study did not take account of IRS enforcement work or recent modifications to the
J2 The source for these figures is private correspondence with the United Kingdom
authorities.
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EITC. If these changes are included, the rate of over-claim falls to 19"per cent. It has
been suggested that the EITC is vulnerable to deception (Steuerle, 1993; Yin and
Forman, 1993). The benefit means-testing process is often more rigorous than a tax
audit. A problem with Family Credit is that once a claim is settled, the resulting
entitlement is paid for six months regardless of fluctuations in income. The initial
assessment covers earnings over a period of six weeks. This opens the scheme to
deliberate manipulation of earnings to ensure eligibility, with no reassessment for six
months. There is no evidence on the degree of manipulation, but estimates suggest that
half of recipients would not be eligible given their current inconle (Fry and Stark
1993).
Assessment of entitlement: Tax and benefit systems operate very different sets ol
rules about the unit of assessment (individual or family), period of assessment (weekly,
monthly, annual), the definition of income and the treatment of wealth. Using the
family as the unit of assessment targets help towards those with high replacement rates.
Under an individual system, women married to relatively well-off men, for example,
would be eligible, although they face few work disincentives from the tax and benefit
system. Hence, most of these schemes are focused on families with children. In the
majority of OECD countries, individual assessment of income tax and the fact that tax
authorities do not collect information on children would preclude use of the tax system
to implement an employment-conditional payment. The definition of income for tax
purposes is often less comprehensive than the one used in assessing benefits. The EITC
is assessed against gross earnings and "adjusted gross income" (taxable income), which
excludes certain income sources which are exempt from income tax (such as a portion
of social security and interest from municipal bonds). According to the United States
General Accounting Office (1995). including all social security benefits, tax-exempt
interest and non-taxable pensions in the measure of income used to determine EITC
eligibility would save almost 6 percent of total expenditure. But it would add
significantly to the burden of administering the income tax (see also O’Neil and
Nelsestuen (1994)). From 1996, taxpayers will be ineligible for the EITC if income
from interest, dividends, rents and royalties exceeds $2.350, excluding around
3 per cent of EITC recipients. The US General Accounting Office (1995) concluded that
operating a weahh test in the EITC would be-’impractical’". In contrast, means-tested
benefit systems can successfully operate assets tests (including Family Credit in the
United Kingdom and AFDC in the United States).
In-work benefits and wages: If gross wages are relatively sensitive to changes in
taxation, wage rates will fall in response to employment-conditional benefits. The
benefit will in effect act as a wage subsidy. If wages adjust fully, then net incomes in
work are unchanged, and no labour supply response can be expected. Due to the shift in
labour costs, a demand-side response may occur, however. There is no empirical
evidence of whether this is the case. Attitudinal evidence in the United Kingdom
suggests that employers are insufficiently aware of the structure of Family Credit for it
to have a direct effect on the setting of wages or hours of work (Callender et al., 1994).
There may, however, be an unconscious response to increased labour supply at tow
wages.
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Tar and benefit systems and part-time work
Policy towards pan-time work oscillates between two competing
views: first, that part-time work is desirable because it keeps benefit
recipients in touch with the labour market; and second, that support for
part-time work may reduce labour supply by making part-time work more
attractive relative to full-time work. Increasingly, policies have been aimed
at reducing disincentives to working part time. For example, those
currently receiving the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion in France face a
withdrawal rate of 50 per cent of earnings. Employers’ social contributions
are also reduced by 30 per cent for some categories of part-time workers.
In Gemaany, an unemployed person (who was fonnerly in full-time
employment) is allowed to work up to 18 hours per week with hall: of his
pay deducted from benefits. Subject to certain limits, half of all earnings of
the unemployed in the United Kingdom are paid as a re-employment bonus
when they find a full-time job. Ireland has a part-time job incentive scheme
paid to those receiving the long-term rate of unemployment assistance who
work for less than 24 hours a week. The first $90 per month is disregarded
from AFDC benefits in the United States, with a further $175 per month
available for child-care expenses.
In many cases, special rules allowing part-time work to be
combined with benefits are limited to those who were previously
unemployed. Australia has gone further and allows those who were
working full-time and whose hours have been sufficiently reduced to be
entitled to means-tested benefit (although benefit entitlement remains
conditional on availability for full-time work if it is offered). About
15 per cent of Australian unemployment benefit recipients work part time.
Table 3.7 illustrates the effects of the various disregards and special
schemes that apply to part-time work. It is assumed that an unemployed
person with a family and two children works two days a week, earning
two-fifths of the APW level of earnings (other assumptions are as in Table
3.1).
The first year of unemployment in Ireland, in Norway when social
assistance is received, and in the United Kingdom when less than 16 hours
are worked, all follow the "traditional" social assistance model. Apart from
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(small) earnings disregards, there is no immediate financial incentive to
work part time.33 In other cases, the features of the benefit system
mentioned above have an impact. Hence, the incentive to work part-time is
sometirnes significant, for example, in Australia. But the trade-off is
apparent: the higher is the incentive to work part-time, the less attractive is
full-time work.
The effective administration of job-search tests is important when
there is an incentive to work part time. The experiences of Belgium and
Norway illustrate the problems caused by increasing the attraction of part-
time relative to full-time work. Both employers and employees altered their
behaviour to take advantage of the possibility of working part-time while
claiming benefit. The result was "a costly growth in the incidence of part-
time work among people who would otherwise be working full-time"
(OECD, 1994b). Both countries have since attempted to reduce such
unintended use of the benefit system. New Zealand has recently
experienced rapid growth in part-time and seasonal employment.
Administrative measures and an extension of the waiting period for re-
qualification for benefits are being used to prevent inappropriate
combinations of these work patterns with benefit receipt. In the United
Kingdom, Family Credit is paid to those who work at least 16 hours. A
supplement has recently been introduced for those working 30 hours to
provide an incentive to move beyond part-time work.
One partial response to the dilemma of wanting to prot-note part-
time work without unnecessarily discouraging full-time work is to
recognise that for some groups, such as lone parents, part-time work may
be a more realistic option than full-time work. Benefit systems could be
adjusted so that benefit reduction rates for these groups are lowered,
increasing the incentive to take part-time work, albeit at the cost of making
full-time work less attractive (Duncan and Giles, 1996). Similarly, METRs
for the long-term unemployed on the first segment of earnings could be
~J This is so unless part-time work is not declared to the authorities. Thus, when means
tests are reduced, it is not possible to measure the extent to which any declared increase
in pata-time work is a genuine increase or simply increased reporting.
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reduced to encourage them to maintain contact with the labour market
even where it is not possible to lift someone fully off benefit.
Policy responses to reduce high METRs and tackle the poverty trap
Earning while receiving benefits. Some countries have increased
the amount which can be earned before means-tested benefits are reduced
or otherwise altered the benefit system to permit a modest amount of part-
time work. These earnings disregards provide an incentive for those on
social assistance to maintain a link with the labour market. Such reforms
have taken place in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Benefits specifically for those in
part-time work have been introduced in Ireland. However, Belgium and
Norway have restricted the extent to which part-time work and benefits can
be combined, in order to curb abuses. Italy provides direct subsidies to
employers and reductions in employers’ social security contributions, and
France has recently extended its contributions exemption for part-time
work. Spain reduces employer contributions for some categories of part-
time work.
Reducing the prevalence of high METRs. Taxes on low earnings
have been reduced in several countries (Denmark, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom), but budgetary constraints limit the possibilities of extending this
and many other policies. Benefit reduction rates for older workers have
been cut sharply in Japan. The current reform in New Zealand will lower
the reduction rate from 70 to 30 per cent over a NZ$ 100 earnings range for
lone parents and invalidity benefit recipients.
Ensuring women married to unemployed men have an incentive to
work. Australia has reduced very high METRs by individualising the benefit
system. Some incentive to work is retained by the spouses of the
unemployed, even where they are in receipt of means-tested benefits. A
similar effect is achieved through employment-conditional benefits, as in
Ireland and the United Kingdom, which reduce the incentive for both
spouses to leave employment when one becomes unemployed.
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3.5 Conclusions
If work does not pay, people will be reluctant to work. For the
majority of the population in the OECD area, there are clear, immediate,
financial incentives to work. But such incentives may be lacking for many
people with low potential wages, particularly if they have children. Some
will work in spite of this, because work experience improves long-run job
prospects or for other reasons. Nevertheless, for these groups, social and
labour market goals may clash. Benefits need to be high enough to ensure
income is adequate, but this may mean that taking a job brings little or no
extra income, trapping families in a cycle of dependency.
Two problems caused by tax and benefit systems were considered:
the "unemployment trap" - when benefits are high compared with expected
in-work incomes when working - and the "poverty trap", where low-wage
workers have little immediate financial incentive to increase their hours
worked or move up the wage ladder is blunted.
Tax and benefit systems are pu~uing multiple objectives, including,
inter alia, raising revenue: insuring against labour-market risk: supporting
families without resources: and trying to preserve incentives to work. It is
inevitable that not all of these goals can be achieved simultaneously. But
this paper has identified avoidable barriers to employment caused by
administrative complexities, poor integration of the various parts of the tax
and benefit systems and badly designed means tests. It has also indicated
several policy areas where policies will increase employment opportunities
for the most disadvantaged, but reduce work incentives for the majority.
The social and labour market consequences of permanently excluding a
significant minority of the population from the world of work are apparent
in too many OECD countries for such policies to be spurned.
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Figure 3.1: Index of Benefit Entitlements", 1961-1995~ (Percentages)
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Figure3.3: Distribution of Work Incentives." Replacement Rates
Unemployed
16O
8O
6O
40
20
0
i i.iiiiiiiiiilii iiiiiil
0-20 21~40 41-60 61-80 81-100 t01-120 >120
71
of the
100
6O ...............................
Y_
4O
0
0-20       21-40      41-60      61-6O      81-1C~     101-120      >120
[D Italy [] NewZealand [] Norway[] Sweden [] UnitedKingdom [] UniledStates ]
L J
Note." Replacement rates are individualised.
Source: National microsimulation models (see text).
72 INCOME SUPPORT AND WORK INCENTIVES
Figure 3.4:
25
2O
15
10
==
5
0
-5
-10
-15
Which Family Types Face Strong Disincentives? Over- or Under-
representation Compared to the Average of the CountrT, of Family
Types Facing Replacement Rates of more than 80 %
Single Lone parent      Couple no children Couple with children
Family Types
Denmark I-’l Germany [] Italy ~ NewZealand J
25
20
15
10
c
5
0
-5
-10
-15
Single           Lone parent     Couple no children Couple with chileren
Family Types
[~ Belgium JJ~ Canada [] ,relend [] Norvray [] Sweden [] United Kingdom J
t
Note: Replacement rates are individualised.
Source: National microsimula’:on models (see text).
Table 3.1 : Replacement Rates~ for Single-earner Households, 1994
Panel A: Replacement Rates at the A P W Level of Earnings
Replacement Rates in First Month of Unenlployment:
No Social Assistance
60th Month of Unemploynlent:
Includht~ Social Assistance
Gross Replacement Net Replacement Rates Gross Replacement Net Replacement
Rates (before tCLr) (after tax attd other benefits) Rates (before tax) Rates (after mx and
other benefits)
(I)     (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Single Couple, No Couple. No Couple, 2 Couple. 2 Children, Couple, No Children Couple, 2 Children,
Children Children Children Housin$ Benefits Housin~ Benefits
Australiab,c.d 22 40 49 64 71 40 71
Belgium ,16 46 64 66 66 42 70
Canada 55 55 63 67 67 0 47
Demnarke 60 60 69 73 83 60 83
Finland 53 53 63 75 88 25 98
France 57 57 69 71 80 36 65
Germany 37 42 60 71 78 37 7 I
Irelandc 23 37 49 64 64 37 64
Italy 30 30 37 47 47 0 I I
Japanc 37 37 43 42 42 0 68
The Netherlands 70 70 77 77 84 0 80
New Zealandc.d 21 35 39 55 63 35 63
Norway 62 62 67 73 73 0 83
Spain 70 70 75 75 7,1 0 46
Swedenb.e 80 80 81 84 89 0 99b
Switzerland 70 70 77 89 89 0 71
United Kingdomc 16 26 35 51 77 25 77
United States 50 50 60 68 68 0 17
Mean 48 51 60 67 72 19 66
(unwei~hted)f --..a
Table 3. I: -..a4~Replacement Ratesa for Single-earner Households, 1994 (cont.)
Panel B: Replacement Rates at Two-thirds of the APW Level of Earnings
Replacement Rates in First Month of Unemployment:
No Social Assistance
60th Month of Unemployment."
Includin~ Social Assistance
Gross Replacement Net Replacement Rates Gross Replacement Net Replacement
Rates (after tax and other benefits) Rates (pre-tax) Rates (after tax and
(before tar) other benefits)
(I)     (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Single Couple, No Couple, No Couple, 2 Couple, 2 Children. Couple, No Children Couple, 2 Children,
ChiMren ChiMren ChiMren Housin~ Benefits Housin~ Benefits
Australiab,c.d 34 61 66 76 78 61 78
Belgium 60 60 75 76 76 55 9 I
Canada 55 55 64 67 67 0 61
Denmarke 86 86 92 93 95 86 95
Finland 60 60 67 83 89 37 1100
France 65 65 79 81 88 54 83
Germany 40 44 60 70 77 39 80
Irelandc 35 66 67 70 70 66 70
Italy 30 30 36 45 45 0 14
Japanc 43 43 49 48 48 0 86
The Netherlands 70 70 79 78 84 0 95
New ZealandC.d 31 52 57 69 78 52 78
Norway 62 62 66 75 75 0 I O0
Spain 70 70 74 78 77 0 66
Swedenb,e 80 80 82 85 89 0 121 b
Switzerland 70 70 75 87 87 0 97
UKc 24 39 52 67 90 38 90
United Statesf 50 50 66 60 60 0 19
Mean 54 59 67 73 76 27 79
(unweighted)
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Table 3.2: T)Tical Extra Benefits Which Can Be Given to Those Receiving Social Assistance or Unentployment Benefits
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COUIIII’~jr
Australia
Canada
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Ireland
Japan
Luxembourg
New Zealand
Norway
Spain
Sweden
United
Kingdom
United States
Sonle of the Items Which Can Be Made Available to Those on Benefit Income
Health care card (reduced cost medicines). Public and private providers sometimes use the card as a passport for other
concessions of which reduced cost transport is the most important. School uniforms; books; help with utility payments are
given in some states. (Benefit recipients get these cards as of right; low-earning households can get them on application.)
Clothing, health premiums, prescriptions, dental, optical (varies by province), educational costs, rentoval cosls. For example,
Ontario pays a winter clothing allowance of $104. and a "back-to-school" allowance of $126. Six out of ten Provinces give
these benefits to those on low wages as well.
Medical expenses.
Various one-off payments. Health care costs sometimes covered.
Medical insurance, prescriptions, lower price public services.
Back-to-school allowance. Free school meals/transport. Fuel allowance. Medicard.
Exempted from inhabitants tax (local tax). Cheap rail travel.
Free transport. Medical insurance.
Health-care costs (including prescriptions). Available to all those with low incomes, not just benefit recipients.
Municipal services (child care, etc.) are often income related.
Health insurance.
Prescription costs, glasses, dental benefit.
If on income support: cold-weather payments; school meals; prescriptions; optical and dental benefit. Other people on low
incomes must apply for some of these payments.
Medical insurance (Medicaid).
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Sources: Eardley et aL(1996) and i nfornmtion provided by national authorities.
Table 3.3: Child-care Costs and Benefits: a Barrier to Work? Percentage Gain in Net Income from Work, for a One-
earner Couple with Two Children Taking Account of Child-care Costs and Benefits
Percentage Child-care Two-thirds of APW                                          APW
Gain ill Cost
htcome Asstttnpliotz
from Work
(I)        (2) (3)         (4) (5) (6) (7)
$ per week Ignoring After Child- After Child-care Ignoring Child- After Child-care After Child-care
Child-care care Costs for Costs and care Costs att(l Costs for Those Costs and
Costs and Those in Work Benefits for Benefits in Work Benefits for
Benefits Those in Work Those in Work
Australia 167 (max) 28 -27 -I 41 -25 -5 ~’3
75 28 -21 3 41 -19 0 :~
Canada 140 (max) 50 5 20 50 18 45 O
75 50 3 18 50 15 43
Finland (145) 15 -43 15 116 -32 16 "m
Japan (242) 108 50 108 138 92 I 15
United 60 (max) 27 -2 50 54 27 30 "<
Kingdom 75 27 - I 0 45 54 21 24
Notes: In columns (2) and (5), child-care costs and benefits are ignored. In Colun’tns (3), (4), (6) and (7), it is assumed that when in work the
costs in colunm (I) must be incurred. When unemployed the family is assumed not to use child-care facilities (see text for a discussion of
the treatment of child-care for the unemployed). The table gives the percentage increase in net income compared with that which would
be received when in the first n’~onth of unemploymenl. In Australia. Canada and the United Kingdom, two cases are included in the table.
The maximum level of child-care costs which will qualify for help may be above typical child-care costs, so the effects of having costs of
$75 per week are illustrated. The gains in net income are calculated for a one-earner couple with two children (except in the United
Kingdom, where the benefit provision applies only to lone parents). The pattern of incentives for other family types closely follows that
in the table: the case of a one-earner couple is included as this family type is discussed in more detail in Table 3. h For detailed country
i’~otes on Finland and Japan see OECD (1996), Table 2.3.
Sottrce: OECD Database on taxation and benefit entitlements.
Table 3.4: Incidence and Causes of High Marginal Effective Tar Rates Caused by Cumulative Benefit Receipt (One-
earner Couples)
MUIR Region where Tax and Benefit Combinations Causing High METRs
MUIR applies (% {’3of APW earnings) O
% % E
Australia 90 38 - 62 Income tax (20%), Parenting allowance (70%).
t¢)
38 62 - 78 Income tax (34%), low-income rebate withdrawal (4%).
104 78 - 84 Income tax (34%); Medicare payments (20%); Additional family payment (50%).
85 84 -100 Income tax (34%); Additional Family Payment (50%); Medicare levy (I .45%). O
78 57 - 91 RMI disregard (50%), social security (18.7%), CSG (2.3%), Housing Benefit (16.5% average).
89 72- 82 Milderungszone (phase out of income-tax free zone (this has now been abolished)): income tax
(51%), social security (I 8.3%), housing benefit (20%).
105.5 62 - 76 Social Security (5.5%), Income tax (40%), Family Income Supplement (60%).
72 147 -160 Income Tax (20%), social security contributions(2%), local tax (31%), Housing Benefit (20%). :~
O97 46 - 65 Income Tax (20%), social security(10%), Family Credit (70%), Housing Benefit (65%) Council
Tax Benefit (20%).
80.5 65 - 77 Income Tax (25%), social security(10%), Family Credit (70%).
72.0 62- 71 Social Security (7.65%), Income Tax (15%), Local Tax (5%), Food Stamps (24%), Earned
t’rlIncome Tax Credit (17.68% for family with two children). Z
France
Germany
Ireland
Sweden
United
Kingdom
United
States
Note: 1994 systems except for Australia and the United Kingdom (I 995). Fantily Credit is only revised every 6 months, so the long-term METR
given in the table for the United Kingdom may be substantially higher than that faced in the short term. Fewer than half of Ireland’s
Family Income Supplement recipients are on earnings’ levels that are exposed to the METR indicated. The benefit level, once set, is not
revised downwards for 12 months even if income increases in the meantime. The long-term rate presented in the Table is substantially
higher than that faced in the short term. Figures for individual taxes and benefits do not sum to the overall METR in France and the
United Kingdom because benefits are withdrawn against net rather than gross income. The 38 per cent rate for Australia is included to
give a more complete impression of Australian METRs.
Source: OECD database on benefit entitlements.
Table 3.5: Growth in Receipt of Means-tested Benefits(1980=lO0)
1980 1985 1990 1992
Austria (Unemployment Assistance) I00
Belgium (Minimex) I00a
Canada (Social Assistance) I00a
Finland (Social Assistance) (Number of Persons) I00
France (RMI)
Germany (Sozialhilfe) 1130
Germany (Unemployment Assistance) I00
The Netherlands (RWW - Unemployment Assistance) I00
Spain (Assistance Benefit) I00
Sweden (Social Assistance) (Number of Persons) I00
United Kingdom (Income Support, Excluding Disabled or Over Age 60) 100
United States (Food Stamps) 100
1,233 1.067 967
174b 195 252c ~,
144 144 228c
143 187 343c
1(30 155d C3
156 219 276
549 355 0
378 319 300
r 1
562 581 687e "o
156 150 208 ~"
,-<
238b 178 247
104 104 139d
Notes: Number ofhouseholds except whe~ noted otherwise. The French RMI wasintroduced in 1989. Figures for
supplementao, benefitin 1980 and 1986.
a. 1981
b. 1986
c. 1994
d. 1993
e. t991
Source: Eardley etal.(1996).
the United Kingdom are fol
Table 3.6: Employment-conditional Tax Credits and Benefits o
Canada Ireland Ital),
Name Child tax Family Income Family benefits
benefit Supplement for employeesa
Cost C$250m [R£21.3m LIT 5763bn
=$200m =$33.9m = $3.76bn
0.7m I 1,000Number of
recipients
Average receipt C$357 IR£1.925
=$3,075
Responsible Tax Social welfare Social security
department administration
Maximum benefit C$500pa b Lit 2.76m pa
Minimum earnings C$3.750 none d
Phase in rate 8% none none
Earnings when C$20,921 immediately Lit 15.984m
phasing out begins
Withdrawal rate I0% of gross 60% of gross I0% of gross
income income income
Minimum hours no limit 20 (19 hours no limitf
worked from July 1996)
hours
Family type Families with Families with Families
children childreng receiving
unemployment
benefit
New Zealand United Kingdom    United States
Independent Family credit Earned income tax
Family Tax Credit credit
(to be introduced)
NZ$2 IOta £1.1bn $26.7bn
=$1.7bn
150.000 0.5 In 19m
NZ$ 27            £2,400
=$3 800 $1,450
Tax administration Social security Tax administration
NZ$15pw per £67.80pwc $2.152/3,556/323 pz
child
18% between
NZ$20.000 and
NZ.$27,000, 30%
abovee
none $0
none 34140/7.65%
£73pw $ I 1,61 O/I 1,610/5,28
0 pa
70% of net 16.0/2 I. I/7.7% of
income gross income
16 hours, no limit
Supplement for
30 hours or more.
Families with First figure is for I
children, child families. 2rid
Pilot scheme for for 2 or more
childless, children, 3rd for no
children.

Table 3.7: The Incentive to Work Part-time for an Unemployed Person with Two Children
Benefit Percentage of Net Income in Full-tinte Work
0
Fulh, Unemployed Part-time Worker Earning 40 per
cent of Full-time Weekly Wa~es
Australia Job-search Allowance 71 86
Denmark UI 83 88
Germany Arbeitslosengeld (UI) 78 92
Ireland UI/UA 64 64
UA/Part-lime Job Incentive 64 84
The Netherlands UI 84 91
SA with disregard 80 91
SA without disregard 80 82
Norway UI 73 84
Social Assistance 83 84
Spain UI 74 85
UK Income Support (less than 16 hours work) 74 78
Family Credit (more than 16 hours work) 74 79
O
O
,-’-I
Note: Incomes are expressed as percentages of net incomes in full-time work at APW wages. Figures are for a couple with 2 children. An
earnings disregard of 15 per cent of benefit is applied for a maximum of 2 years in The Netherlands. Thereafter, there is no earnings
disregard.
Source: OECD database on taxation and benefit entitlements.
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INCOME SUPPORTS IN IRELAND AND THE UK
Tim Callan and Holly Sutherland
4.1 Introduction~
How have the Irish and UK tax and benefit systems evolved over
recent years? How do benefit rates and direct taxation levels compare at
present? And to what extent have differing policy developments
contributed to differences in key outcomes in terms of labour market
performance and poverty rates? These are the questions we raise and
explore in this paper. We do not claim to have comprehensive answers, but
our analysis does provide some new insights into these issues.
The recent Jobs Study (OECD, 1995) suggests that the cross-
country relationship between unemployment benefits and the level of
unemployment is a complex one. On a sirnple cross-sectional basis some
countries with relatively high levels of benefit, may have low levels of
unemployment. This may reflect, inter alia, elements of reverse causality -
high benefits can be afforded if unemployment is relatively low, but not if
unemployment is widespread. But the OECD analysis suggests that, taking
data on benefit entitlements and unemployment rates for 14 countries over
a number of years, a rise in benefit levels tended to increase measured
unemployment some years later.
If a relationship of this type holds, the trade-off between generosity
of benefits and the level of unemployment becomes crucial.2 A cut in
i POLIMOD uses data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) which are Crown
Copyright. They have been made available by the Office for National Statistics (ONS)
through the ESRC Data Archive and are used by permission. Neither the ONS nor the
ESRC Data Archive bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data
reported here.
2 There are, of course, other issues of relevance in the setting of benefit rates -
particularly if they are designed as general income supports, not only for the unemployed
but also for pensioners, lone parents etc. as in the UK.
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benefits may boost employment, but lead to a fall in the living standards of
those who remain unemployed. A rise in benefits may boost the living
standards of those who are unemployed, but lead to the loss of jobs for
some of those currently employed. A comparison between Ireland and the
UK over the 1978 to 1994 period is of particular interest in this context, as
the relative generosity of income maintenance payments changed
considerably over that period.
A comparison with the UK is of further interest in Ireland because
migration and return migration flows mean that UK tax, welfare and labour
market developments have a strong impact on the Irish labour market.
Despite this, comparative analysis of the tax/transfer systems has been
somewhat neglected. Individual aspects have been highlighted front time to
time, such as the lower threshold at which Irish workers - particularly
single people or dual-earner couples - pay the top rate of tax; and
differences in the structure of social insurance contributions, especially
those affecting low wage industries. But a broader comparison of the Irish
and UK tax/transfer systems has not yet been undertaken:3 this paper
represents a step in that direction.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 4.2 gives a
brief overview of policy developments in the two jurisdictions from the end
of the 1970s until the mid-1990s. This simply sets out the evolution of
social welfare rates, income tax rates and thresholds, and the rates and
limits applying to social insurance contributions. While this description
helps to summarise what has happened over a 16 year period, it cannot take
account of the diversity of the populations to which these rules apply.
Section 4.3 deals with this issue, summarising the results of some
microsimulation analyses which compare the 1994/5 tax and transfer
systems in the two countries. A direct simulation of the UK system on the
Irish model, or vice versa, is not possible. But each country’s system can be
compared with a simple common standard: a basic income paid to all at a
fixed proportion of average income, and financed by a flat rate tax on all
3 A helpful description of the income tax and social welfare systems in Ireland and the
UK was set out by the National Social Services Board (1995a and b).
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other income. This indirect comparison gives some interesting insights into
the nature of the current system, which do not depend on assessments of
the merits of the basic income scheme itself. In Section 4.4, we sketch out
alternative views of the outcomes which could be expected from these
different policy developments, and compare them with the actual outcomes.
Section 4.5 draws together our conclusions and sorne suggestions for
further work.
4.2 Comparing Policy Developments
In our analysis we take the policies prevailing in the year 1978/79 as
a starting point. In the UK, 1979 marked the advent of a new Prime
Minister, Mrs Thatcher, who was to serve in office for more than 10 years,
and a period of Conservative government which continues to the time of
writing. Ireland saw several changes of government during this period, but
1979 was, none the less, a significant turning point. It marked the end of
the rapid fiscal expansion of the 1977-79 period, and the beginning of a
long period in which the public finances were dominated by the overhang of
debt and deficit from that period. We focus on changes in tax rates and
income supports from that time to the year 1994 - at present, the latest year
for which any outcomes in terms of poverty rates are available. Policy
changes for an intemlediate year, 1987, for which these outcomes can also
be measured are also presented.
Table 4.1 presents the basic data on the income tax systems in the
two jurisdictions. It could be argued that the tax systems in 1978/79 were
quite similar in structure: personal allowances represented similar
proportions of average earnings, joint taxation applied to husbands and
wives, with some special provisions for the earnings of a married woman,
standard tax rates of 33 per cent and 35 per cent were quite close, and
while higher rates applied at lower thresholds in Ireland, the top tax rate
was somewhat lower in Ireland than in the UK. During the 1980s, each
system was simplified down to two or three marginal rates, with top rates
of tax being cut, and the standard rate band being widened. But by
1994/95, it is differences rather than simil~u-ities which are more striking in
comparing the systems. The standard tax rates are still rather similar (25
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per cent in the UK, 27 per cent in Ireland) but basic personal allowances in
Ireland are very much lower than their UK counterparts - except for one-
earner couples. Top rate tax thresholds are very much lower in Ireland than
in the UK - even for one-earner couples - and the top rate of tax is
significantly higher (at 48 per cent as against 40 per cent).
Table 4. I : Income TcLr Systems in Ireland and the
1994/95
Income tcL~" parameters 1978/79
UK, 1978/79, 1987/88 and
1987/88 1994/95
UK (UK£ p.a.)
Single person’s allowance (SPA) 985 2425 3445
One-earner couple allowance SPA+550 SPA+1370 SPA+ 1720"
Reduced rate 25% 20%
Standard rate 33% 27% 25%
First higher rate 40% 40%
Top rate 83% 60% 40%
Thresholds (taxable income p.a.)
Standard rate 750 0 3,000
First higher rate 8,000 17,900 23,700
Top rate 24,000 41,200 23,700
Ireland (IR£ p.a.)
Single person’s allowance 865 2,000 2,350
One earner couple allowance +865 +2,000 +2,350
Reduced rate 20
Standard rate 35% 35% 27%
First higher rate 45% 48%
Top rate 60% 58% 48%
Thresholds (ta.rable income p.a.)
Standard rate 1,500 0
First higher rate (single/married) 4,500
Top rate (single/married)
0
4,700/
9,400
7,000 7,500/ 8,200/
15,000 16,400
a. The Irish pound was linked at parity to the pound sterling in 1978/79, and had an
average value of UK£0.91 during 1987; and £0.98 during 1994. Purchasing power parity
adjusted exchange rates were IR£1=UK£0.7741 in 1987, and IR£1=UK£0.9665 in 1994.
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Much of the difference between the two systems arises from the
different tax treatments of couples. While the starting point -joint taxation,
with some rather small provisions for married women’s earnings - was
similar, the two systems have diverged during the 1980s. The Irish system
changed from joint taxation to "income splitting" in 1980, under which the
tax liability of a couple is determined by treating each spouse as having half
of their joint income, and taxing them as single individuals.4 The UK
structure changed more recently, culminating in 1990 with a more
independent treatment of the tax liabilities of husbands and wives. The
impact of these different structures is dramatically illustrated by the fact
that the income threshold at which a single person faces the top tax rates is
less than £12,000 in Ireland, but more than £27,000 in the UK; while for a
one-earner couple the gap is much smaller, with the figures being about
£22,000 in Ireland and £29,000 in the UK.
Some other developments show more similar trends in the two
countries e.g., the restriction of mortgage interest relief, through
standardisation of the allowances in both jurisdictions; restriction of the
relief to a proportion of the interest in Ireland; and non-indexation of
capital limits on the amount of the loan qualifying for relief in the UK.
We now turn to the transfer system, focusing on cash transfers. Our
focus is further restricted by the exclusion of housing-related income
supports. Ideally, all forms of income support, including those related to
housing, would be included. But the complex and changing nature of
housing-related support in the two countries means that this task is outside
the scope of the present paper. In the UK, housing benefit is a major
element of income support, with close to 5 million recipients (about two-
thirds of whom are also in receipt of Income Support, the UK safety net
scheme) and an average payment close to UK£40 per week. In Ireland, the
numbers receiving rent and mortgage supplements under the
Supplementary Welfare Allowance have grown rapidly, but from a very
low base. By 1994, about 3 per cent of households were in receipt of a rent
There are additional allowances for employees (the PAYE allowance and, until
recently, the PRSI allowance) which are not transferable between husband and wife.
5 The calculations assume standard personal allowances for employees.
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Table 4.2:
INCOME SUPPORT AND WORK INCENTIVES
Sofety Net Income Support Rates° as a Percentage of A verctge
. . . b
Weekly Earnings m Manufacturing , 1978/79, 1987/88 and
1994/95
1978/79 1987/88 1994/95
UK: Supplementary Benefit~Income Support
Adult (Maximum rate) 24.0 20.4 14.5
Adult (Minimum rate) 15.5 12.8 I 1.4
Couple (Maximum rate) 38.0 32.6 22.7
Couple (Minimum rate) 31.6 26.0 22.7
Child Rates
Maximum rate 15.5 12.8 II .4
Minimum rate 5.5 5.5 4.9
Fomily Rates:
couple phts 3 children aged 4, 8 and 12
Maximum 60. I 51.8 43.0
Minimum 53.6 45.2 43.0
Ireland: Unemployment Assistance/Supplementary Welfare Allowance
Adult (Maximum rate) 17.8 20. I 24. I
Adult (Minimum rate) 17.2 18. I 23.3
Couple (Maximum rate) 30.7 34.6 38.6
Couple (Minimum rate) 29.8 31.3 37.8
Child Rates’:
Maximum rate 6.5 7.0 7.5
Minimum rate 5.8 5.8 7.0
Family Rates:
couple plus 3 children aged 4, 8 and 12
Maximum 49.8 54.8 59.7
Minimum 48.9 50.4 58.9
tVotes: a. In the UK, maximum rates are for householder and/or long-term recipients minimum
rates for non-householder and/or short-tenn. In Ireland, maximum rates are for long-term
urban rate of Unemployment Assistance: minimum rates are Ibr Supplementary Welfare
Allowance.
b. In order to take account of differences in hours distributions, average earnings figures
are calculated on the basis of a 40 hour work-week at average hourly earnings - for all
workers in Ireland. where part-time work is relatively uncommon; and for full-lime workers
in the UK. Thus. weekly earnings figures were (Ireland in IR£, UK in UK£) IR£66.16 and
UK£74.60 in 1978, IR£187.60 and UK£189.64 in 1987. and IR£252.80 and UK£304.40 in
1994.
c. Child benefit counts as means under the UK system, but represents an additional support
to Irish welfare recipients with children. Thus, the child rales quoted Ibr Ireland include
child benefit in order to maintain comparability.
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or mortgage supplement - a much lower proportion than in the UK. But a
great deal of housing support in Ireland is still provided through local
authority housing, including the income-related differential rent schemes
operated by the various local authorities.
Differences in the systems of housing-related support (and indeed,
of other in-kind transfers6) are possibly of more importance in relation to
incentives than to income support as such. Both the UK Housing Benefit
and the Irish rent and mortgage supplements seek to ensure that a family’s
resources after housing costs are similar to the resources of a family on the
safety net scheme (Income Support in the UK, Supplementary Welfare
Allowance in Ireland). This means that rates of benefit for the safety-net
schernes are of the most fundamental importance, and it is to these that we
now turn.
In 1979, the maximum rates under the UK safety net scheme (for
householders who were in receipt of long-term rates) were well above the
corresponding maxima under the Irish scheme. The rninimum adult rates
were rather closer, but rates for children were higher in the UK. A three
child family on the Irish safety net scheme would have received just under
half the average wage in manufacturing; but would have received between
about 5 and 10 percentage points rnore in the UK. By 1994/95, these
positions had been reversed. Payments under the UK safety scheme had
fallen to 43 per cent of the average wage, while payments under the Irish
safety net scheme had risen to ah’nost 60 per cent of the average wage.
Thus, measured against average wages, payment rates had fallen by
between 10 and 17 percentage points in the UK, and risen by about l0
percentage points in Ireland - a "swing" in the relative positions of between
20 and 27 percentage points.
6 For example, the universal nature of the National Health Service in the UK can be
seen as neutral with respect to an individual’s employment status, whereas u move from
being out-of-work to in-work can lead to loss of a medical c~lrd in Ireland.
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Table 4.3:
INCOME SUPPORT AND WORK INCENTIVES
Means-Tested Pension Supports as a Percentage of Average
Weekly Earnings in Manufacturing, 1978/79, 1987/88 and
1994/95
1978/79 1987/88 1994,/95
UK: Supplementary Benefit~Income Support with Elderly Premia
Adult 24.0 20.4 20.1
Couple 38.0 32.6 31.3
Ireland: Old Age Non-Contributory Pension
Adult 20.6 25.1 24. I
Couple 30.8 37.7 38.6
A similar "swing" is evident in the levels of support provided
through means-tested schemes for the elderly. UK rates were initially
higher, at around 24 per cent of average earnings for a single adult, and 38
per cent for a couple, these rates fell to about 20 per cent and 31 per cent
respectively. Rates in Ireland followed the reverse course, almost precisely,
rising by almost 8 percentage points for a couple and 4 percentage points
for a single adult, to reach levels very similar to the initial UK rates.
While the examples given in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are somewhat
limited, they show up clearly the impact of policy developments which had
a wider relevance. One key factor in determining these trends was the
change in UK policy in the early 1980s, moving away from uprating of
benefits in line with earnings - a statutory link in the case of pensions, and
an informal one in the case of some other benefits - towards uprating of
benefits in line with prices (Hills, 1995). While price-linking of benefits
maintained their value in real terms, it resulted in a substantial deterioration
in the relative position of the population dependent on benefits, as other
incomes grew substantially in real terms.
On the Irish side, real increases in state pension payments -
sometimes ahead of other incomes, as well as prices - were a feature of the
1970s and the flu’st half of the 1980s. Following the report of the
Commission on Social Welfare (1985), the focus shifted to those on the
lowest rates of social welfare - including Supplementary Welfare and
Unemployment Assistance. Pension rates were increased at, or just slightly
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ahead of price inflation, while the lower rates were increased more rapidly,
until they converged with the means-tested pension.
Rates of benefit are, of course, only a part of the story. The
incomes provided to the actual population of unemployed persons depend
also on the conditions attached to insurance and means-tested benefits,
which have changed significantly in each jurisdiction. Earnings- or pay-
related unemployment benefits have been restricted and ultimately
abolished in each country. In the UK, Atkinson and Micklewright (1989)
have catalogued no fewer than 38 changes in the structure of the benefit
system affecting unemployed people during the 1979 to 1988 period. The
broad thrust of these measures has been to restrict the role of insurance
benefits for the unemployed - through tightening of contribution conditions,
extension of the disqualification period and a range of other measures.
While means-tested income supports therefore became more important to
the unemployed, other policy changes tended to reduce the generosity of
these supports in a number of respects.
4.3 A Snapshot Comparison: 1994
Comparisons between countries based on a small number of benefit
rates are, of course, rather limited. As earlier papers have pointed out, a
small number of hypothetical households cannot adequately represent the
diversity of the actual household population in terms of characteristics
relevant to taxes and benefits. Microsimulation models, based on large
scale national surveys, can be used to get over these problems in
comparative work as well as in national policy analysis. But even for
systems with a common basic structure, such as the Irish and UK systems,
direct comparisons using microsimulation models can be difficult.
Differences in policy structures and data sources make it difficult, if not
impossible, to undertake modelling of the effect of country A’s system on
the country B population - unless, as in the current Europe-wide project
(EUROMOD, on which see Callan and Sutherland, 1997), such
comparisons are at the heart of the model design process.
Even where direct comparisons are not possible, however, we can
gain insights into the differences between systems by comparing each with
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a common benchmark. A simple basic income system, designed to provide
a benefit set equal to a common proportion of average income in each
country, is particularly suitable for this role. An extensive analysis along
these lines was undertaken in Callan, O’Donoghue, Sutherland and Wilson
(1996). In this section, we draw on these results to give some further
insights into the differences between the Irish and UK tax/transfer systems
as of 1994. The analysis is undertaken using microsimulation models of the
tax and benefit systems in each country: POLIMOD for the UK (Redmond,
Sutherland and Wilson, 1996) and SWITCH (Callan, O’Donoghue and
O’Neill, 1996) for Ireland, each based on nationally representative survey
data which takes account of the wide diversity of household types and
situations. Average income per adult equivalent, using a simple common
equivalence scale,7 was calculated using the household survey data on
which these models area based (FES for the UK, and the ESRI 1987
survey, uprated to 1994, for Ireland).
The actual tax and benefit systems in each country are compared
with a simple basic income system, at a common proportion of average
income per adult equivalent, and financed on a revenue-neutral basis by a
simple flat rate tax. A key factor in this comparison is the tax rate required
to finance the scheme. This can be seen as depending on two main factors:
the level of the basic income payment - or in this instance, the proportion of
average income the basic income is designed to deliver; and the net revenue
required from the tax and transfer system to finance other elements of
public expenditure. While social security spending is a somewhat higher
proportion of GNP in Ireland than in the UK - reflecting differences in the
relative size of the client populations as well as differences in relative
benefit rates - the net revenue gathered by each tax-transfer system was
rather similar in 1994, at between 8 and 9 per cent of GNP.
7 The scale is I for the first adult in the tax unit, 0.64 for an additional adult, and 0.38
for each child - an approximation to the McClenlents scale used in the UK CSO’s
Households Below Average Income, but averaged over age-differeutiated scales for
childreu.
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Table 4.4: Selected Benefit Rates. UK attd Ireland, 1994
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UK UK rate in IR£ Ireland
"Safety net "’ for those U K£ 1R£ 1R£
aged:
18-24 36.20 37.46 58.90
25-64 45.70 47.28 58.90
65-74 63.95 66.17 61.00
Social Insurance benefits
Unemployment Benefit 45.45 47.03 61.00
Old age pension 57.60 59.60 71.00
Notes: A purchasing power parity adjusted exchange rate of IR£1=UK£0.9655 was used
in converting UK rates to Irish pound values. (Europeal~ Ec’onotny. November
1995). Average weekly earnings in manufacturing, as discussed in "Fable 4.2:
IR£252.80 in Ireland and UK£304.40 in the UK. Average incomes per adult
equivalent, IR£117.6 in Ireland and £171.2 in the UK. The greater disparity in
incomes per adult equivalent reflect lower participation rates and higher
dependency ratios in Ireland.
Table 4.4 illustrates some of the main income support rates in
Ireland and the UK, for both social insurance benefits and means-tested
benefits. It is clear that for all rates except means-tested support for the
elderly, the Irish rates in 1994 were higher than the corresponding UK rates
in real terms (i.e., adjusted for exchange rates using a purchasing power
parity standard). Irish rates were, afortiori, higher than UK rates in
relation to average income, and even the means-tested support for the
elderly was higher in relative temas in Ireland.
Table 4.5 puts these comparisons into a wider European Union
context, with rates for hypothetical recipients of payments under a number
of different schemes being shown in relation to average net earnings. These
results confima that Irish rates were typically higher than UK rates, but
show that both Irish and UK rates were in most instances well below the
average for EU countries. For example, the figures for Unemployment
Benefit refer to a man aged 40, who has been in regular employrnent at the
average wage since the age of 20. On becoming unemployed, his
entitlement to Unemployment Benefit is, on average, 60 per cent of average
net earnings across all EU countries; but for Ireland the figure is 35 per
cent, while for the UK the figure is 23 per cent. The trends noted in Section
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4.2 above can therefore be seen as having moved Irish rates of income
support closer to the EU average, with UK rates having declined and
diverged further from that average.
Table 4.5: Selected Benefit Rates as Percentage of Average Net Earnings: UK,
Ireland and EC A verase, 1992
UK        Ireland      EU Average
Unemployment Assistance
Unemployment Benefit
Short-term illness
Disabled
Lone parents
Child benefit (2 children)
Old age pension (soc. ins.)
Widow aged 30, 2 children
Widow aged 50, no children
23 35 42
23 35 61
28 32 69
32 35 50
38 44 40
9 4 12
44 42 75
53 58 64
31 36 55
Source: Social Protection in Europe 1993, Chapter 4.
The basis of the microsimulation calculations is set out in detail in
Callan et al. (1996). Here we focus on one variant of basic income (B1),
which can be thought of as a family basic income scheme. The payment rate
for a single adult is set at 40 per cent of average disposable income,
adjusted for family size. This amounts to UK£68.50 per week in the UK
and 1R£47.00 in Ireland. Under the family BI scheme, each adult in a
couple would receive 82 per cent of the amount paid to a single adult. This
would bring the rate for a couple to 1.64 times the rate for a single adult, in
line with the current rates of social welfare payments in each country,
which take account of the economies of scale in living together as a couple.
The flat tax rates required to finance these schemes are very similar in each
country, at around 49 per cent.8
An individualised BI scheme would require a flat tax rate about 5 percentage points
higher in each country.
Table 4.6:
Decile~
INCOME SUPPORTS IN IRELAND AND THE UK
Distributional hnpact of a Standardised Basic hlcome Scheme,
Ireland and UK. 1994
Percentage Gain~Loss in Average Disposable
h~corne under Family BI Scheme
UK                   IRE
95
Bonom 73.8 17.7
2 18.6 -9.7
3 12.5 -15.0
4 7.8 -8.7
5 6.0 -I.4
6 3.6 4.2
7 0.4 4.3
8 -3.2 -0.6
9 -5.9 0.5
Top - 10.5 0.4
All 0.0 0.0
Note: a. Ranked by disposable income per adult equivalent under existing policies,
from poorest to richest.
Table 4.6 summarises the impact of these BI schemes in each
country, showing the percentage gain or loss in average income for ten
equal sized income groups, from poorest to richest ("deciles"). There are,
of course, gains and losses within each income group but here we focus on
the gain or loss of the decile group. Under each scheme, there are
substantial gains for the bottom decile in each country,9 which includes
many individuals not currently receiving benefits or paying taxes, who
would gain from the payment of a basic income. But for the remaining 90
per cent of the population, the distributional impacts in Ireland and the UK
are very different. There are losses for the remainder of the bottom half of
the distribution in Ireland, whereas the average gain is positive for the
whole of the bottom half of the distribution in the UK. There are substantial
losses at the top of the distribution in the UK, but in Ireland gains and
9 The proportionate gains for the bottom decile are much greater in the UK than in
Ireland. reflecting the fact that most welfare recipients in these deciles gain in the UK,
but lose in Ireland.
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losses are quite evenly balanced towards the top of the distribution, with
net gains in the top two income groups.
Table 4.7 shows the impact classified by family type. It shows in
Ireland that the common basic income system would involve substantial
average losses for unemployed couples, with or without children, while
losses for single unemployed persons in receipt of full rates of benefit
would be offset by gains for those single unemployed persons currently
most affected by the provisions of the means tests. In the UK, by contrast,
a basic benefit at the same relative income standard would involve
substantial average gains for the unemployed. Pensioners would lose in
each country, but by rather more in Ireland (about 20 per cent) than in the
UK (about 10 per cent). The overall impact of the scheme on most families
in employment would be rather similar across the two countries.
Table 4.7: Distributional Impact of Family Basic Income by Family Type,
Ireland and UK, 1994
Family T),l~e UK IRE
Single employee
Employed lone parent
One-earner couple
One-earner couple with children
Two-earner couple
Two-earner couple with children
Single unemployed
Unemployed couple
Unemployed couple with children
Other lone parent
Single Pensioner
Pensioner Couple
% Gain~Loss in Disposable Income
3.8 3.3
0.5 7.3
-2.7 -2.6
6.2 7.3
-5.2 -4.0
2.8 2.7
53.5 1.5
I 1.7 -23.7
20.2 - 18.0
I 1.7 -9.6
-10.2 -23.3
-12.8 -21.2
Other (includes disabled) 6.0 - 18.9
These results can be read as giving us information on the nature of
the current systems in the two countries. The Irish system diverges from
the common basic income standard by proving more favourable to the
unemployed, and to pensioners. The UK system diverges from the common
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family BI by being more favourable to pensioners (though less so than in
Ireland) and by being less favourable to the unemployed.
4.4 Comparing Outcomes
The differences in the evolution of policy in Ireland and the UK
over this period can be seen as reflecting quite different choices as regards
the trade-offs between economic efficiency and social protection. In the
UK, the emphasis on improved work incentives and lower taxes was very
strong. In Ireland, while these considerations received some weight, real
improvements in social welfare rates for those initially receiving the lowest
rates of payment were a major feature of policy development. The outcome
in terms of measures of work incentives is dealt with in later chapters. But
it is of some interest to examine the overall labour market and distributional
outcomes associated with these different policy choices. While a detailed
decomposition of the effects of policy choices on these outcomes cannot be
expected, there are a number of features of interest in this comparison.
In considering these comparisons, it may be helpful to bear in mind
a "favourable" and "critical" interpretation of the impact of the relevant
policy changes in each country. Here, we present these alternatives rather
starkly. A favourable interpretation of the Thatcher years in the UK would
suggest that cuts in direct tax rates, together with restrictions on the
growth of welfare payment rates, helped to improve work incentives and
the operation of the labour market; and led ultimately to a higher growth in
employment and lower unemployment than would otherwise have
occurred. A critical interpretation would suggest that the main effects were
distributional, with cuts in income tax favouring those at the top of the
distribution, and those at the lower end of the scale becoming increasingly
marginalised.
A critical view of the Irish experience would suggest that increased
welfare payment rates limited the resources which could be applied to
reducing taxes on labour, and contributed to disimproved work incentives
and the maintenance of high unemployment. It would suggest that an
alternative involving lower welfare rates and lower income taxes could
have boosted employment growth. A favourable interpretation would stress
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that the evolution of policy struck a balance between providing improved
income supports for the unemployed while maintaining and in some cases
improving work incentives.
A full investigation of these issues would require a major research
effort. Here we simply present some simple measures of labour market
outcomes in the two countries, in the interests of stimulating debate and
further work on these issues. First, we look at what has happened to
unemployment rates in the two economies (Table 4.8). Unemployment
rates rose in the first sub-period (1979-87) and fell in the second (1987-94)
for both countries - unsurprisingly, given developments in the wider world
economy during these years. The gap between Irish and UK unemployment
is perhaps of more interest in the present context,t° This rose from 2~,h
percentage points in 1979 to about 6 percentage points in 1987, and fell
back to 4¾ percentage points in 1994.
Table 4.8." Unemplo),ment Rates, Ireland and UK, 1978. 1987 and 1994
1978     1987     1994
National definitions (LFS)
UK 4.6 10.4 9.2
Ireland 7. I 17.6 14.8
Standardised rates (ILO)
UK 5.0 10.9 9.6
Ireland n.a. 16.9 14.3
Source: OECD Historical Statistics 1960-1989 and 1960-1994 Tables 2.15 and
2.20. LFS=Labour Force Survey, ILO=lnternalional Labour Organisation.
Tax and transfer policies are, of course, only two elements feeding
into the micro- and macroeconomic forces determining the unemploylnent
rate. One cannot, therefore, attribute the entire rise in relative
unemployment rates to relative changes in taxes and transfers; nor can one
to A comparison ba~d purely on the standardised ILO definitions would be preferable,
but an ILO-based figure is not available for Ireland in 1979. While national definitions
(on a Labour Force Survey basis) can and do diverge over certain periods, this does not
seem to be a major problem for the particular years of interest here.
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be sure that other forces may have limited the extent of the relative rise in
Irish unemployment over the period.
Migration may be one force tending to limit the gap between Irish
and UK unemploynlent rates (see, for example, Walsh (1974), Honohan
(1992)). A rise in Irish unemployment relative to UK tmenaployment may
lead to net migration from Ireland to the UK, until unemployment rates
return towards an equilibrium relationship. Changes in the structure of
taxes and transfers may influence the size of the equilibrium gap between
unemployment rates, but may also have an impact on the size and structure
of migration flows (see Sexton et al. (1991)). Many other forces may of
course contribute to the extent and nature of migration - such as differences
in the growth of population and the potential labour force, and the state of
the economic cycle in the two economies - but some consideration must be
given to changes in migration over the period as well as to changes in
unemployment.
Even if we restrict our attention to the possible impact of
tax/transfer policy changes on migration, the potential outcomes are quite
complex. At least three possible channels can be identified. First, to the
extent that the UK’s greater emphasis on work incentives paid off in
greater employment creation than in Ireland, migration from Ireland to the
UK could have been stimulated by better prospects of obtaining a job.
Second, for those with options of employment in each country, tax cuts in
the UK may have made it a more attractive destination. But the rise in
welfare rates in Ireland relative to the UK may have lessened the stimulus
to emigrate for those seeking work, or induced a return to Ireland among
some Irish migrants who became unemployed in the UK. The impact on net
migration of even these three factors is unclear, but it does suggest shifts in
the composition of migration.
The 1970s saw a reversal of the usual migration balance, with net
inward migration of about I0,000 per annum. Net outward flows resumed
during the 1980s, accelerating from about 14,000 per annum during the
first 5 years to about 33,000 per annum during the latter half of the decade.
But in the first half of the 1990s, outflows have exceeded inflows by about
4,000 per annum. While the share of the UK in gross migratory outflows
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has declined (from over 80 per cent in the 1970s, to about half during the
1990s), net migration to the UK seems to have followed a similar pattern:
negative in the 1970s, as return migrants outnumbered new emigrants,
accelerating during the 1980s to substantial levels, and then declining to
approximate balance during the early 1990s.
It can certainly be argued that the divergences in tax and transfer
policy outlined in Section 2 contributed to the rise in Irish unemployment
relative to that in the UK, and to the resurgence of emigration during the
1980s. There are, however, other factors which must be taken into account
in assessing these outcomes. The unsustainable fiscal expansion in Ireland
during the 1970s makes the starting point for these comparisons somewhat
artificial. The fiscal expansion had a favourable, but temporary, influence
on employment growth; the debt overhang it left had a negative and
continuing impact on the labour market through its effects on the public
finances. But a comparison of gaps between unemployment rates over a
longer period still suggests an upward drift in the gap, to which structural
factors such as the relative shifts in taxes and transfers have contributed.
We now turn to the distributional outcomes, focusing on the out-
turn in terms of poverty rates, for reasons we now explain. Considerable
attention has been given to increases in the dispersion of earnings in the UK
(and indeed in the US). It could be argued, however, that some of this
increased dispersion in the distribution of earnings may arise from policies
which facilitate the growth of low wage employment, taken up by
individuals who might otherwise be unemployed. Alternative policies,
which provide greater income support for the unemployed, may crowd-out
some low wage employment, and result in higher numbers unemployed. An
assessment of outcomes in terms of income poverty takes account of both
the impact on unemployment, and the incomes of the unemployed and low
wage earners (including any support provided through in-work benefits,
such as Fanaily Credit and Family Income Supplement).
Table 4.9 shows the proportions of the population (at individual
level) falling below a selection of relative income poverty lines in both the
UK and Ireland. The equivalence scales and some of the technical
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procedures involved~ are somewhat different, but this is likely to affect
comparisons of levels, rather than of trends, which is the focus in the
present context. Poverty rates in the UK were, in 1979, substantially lower
than in Ireland at each of the relative income cut-offs (40, 50 and 60 per
cenl of average income). Bul by the early 1990s, poverty rates were very
similar. The UK saw a rise in rates of income poverty of between 7 and 9
percentage points more than the change in the Irish rates.
Table4.9: htcome Povert), in lreland and UK, 1979/80, 1987 and1992/94
Incame Standard:
Proportion of Average Income UK
1979 1987 1993/4
40 per cent 2 5 9
50 per cent 8 16 19
60 per cent 18 26 29
Ireland
1980 1987 1994
40 per cent 9 7 7
50 per cent 16 19 21
.60 per cent                          30           32          35
Notes." UK figures based on McClements cquivaleuce scale and income averaged
over persons. Irish figures based on a scale of I for first adult, 0.66 for other
adults, and 0.33 for children, iucomes averaged over households. For both
countries, resulls are calculated on incomes before housing costs.
Sources: UK: Department of Social Security (1992, 1993, 1994 and 1996) Table FI
Ireland: Callan, Nolan. Whelan, Whelan and Williams (1996).
As with the labour market outcomes, the question arises to what
extent these differences in outcomes can be attributed to the dramatic
policy differences, and to what extent they are caused by other factors.
There have been a number of investigations of the distributional impact of
policy changes in the UK (Jenkins, 1994; Johnson and Webb, 1992;
~t We rely here on published results. Both approaches begin by calculating income per
adult equivalenl at household level. The HBAI method (Department of Social Security,
1992: Households Below Averoge Income) then attributes that income to each person
(adull or child) in tbe bousebold, and averages over individuals. The Irish figures are
based instead on averaging equivalent income over households.
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Redmond and Sutherland, 1995), though poverty rates have not been a
specific focus. Hills (1995) summarises the results as indicating that taxes
and transfers failed to slow the growth of market inequalities. Discretionary
changes in taxes and transfers tended to increase inequality, offsetting the
automatic rise in the equalising effects of progressive systems as inequality
in market incomes grew. In the Irish context, similar investigations into the
impact of discretionary policy changes are currently under way, as part of a
programme of research commissioned by the Department of Social Welfare
and the Combat Poverty Agency. Given the importance of benefit incomes
to those in the lower reaches of the distribution, it seems likely that the
policy trends identified in Section 2 contributed substantially to the growth
in income poverty in the UK, relative to that in Ireland, but a cornparison of
analyses more directly focused on the issue of relative income poverty in
the two countries would be of great interest.
4.5 Conclusions
There have been quite dramatic shifts in the relative levels of
income support provided in Ireland and the UK over the past 20 years.
Changes in the basic safety net payment for a single adult serve to illustrate
this point. In 1978, a three child family on the Irish safety net scheme
would have received just under half the average wage in manufacturing; but
would have received between 5 and 10 percentage points more in the UK.
By 1994/95, payments under the UK safety scheme had fallen to 43 per
cent of the average wage, while payments under the Irish safety net scheme
had risen to almost 60 per cent of the average wage. Thus, measured as a
proportion of the average wage in each country, there was a "swing" in the
relative position of between 20 and 27 percentage points.
Comparisons based wholly on selected benefit rates could, of
course, be misleading. A microsimulation analysis of the 1994/5 position
was able to take into account the diversity of the household population and
much of the complexity of the tax and welfare codes in each country. This
analysis broadly confirmed the impression that, as regards cash benefits, the
Irish system has become more generous to welfare recipients than its UK
counterpart; a major caveat in this regard is that the relative roles of
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housing benefit or housing-related income supports was not taken into
account.
Some of the outcomes in tenns of work incentives will be explored
in later papers. Here we looked more directly at outcomes of interest, in
terms of the labour market and rates of income poverty. The gap between
Irish and UK unemployment rates has risen over the period. Net migration
to the UK rose to very substantial levels during the 1980s, though it has
fallen back to very low levels during the 1990s. At the same time, there
have been dramatic increases in income poverty in the UK, while Irish rates
have been constant or risen much more slowly. The links between the
relative policy trends and the relative performance in temls of labour
market and policy outcomes deserve further investigation. On the basis of
the evidence assembled here, it appears that the dramatic shifts in relative
policy have contributed to significant shifts in relative labour market
performance, and substantial changes in relative poverty rates. There is
undoubtedly scope for some Pareto improvement within each system -
improvements in incentives which do not damage the income support
provided to the least-well off. But identifying the nature of the trade-offs
between income support levels and employment is of vital importance in
the future development of policy. More detailed comparison of the
outcomes of very different policy choices made in the UK and Ireland can
make a contribution to this important work.
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Table A4. I : Some Background Information: UK and Ireland, 1994
UK h’eland
(I) PPP Exchange rate IR£1 = UK£0.9665
(2) GNP U K£601,414m IR£26,693m
(3) Average industrial wage UK£304 IR£263
(4) Social Security as % of I 1.0 14.7
GNP
(5) Income tax and social 19.8 22.8
insurance contributions as
% of GNP
(6) = Net Revenue as % of GNP 8.8 8. I
(4)-(5)
Chapter 5
MICROSIMULA TION ANALYSES OF TAXES, BENEFITS AND
FINANCIAL RETURNS TO EMPLO YMENT:
UNITED KINGDOM, 1993-94
Alan Duncan and Christopher Giles
5. I Introduction
This paper highlights the financial returns to employment for
employed and unwaged individuals in the UK. The aim of the paper is to
evaluate these returns and to compare them to Irish estimates calculated by
Callan (1995). It uses a range of summary measures of work incentives
based on a representative sample of the UK labour force. The estimates of
the financial returns to work have been calculated using TAXBEN, the
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) tax and Benefit model.
Similar calculations for the UK were originally undertaken as part
of the follow up to the OECD job study using the same data and a similar
tax and benefit model. The results in this paper differ from the OECD
results to the extent that the assumptions in this paper regarding earnings
levels in the UK have been matched as closely as possible to those used for
Ireland by Callan (1995).
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, we set out the
assumptions included in this paper. These include the measures of financial
returns from employment, our wage assumptions, excluded household
types and alternative treatments of housing costs. The section also includes
a brief description of TAXBEN. Section 5.3 describes the main parameters
of the 1993 UK tax and benefit system. The UK results and a comparison
with Ireland are presented in Section 5.4.
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5.2 The Calculation of Financial Returns to Employment
In this paper, we calculate the financial returns to enlployment using
two measures, the Average Tax Rate (ATR) and the Replacement Rate
(RR). Both measures compare the financial returns to employment with the
financial position of unwaged individuals. Hence they help to shed light on
the incentives in the tax and benefit system for individuals to take work.
The ATR measures the proportion of their gross wages that
employees lose in tax, social insurance contributions and reduced benefits
when they take employment. As different countries raise different
proportions of direct tax revenue formally incident on employers, the gross
wage includes employer taxes. This improves cross country comparisons.
Higher average tax rates indicate a higher proportion of any increase in
gross earnings is taken by the state. The definition of the ATR is as follows:
TR = I O0 * (1 - In work family net income - Out of work family net incomeA
L Gross labour costs
The replacement rate measures the out of work income as a
proportion of in work family income, to give an impression of the
proportionate gain of employment, relative to being unwaged. The higher
the replacement rates, the greater out of work income is relative to income
in work. The RR calculation used in this paper is shown below:
RR = Out of work family net income
h~ work family net income
Neither of these measures completely describes work incentives in
any country for which we would need econometric estimates of individual
preferences subject to full descriptions of budget constraints which
incorporate the tax and benefit system.
In particular, these measures of financial returns to employment do
not always accord with theoretical interpretations of the effect of taxes and
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Figure 5. I: htcentive Effect of Higher Wages
Income per week
£600
£5OO
£400
£300
£200
Interpretation: The theoretical incentive effect of a shift from budget constraint A to B
is ambiguous. The incentive effect as measured by the replacement rate
and/or average tax rate is positive.
Figure 5.2: Incentive Effect of Higher Income
Income per week
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£5OO
£400
£300
£200
£100
................... B .................
Interpretation: The theoretical incentive effect of a shift from budget constraint A to B
is negative. The incentive effecl as measured by the replacentent rate is
negative, but the average tax rate is unchanged.
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benefits on incentives. The potential problems are shown in Figures 5.1 and
5.2.
In both these figures, the line which includes letter A can be viewed
as the hours/income choice initially available to individuals, and the line
including letter B shows the choices available after a reform. Below the
figure, we list the changes in incentives according to standard economic
theory for an individual starting at point A, and the effects on replacement
rates and average tax rates.
Figure 5.1 shows the effect of an increase in the net wage at all
hours levels. If individuals start at point A, the theoretical effect on their
incentives are ambiguous. On the one hand, they would keep more income
from any additional hour of employment, which would imply greater labour
supply (the substitution effect). But on the oiher hand they need to work
fewer hours to gain the same level of income (the income effect). Which of
these effects dominates is ambiguous. However, neither replacement rates
nor average tax rates show ambiguous results, both measures fall indicating
a positive effect on work incentives. This unambiguously positive effect on
these measures from an increase in the net wage is only theoretically
supported for those not employed.
Figure 5.2 shows the effect of a universal increase in income on
incentives. It could be thought of as an increase in a universal benefit or an
increase in a partner’s income within a family unit. Theoretically a pure
income effect, this has an unambiguously negative effect on work
incentives because individuals can sustain the same living standard working
fewer hours. The replacement rate measure also shows an unambiguously
negative effect on financial returns to employrnent as the relative level of
the intercept income is higher. But average tax rates are unchanged and
therefore do not reflect theoretical interpretations of an income effect.
Care must therefore be taken in the interpretation of average tax
rates and replacement rates, as they sometimes show results that seem
perverse and contradictory. But though there are problems in
interpretation, nevertheless, average tax rates and replacement rates are
interesting summary measures of the financial returns to employment and,
used in conjunction with representative samples of the population, improve
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markedly on estimates of incentives based upon hypothetical or "average"
families.
Average tax rates and replacement rates are sensitive to the precise
definition of net income in work, for the unwaged and out of work income
for the waged. In this paper, we use only one "unemployment
counterfactual", because the out of work incomes in the UK vary little with
the length of time on benefits) For the "employment counterfactual" we
follow the OECD2 specification with two full-time employment job
scenarios. We used the median and tenth percentile earnings for full-time
men (over 30 hours a week) which were respectively £289 and £119 in
1994 prices. For the results, it can be assumed that these earnings levels are
at any hours level above 16 hours a week, the threshold for entitlement to
the UK Family Credit.
Using these counterfactuals, average tax rates and replacement
rates were calculated for all individuals in the 1993 Fanlily Expenditure
Survey who were in the potential labour force. Included individuals were
employees (using observed hours and wages) and unemployed and
unoccupied individuals. Retired, the self employed, the sick and those in
full time education were excluded.
As a default, the incentive measures were calculated gross of
housing costs and housing benefits. This measure includes all housing
related benefits in net income and does not deduct housing costs. The net
income level therefore represents the total family resources for all
expenditure items including housing. The second basis for comparison was
a net of housing costs measure. This deducts housing costs from the gross
of housing costs income measure. As the same amount is deducted in both
the waged and unwaged scenario, the net basis for housing costs has no
effect on average tax rates but reduces the level of replacement rates, as
out of work income is reduced. The final housing costs assumption was a
zero housing costs assumption, where average tax rates and replacement
rates were calculated abstracting from housing costs. Though this is an
The most significant difference being an increase in the mortgage payments available
after 16 week out of work.
2 OECD (forthcoming).
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inappropriate method of calculating returns to employment in the UK, it
can be a valid basis for international comparison where data in other
countries does not include sufficient housing cost information for valid
comparisons. In the OK benefit system, this reduces out of work incomes
as there are no housing related benefits. Consequently average tax rates and
replacement rates are lower under this measure than under the gross or net
of housing measures.
The IFS TAXBEN3 model was used to calculate the measures of
financial returns to employment. It is a static tax and benefit
microsimulation model based on the UK Family Expenditure Survey data
1978, 1984 through to 1994-95. TAXBEN can operate using any UK tax
and benefit system from 1978 to 1996 inclusive. In this exercise, 1993 data
and the 1993 tax system were used in order to overcome problems of
uprating the data or the tax system. The model estimates payments of taxes
(direct and indirect) social security contributions and receipt of means-
tested and non means-tested benefits. It achieves a high degree of accuracy
in estimating the aggregate receipt of direct tax revenues and payment of
the major UK benefits for the non-sick population (Income Support, the
retirement pension, child benefits and housing benefits). It is less accurate
in estimating payments of indirect taxes, receipt of more minor benefits and
benefits to the sick and disabled.
The income measure is current weekly income so that distinctions
can be drawn from income levels in different employment circumstances.
The incentive measures were calculated at the immediate family unit level,
which includes a couple or single adult plus any dependent children. In
these calculations we have assumed full take up of all means-tested benefit
entitlements.
5.3 UK Tax and Benefits System (1993)
The parameters of the UK tax and social security system can be
found in many relevant Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise and
Department of Social Security publications. The following is but a brief
3 See Giles and McCrae (1995) for more details.
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description of the parameters of the major direct taxes and benefits which
existed in the UK for those in the labour force in 1993. Since 1993, there
have been many minor changes to the system, but it remains essentially the
same in structure.
¯ The income tax system is based on individual income.
¯ The basic rate of Income Tax is 25 per cent. There is a higher rate of 40
per cent paid by fewer than 10 per cent of tax payers, and a lower
starting rate of 20 per cent for the first £2,500 of taxable income. Each
individual is entitled to a personal income tax allowance of £3,445 and
each married couple receives an additional allowance of £1,720.
¯ The main employee rate of National Insurance Contributions (NIC, the
UK social security contribution) is 9 per cent. This is payable on
earnings above the Lower Earnings Limit (£56 per week) up to the
Upper Earnings Limit (£420 per week). A lower rate of 2 per cent is
payable on earnings below the LEL. The main employer rate of NIC is
10.4 per cent payable on all earnings, with no ceiling on contributions.
There are lower rates of employer contributions for employees on low
earnings. Individuals can waive rights to certain social security
provisions in return for a rebate of NICs, which is paid into an approved
pension plan.
¯ The social security system includes non-means-tested benefits, (both
social insurance benefits and contingent benefits) and means-tested
benefits. The role of means-tested benefits has increased significantly
since the early 1980s.
¯ Child Benefit is a contingent benefit payable to mothers of children. In
1993 the rate was £10 per week for the first child and £8.10 for
subsequent children. It is not taxable. Unemployment benefit is a social
insurance benefit payable at a rate of £44.65 a week for the first year of
unemployment in 1993. It is contingent on past social insurance
contributions and is generally lower than the rates of means-tested
benefits for the unwaged.
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Income Support is the major means-tested benefit in the UK. It provides
a safety net level of income for those families with incomes below the
level. Most income (private and benefit such as Unenlployment Benefit
or Child Benefit) is taken into account in the income test, and Income
Support is withdrawn at a 100 per cent rate on this income. Income
Support entitlement ceases if one member of the family works more than
16 hours a week. The average level of Income Support payments in
1994 was £55.78 per week. The table below gives Income Support rates
for 1993, and the proportion of the total entitlement due to the presence
of children in a family.
Table 5.1 : Income Support Rates, 1993
Family type Income % of Payment
Support Generated
Rate by Children
£ %
Single Adult - Under 25 34.80
Over 25 44.00
Lone Parent ° I Child age 6 73.60 40
3 children aged 3, 8, I I 110.80 60
Couple Over 18 - No children 69.00
I child age 6 93.70 26
2 children aged 8. I I 115.85 40
3 children aged 3, 8, I I 130.9~ 47
¯ Family Credit is the principal "in-work" benefit in the UK. It provides
additional means-tested income for low income families with children
where at least one person works more than 16 hours a week. The main
adult credit in 1993 was £42.50 with additional child credits and the
effective tax rate on Family Credit is 70 per cent of net income. The
average Family Credit payment in 1993 was £45.97.
¯ Housing Benefit covers 100 per cent of rent payments for families on
Income Support, and up to 100 per cent of rent payments for other low
income families. Under the income test, the marginal withdrawal rate of
Housing Benefit is 65 per cent on net income (after deduction of taxes
and withdrawal of benefits such as Family Credit).
114 INCOME SUPPORT AND WORK INCENTIVES
¯ There is an additional benefit for help with the UK local tax, the Council
Tax. It provides means-tested help with Council Tax bills on the same
basis as Housing Benefit. The withdrawal rate on Council Tax Benefit is
20 per cent.
¯ Each of the means-tested benefits is subject to a capital test, as well as
the income test. Any assets (excluding the primary dwelling of a family)
greater than £3,000 will result in some reduction of benefit and if assets
exceed £8,000 families lose all benefit entitlement.
5.4 Results
5.4. 1 UK Results: Averuge Tax Rates
A summary of the UK ATR results are shown in the tables below.4
Table 5.2 shows a summary of average tax rates for employees, and the
unwaged (on both high and low wage assumptions). They are also split by
gender. It shows that nearly 40 per cent of employees face an ATR of
between 20 per cent and 40 per cent, with a further 30 per cent having
average tax rates between 40 per cent and 60 per cent. Average tax rates
for women employees are generally lower than those for men for two
reasons. First, women who are secondary earners have no out of work
benefit entitlements and therefore the only withdrawal they face from their
gross income are taxes and social security contributions. Second, part-time
women will face very low income tax bills as a result of the high UK
personal income tax allowance which creates substantial progressivity in
the UK income tax system.
Average tax rates for the unwaged using the median earnings
assumption are slightly higher than for employees, predominantly because
there was a greater proportion of individuals from families with high
average tax rates such as lone parents and married couples with children.
Amongst this group, women again face lower average tax rates on average
than men. Much of the reason for this is the composition of unwaged
4 The full list of tables is available from the authors on request.
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women. Those that are unemployed face higher average tax rates than
those otherwise unwaged as they often lived with an employed partner.
Table 5.2: Summary of Average Tax Rates in the UK
Employees Unwaged Unwaged
(median wages) (low wages)
All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women
Ncgativc 5 I 10 0 0 0 0 0 I
0>=20 9 2 17 0 0 0 22 9 28
20>=40 39 37 41 36 19 44 17 12 19
40>=60 30 40 19 34 47 27 22 30 18
60>=80 12 16 9 25 28 24 18 15 20
80>=100 4 4 3 5 6 4 19 31 13
100>=120 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I I
>120 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I 0
The low earnings results showed some interesting features
compared with the median earning results. There were more individuals
with average tax rates greater than 60 per cent using the low wage
assumption, which we would expect because earnings are lower and we
would expect proportionately more to be lost in benefit withdrawal. But
there were also more individuals with average tax rates lower than 20 per
cent than under the median wage assumption, particularly for women. This
occurs for individuals with no means-tested benefit entitlement, primarily
because their partner is unwaged. If someone has no means-tested benefit
entitlement, the higher wage assumption generates substantially more
income tax liability and hence a higher ATR. Care must be taken, therefore,
not to attribute this lower ATR to worse work incentives if wages are
increased for unwaged individuals.
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Table 5.3:
INCOME SUPPORT AND WORK INCENTIVES
UK Average Tax Rates, by Quintile. Family 7),pe and Economic
Status
Employees Unwaged Unwaged
(median wages) (low wages)
%>~     %>~     %>~    %>~    %>40 %>~
Quintile
Ist 65 35 81 6 76 25
2nd 79 22 86 57 84 66
3rd 75 38 75 56 72 60
4th 45 18 31 16 30 20
5th 28 4 12 0 7 3
Family Type
Single             80 21 82 I I 80 28
Lone Parent 71 42 95 63 87 62
Married no 22 6 43 15 41 27
Children
Married with 45 20 55 37 53 43
children
Economic
Status
Unemployed 82 33 80 47
Other unwaged 52 28 49 34
Table 5.3 shows proportions of UK individuals with high average
tax rates broken down by quintile family type and economic status.
Average tax rates for the employed fall on average as income quintile rises
due to fewer individuals in higher income brackets being entitled to means-
tested benefits if they were out of work. The same is broadly true for the
unwaged at median earnings although the bottom quintile includes many
individuals with average tax rates around 60 per cent, which accounts for
the very low proportion over 60 per cent. For the low wage assumption,
we again observe a widening of average tax rates relative to the median
wage assumption, with more individuals with average tax rates below 40
per cent and more above 60 per cent.
The family type calculations show that lone parents and couples
with children are most likely to have very high average tax rates (>60%)
but the single childless also have a high proportion of individuals with
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average tax rates between 40 per cent and 60 per cent. Most of these
groups will be entitled to means-tested out of work benefits, and the level
of benefit for families with children is high rclative to the childless (see
Table 5.1), which explains the higher proportion of families with average
tax rates in excess of 60 per cent. The economic status results show that
the unemployed have higher average tax rates than the unwaged as they are
more likely to be single or married to an unwaged spouse.
5.4.2 UK Results : Replacement Rates
The replacement rate sumnlary results shown in Table 5.4 show
similar features to the average tax rates but there are also some important
differences. One of the most obvious is that women (especially secondary
earners) have higher replacement rates than men. This is because if their
partner is employed, the family will still have a relatively high net income
when the woman is not in paid employment. Hence her earnings might
make proportionately little difference to the family income, and her
replacement rate might be relatively high. This is a feature of replacement
rates because they include an indication of the income effect on incentives
rather than simply effect of the tax and benefit withdrawal.
Table 5.4: Summary of Replacemem Rates in the UK
Employees Unwaged Unwaged
(median wages) (low wages)
All Men ~men All Men It~men All Men Women
Negative I I I I 2 I I 2 I
0>=20 7 I I 4 8 15 4 I I I
20>=40 23 32 13 19 27 15 7 14 4
40>=60 32 39 25 41 29 47 14 18 II
60>=80 23 13 34 27 21 29 41 24 50
80>=100 14 4 23 4 4 4 34 38 32
100>=120 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I 1
>120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Replacement rates also show more consistent results when different
wage assumptions are made, and replacement rates increase with lower
wage assumptions. Using the median wage assumption, 31 per cent of
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initially unwaged individuals had replacement rates greater than 60 per cent
compared with 77 cent of the same unwaged individual using the low wage
results.
Table 5.5 shows the replacement rate results for families of different
types, income quintile and economic status. The proportion of individuals
with high replacement rates increases with an increased proportion of
individuals married to an employed spouse and with an increase in
dependence on means-tested benefits. Therefore, there is little pattern of
replacement rates by income quintile for employees. For the unwaged,
replacement rates rise with income quintile as individuals arc more likely to
be a partner of an employed person. Replacement rates are again higher for
families with children, especially in the low wage case. The economic status
results are also consistent with the hypothesis that individuals with waged
partners have higher replacement rates.
Table 5.5: UK Replacement Rates, by Quintile, Family Type and Economic
Status
Employees Unwaged Unwaged
(median wages) (low wages)
Quintile
Ist
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Family Type
Single
Lone Parent
Married no Children
Married with
children
Economic Status"
Unemployed
Other unwaged
%>40 %>60 %>40 %>60 %>40 %>60
73 4O 8 0 63 26
44 28 81 7 100 85
61 40 99 49 100 97
75 40 100 30 100 100
74 36 100 100 100 100
33 12 14 2 64 30
92 68 84 26 99 86
76 34 75 25 96 80
84 54 98 50 100 98
56 24    84     66
82 35    94     84
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5.4.3 UK / Ireland Comparisons
Using the default assumption on the treatment of housing costs and
benefits for the UK (after housing benefit and before housing costs) Table
5.6 compares replacement rates in the UK and Ireland for employees and
the unwaged. In the case of the unwaged, we present results for a low
wage assumption and for an assumption of median earnings, as detailed in
Section 5.2. It shows that for all groups, while the overall distribution of
replacement rates for the UK and Ireland are similar, Irish replacement
rates are slightly lower on average. One possible explanation of this finding
is that out of work incomes are lower relative to in work incomes in Ireland
than in the UK. This could arise if benefits were higher in the UK than in
Ireland (although Callan and Sutherland (1997) - Chapter 4 of this volume -
would reject this explanation) or, more plausibly, because other income in a
family is higher in the UK, because partners might be more likely to be
employed in the UK.
Table 5.6: Rel)lacement Rates: UK (After Housing Benefit, Before Housing
Costs) and h’eland (Before Housing Costs and Benefits)
Employees Unwaged Unwaged
(median wages) (low wages)
UK Ireland UK Ireland UK Ireland
Negative I 0 I 0 I 0
0>=20 7 19 8 4 I 3
20>--40 23 27 19 24 7 3
40>=60 32 28 41 31 14 13
60>=80 23 20 27 36 41 62
80>=100 14 5 4 5 34 20
100>=120 0 I 0 0 0 0
>120 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alternatively, the result could be driven by different techniques in
the calculation of replacement rates, in particular the treatment of housing
costs. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the same results for Ireland, but for the UK
use two alternative treatments of housing costs. Table 5.7 nets housing
costs from both in work and out of work incomes, whilst Table 5.8 shows
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the replacement rate before housing costs and benefits, which effectively is
the same as assuming housing costs are zero. Difficulties in generating
accurate and contemporary housing cost information from the Irish data
means that the third basis (in Table 5.8) gives the best comparison of
financial returns in the two countries.
The ahemative housing costs assumptions for the UK significantly
change the picture as replacement rates fall relative to the gross housing
cost assumption for both the net and zero housing costs assumption. In
Table 5.8 it is clear that the UK has lower replacement rates for unwaged
individuals which reflect lower out of work incomes and higher wages in
employment. This is consistent with comparisons of the generosity of the
two benefit systems shown in Callan and Sutherland (1996). But for
employees, replacement rates in Ireland are lower on average than in the
UK. This is a reflection of a greater proportion of two earner couples in the
UK than in Ireland, which increases the out of work incomes of individuals
in the UK and hence their replacement rate.
Table 5.7: Replacement Rates UK (After Housing Costs and Benefits) and
Ireland (Before Housing Costs and Benefits)
Employees Unwaged Unwaged
(median wages) (low wages)
UK Ire~nd UK Ire~nd UK Ire~nd
Negative 3 0 2 0 2 0
0>=20 10 19 9 4 I 3
20>=40 30 27 28 24 8 3
40>=60 27 28 41 31 19 13
60>=80 18 20 17 36 44 62
80>=100 II 5 2 5 25 20
100>=120 0 I 0 0 1 0
>120 0 0 0 0 I 0
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Table 5.8: Replacem~ nt Rates UK and h’eland (Before Housing Costs and
Benefits)
Empl, ,yees Un waged Un waged
(median wages) (low wages)
UK Ireland UK Ireland UK Ireland
Negative I 0 I 0 1 0
0>=20 II 19 9 4 I 3
20>=40 28 27 32 24 9 3
40>=60 30 28 40 31 27 13
60>=80 20 20 16 36 48 62
80>=100 II 5 I 5 14 20
100>=120 0 I 0 0 0 0
>120 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finally, in Table 5.9 we show a comparison of average tax rates in
the UK and Ireland using the zero housing costs assumptions. For all three
groups, average tax rates are lower in the UK than in Ireland. This is
consistent with the replacement rate results because the effect of a partner’s
earnings fail to increase average tax rates but do increase replacement rates.
Again the main reasons for these results are higher wages in the UK and
lower benefits relative to those wages. There are some interesting
compositional breakdowns, however. Families with children (particularly
lone parents) in the UK tend to have higher average tax rates than in
Ireland, indicating a faster rate of withdrawal of benefit in the UK than in
Ireland. This is despite the more generous Family Credit in work benefit in
the UK.
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Table 5.9:
INCOME SUPPORT AND WORK INCENTIVES
Average Tat Rates Comparison UK and Ireland (Before Housing
Costs and Benefits)
Employees Unwaged Unwaged
(median wages) (low wages)
UK Ireland UK Ireland UK Ireland
Negative 9 0 0 0 0 0
0>=20 9 3 0 0 23 1
20>--40 41 20 38 7 20 24
40>=60 37 53 49 65 35 39
60>=80 6 21 13 26 19 3 I
80>= 100 I 2 0 2 2 5
100>=120 0 I 0 0 0 0
>120 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Chapter 6
MICROSIM ULA TION A NA L YSES OF REPLA CEMENT RA TES
1N IRELAND
Tim Callan and Brian Nolan
6. I Introduction
Making the tax and social welfare systems more "work-friendly", and
thus improving the financial incentive to take up and stay in work, is now a
major preoccupation of Irish policy-m’,d<ers. In recent years income tax and
PRSI relief have been targeted at the low paid, and the report of the Expert
Working Group on the Integration of the Income Tax and Social Welfare
Systems (1996) seeks to point towards ways of improving work incentives.
But what is the current distribution of work incentives, how has it been
changing, and how does it look in comparative perspective? In this paper
we present a profile of the financial work incentives facing key groups
actually or potentially in the Irish labour force, analyse how this pattern has
evolved in recent years, and carry out an in-depth comparison of the Irish
situation with corresponding results for the United Kingdom.
The most commonly-used measure of work incentives is the
replacement rate, the ratio of income when unemployed to income when in
work. The full distribution of replacement rates can only be seen from
micro-data on individuals and their families. For Ireland, the 1987 ESRI
large-scale household survey on income distribution, poverty, and use of
state services has provided the basis for the construction of the tax/benefit
simulation model SWITCH (Callan, 1991; Callan, O’Donoghue and
O’Neill, 1996). Using this model Callan, O’Donoghue and O’Neill (1994)
estimated replacement rates for the unemployed and employees in the 1987
sample, and using the more recent version based on that sanlple data
uprated to 1994; Callan, Nolan and O’Donoghue (1996) looked at the way
replacement rates changed since 1987. It is this uprated version of
SWITCH which provides the basis for the results presented in this paper. It
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will be possible in the future to repeat the analysis using the next phase in
the development of SWITCH incorporating 1994 sample data from the
Living in Ireland Survey: both experience elsewhere and preliminary
indications here suggest that the model based on uprated 1987 data
provides a reasonably reliable overall picture.
In Section 6.2, some general issues in the measurement of
incentives via replacement rates are discussed. In Section 6.3 we summarise
what microsimulation-based measures show about the evolution of
replacement rates in Ireland between 1987 and 1994, and contrast this with
ahernative.approaches. Section 6.4 presents the detailed comparisons of the
distribution of replacement rates between Ireland and the UK and seeks to
identify key features of the tax and welfare systems underlying these
results. The concluding section sets out the main conclusions from a policy
perspective at this stage and how we see the future development of
research on work incentives in Ireland.
6.2 Some Issues in Measuring Work Incentives
The most commonly used measure of work incentives is the
replacement rate, the ratio of income when unemployed to income when in
work. Alternatives such as the average and marginal tax rate on an
unemployed person taking up a job have also been used, and results for
Ireland for those measures have in fact been produced for the OECD using
the data-base employed in this paper (see Callan, 1995), but here we
concentrate on the measure which dominates Irish policy debates.
Replacement rates are intended to provide a measure of the balance
between income in work and income out of work, to reflect the financial
incentives which an unemployed person has to seek employment or which
an employee has to continue in employment. Replacement rates can be
defined in different ways and no one definition is best for all purposes. It is
therefore necessary to discuss briefly the issues which arise and the route
followed here.
Microsimulation modelling provides a means of analysing the
replacement rates facing individuals and families on the basis of detailed
micro-level data gathered in a large-scale household sample. Essentially,
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the tax-benefit model is first used to simulate the disposable income of the
tax unit when unemployed. This involves simulation of the relevant social
welfare unemployment compensation and of income tax liabilities, as well
as the universal child benefit. The counterfactual situation, where the
individual is employed is then modelled. Again, the tax-benefit model is
used to estimate the disposable income the tax unit would have in that
situation, taking into account changes in social welfare entitlements and tax
liabilities, and, where relevant, entitlement to Family Income Supplement
(FIS) - the social welfare benefit targeted at low income families depending
on wage earnings. (In these calculations the gross earnings of the spouse
are held constant, but their net earnings or benefit receipt may be affected
by their partner’s en~ployment status.) The replacement rate is then
calculated as the ratio of family income when out of work to fmlaily income
when in work.
The first issue in measuring replacement rates via microsimulation
modelling is what level of earnings one should employ for those currently
not in paid work, what is the appropriate earnings counterfactual for this
group? Atkinson and Micklewright (1985) suggest that from an incentive
point of view the ratio of benefits to net earnings in the last job may be of
interest, in that it may play a role as a "rule of thumb" which influences the
reservation wage of the unemployed. (Some results based on this measure
from the 1987 ESRI sample were presented in Callan and Nolan, 1994.)
However, in empirical studies employing micro-data to examine incentive
effects and search behaviour the most common definition is after-tax
income when unemployed compared with after-tax income in a prospective
job. This is the concept employed in estimating replacement rates from the
1987 ESRI sample in Callan, O’Donoghue and O’Neill (1994), using for
the unemployed the predicted gross earnings from estimated earnings
functions. A simpler alternative is to use a particular gross earnings level -
such as mean, median or lowest decile of earnings in the sample - as the
prospective earnings for all those not currently at work. Here we employ
both predicted wages and several such alternatives to see how much
difference this makes to the results.
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The second key issue is what unemployment compensation to
attribute to those in employment when sampled in estimating their
counterfactual situation. Here the replacement rate is calculated on the
basis that income support when unemployed would be provided by long-
term Unemployment Assistance (UA). While some would in fact receive
Unemployment Benefit for a time if they became unemployed, in a situation
where long-term unemployment is so high it is the rate of long-term
support which is arguably most relevant to the debate on incentives. We
therefore continue to employ this simplification, adopted in previous
analyses with SWITCH and in the UK results by Duncan and Giles (1996)
on which we draw for comparative purposes. The amount which would be
received from UA is sit’nulated by the model by application of the means
test and the amounts payable for families of differing composition.
Finally, the appropriate treatment of FIS is also an issue.
Entitlement to FIS is modelled on the basis of the parameters of the scheme
by SWITCH and these entitlements can be included in the calculations.
However, as in the UK the take-up of this scheme appears to be
particularly low, with perhaps only one-third of those entitled actually in
receipt of the payment. For this reason, in this paper we also employ a
variant where only a randomly-selected one in three of those entitled to FIS
is attributed that benefit.
Non-cash benefits such as the value of medical card entitlement,
fuel vouchers, and differential rent for local authority tenants are not taken
into account in these calculations. Callan, Nolan and Whelan (1996) find
that the value of secondary and non-cash benefits can be as much as 20 per
cent of the basic payment rate, for an unemployed couple with 4 children.
But there can be considerable variation across schemes and across
individuals and families in the relative importance of such benefits. A
comprehensive microsimulation study of incentives, building entitlement to
these benefits into the modelling procedure, would be of great interest,
particularly given the extension of secondary and non-cash benefits in the
past decade. In the present context, the key issue is how the structure of
secondary and non-cash benefits in Ireland compares with that in the UK.
Broadly speaking, one would expect that the Irish medical card structure
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has a more adverse impact on incentives than the UK’s NHS system,
whereby all citizens - both unemployed and employed, at whatever income
level- have free access to hospital and GP care. Comparisons in the housing
area are made more difficult by the very different structures involved: a
combination of rent reductions (the differential rent scheme) and cash
supports (rent and mortgage supplements in Ireland, which are conditional
on not being at work full-time) as against a very extensive cash-based
housing benefit system in the UK. Again, these issues would merit a full-
scale investigation, but at present in rnaking comparisons with the UK we
necessarily restrict attention to cash replacement rates.
6.3 The Evolution of Replacement Rates in Ireland 1987-1994
Our analysis of replacement rates in Ireland via the SWITCH
microsimulation model is based on data obtained in a large-scale household
survey carried out by the ESRI in 1987, but uprated to 1994. In this section
we describe the uprating procedure employed and bring out what
comparison of microsimulation results for 1987 and 1994 shows abont the
evolution of replacement rates over the period. We also refer to how this
compares with the pattern suggested by alternative approaches to
measuring replacement rates over time, which was examined in some detail
in Callan, Nolan and O’ Donoghue (1996).
In uprating the model from 1987 to 1994, the tax and social welfare
policy changes between the two years are captured by changes in the
relevant parameters (tax rates and bands, social welfare rates, etc.) in the
microsimulation model. The 1987 data can also be uprated to approximate
1994 composition in terms of key characteristics by a combination of static
ageing techniques: for a full description of the uprating procedures, see
Callan, O’Donoghue and O’Neill (1996). In the present context, however,
we are particularly interested in investigating the evolution of replacement
rates for a fixed population of the unemployed, so we abstract from that
part of the usual uprating procedure which involves reweighting of cases to
reflect changes in the demographic and socio-economic composition of the
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population.~ Increased incomes are taken into account by separate uprating
factors for wage and salary income, self-employment income, and fan’n
income.
We now compare the mean replacement rate for the unemployed
produced by the microsimulation model in 1987 with the uprated 1994
mean, using predicted wages from four human capital type wage equations
for single and married men and women. These equations (described in
Callan and Wren, 1994) include infonnation on past labour market
experience and educational qualifications, with the depreciation effect of
years spent unemployed or out of the labour force taken into account, so
that wages facing the long-term unemployed are affected by the length of
their unemployment.2 The "realistic" one-third take-up assumption for FIS
is also employed.3 Table 6. I shows (row A) the mean replacement ratio for
the unemployed produced by the microsimulation approach for 1987 was
62.3 per cent. The uprated 1994 mean is slightly lower, at 61 per cent. The
microsimulation approach using predicted wages thus suggests that
replacement rates facing the Irish unemployed fell marginally between 1987
and 1994. A separate analysis of Unemployment Benefit and
Unemployment Assistance recipients reveals that the mean for those on UB
fell while that for UA recipients rose by about 1.5 percentage points,
reflecting the more rapid increase in UA rates over the period.
It is of interest to compare the trend shown by this approach with
some alternatives. First, the microsimulation approach is again adopted but
with two simplifications. Instead of predicted individual wages,
unemployed men/women are all assumed to obtain a job at average weekly
male/female industrial earnings respectively, and full take-up of FIS is
l The full uprating procedures are used in Section 4, for comparisons with the UK.
2 If the unmeasured labour market characteristics of the uuemploycd are less favourable
than those of the employed, wages predicted oll this basis could overstate the wage
which the unemployed could expect; but the fact that the duration of total unemployment
is included in the equation may capture some or all of this effect.
3The allocation of individuals to take-up or non-take-up is random. Given the small
number of cases found to be taking up I;’IS, it is not possible at present to use the more
complex modelling procedures adopted in the UK.
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assumed. Table 6.1 also shows the mean replacement rates for 1987 and
1994 produced on this basis (row B). Unsurprisingly, the mean replacement
rate is much lower than with predicted wages, since the wages predicted
for the unemployed by the earnings equations are well below the average -
their mean predicted wage is about two-thirds of the average industrial
wage. Over the 1987-94 period the mean replacement rate is now shown to
have risen rather than fallen by I percentage point. This reflects in part the
fact that tax/social insurance policy changes were targeted on those below
average earnings, which will be missed by calculations based on average
earnings. However, it also arises because average industrial earnings rose
less rapidly over the period than the National Accounts-based figure used in
uprating earnings in the microsimulation model and applied in predicting
earnings for the unemployed via earnings functions.
It is also necessary to assess the reliability of alternative
methodologies for assessing how replacement rates are changing over time.
Relying on hypothetical replacement rates based on illustrative cases - what
Walker (1996) calls the first generation approach to analysing tax and
welfare reforna - has been seen to be inadequate in analysing replacement
rates at a point in time, but might none the less adequately capture changes
over time. We have updated the hypothetical replacement rate series
produced by Hughes and Walsh (1983), which compares UB and UA for
different family types with the after-tax wage corresponding to average
industrial earnings.’* Row C of Table 6.1 shows that the mean replacement
rate for 1987 and 1994 under this approach. The results are in fact very
similar to those produced by the "simple" microsimulation approach, with
replacement rates rising over the period, in contrast to the fall suggested by
the more sophisticated microsimulation approach: the hypothetical series
cannot therefore be taken as a reliable short cut.
Perhaps the simplest approach to measuring trends in income for
those in and out of work is to rely on aggregate statistics on income from
employment and expenditure on income support for the unemployed. Such
a series relating mean unemployment compensation per recipient to mean
4 See Callan. Nolan and O’Donoghue (1996) for details.
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net earnings has been used in econometric analysis of Irish unemployment
by McGettigan and Browne (1993) and in some similar studies elsewhere.
Using this approach to produce a "mean replacement rate" series,s the
results for 1987 and 1994 are once again shown in Table 6.1. (A full
description of the construction of the series is in Callan, Nolan and
O’Donoghue, 1996.) This expenditure-based series (row D) shows a large
fall in the average replacement rate between 1987 and 1994, of almost 6
percentage points, much larger than the naicrosimulation approach with
predicted wages (row A). Both this difference and the crude nature of the
series itself suggest that it cannot be relied on to accurately reflect changes
in replacement rates.
Table 6. I : Alternative Measures of Replacement Rates, 1987 and 1994
Measure 1987 1994 Chan~e
(A) Microsimulation @
predicted wage, low 62.3 61.0 - 1.3
take-up
(B) Microsimulation @
average wage, full 45.6 46.8 1.2
take-up
(C) Hypothetical 45.6 47. I 1.5
(D) Expenditure 35.7 30.0 -5.7
SThis is in fact something of a misnomer, since the series represents
[mean unemployment compensation/mean earnings], and not the mean of
[unemployment compensation/earnings].
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Table 6.2: Distribution of Replacement Rates Estimated using Predicted Wages,
1987 and 1994
Full Take-up of FIS 33 per cent Take-up of FIS
1987 1994 1987 1994
0<10 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.7
10<20 1.7 2.4 1.7 2.4
20<30 4.3 3.3 4.3 3.3
30<40 9.3 8.5 9.3 8.5
40<50 11.6 11.7 11.7 11.8
50<60 16.5 15.3 16.4 15.3
60<70 18.9 21.6 19.1 19.6
70<80 16.6 28.4 13.9 22.0
80<90 14.4 4.5 13.1 9.1
90<100 4.0 2.4 5.4 4.6
Overl00 1.7 0.1 4.0 1.6
Total 100 100 I O0 100
Clearly, developments in mean replacement rates tell us only a part
of what is going on. A relatively constant mean is consistent with little
change throughout the distribution, or with a fall in the replacement rates at
the highest levels, offset by a rise in replacement rates by those initially
facing rather lower levels. Table 6.2 shows the distribution of estimated
replacement rates for the unemployed, for 1987 and 1994, from the
microsimulation approach using predicted wages and low FIS take-up.
About 37 per cent of the unemployed face a replacement rate of over 70
per cent in 1994, little different to the figure for 1987. Despite this stability,
Figures 6. I and 6.2 illustrate that there have been some significant changes
at the top of the distribution.
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of Replacement Rates 1987and 1994; Microsimulation
Esthnates at Predicted Wage, 1/3 Toke-up of FIS.
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Figure 6.1 shows the proportion of the unemployed facing
replacement rates below the interval cut offs (equal 10 percentage point
intervals). A scenario in which some replacement rates fell, while none
rose, would give rise to a curve for 1994 which lay entirely above the 1987
one, and vice versa; more complex changes could give rise to crossing
curves, somewhat analogous to crossing Lorenz curves. Figure 6.1 makes
it clear that the actual changes have been concentrated towards the top of
the replacement rate distribution, where the 1994 curve lies above the 1987
one. Figure 6.2 thus focuses on this change at the top of the distribution,
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and shows sharp falls in the numbers facing replacement rates of over 80
per cent, accompanied by a roughly equal rise in the numbers facing
replacement rates of 70 to 80 per cent. Thus the microsinlulation analysis
with predicted wages suggests that the major change in the distribution of
irish replacement rates in recent years has been a reduction in the incidence
of very high replacement rates (over 80 per cent), to levels of 70 to 80 per
cent, Higher real wages and rednced taxes on low incomes (which are
particularly relevant for those with the highest replacement rates) have
contributed to this phenomenon.
Figure 6.2:
% of claimants
25%
Distribution of Replacement Rates over 70 Per Cent, 1987 and 1994
(Microsimulation estimates at predicted wage, I/3 take-up of FIS).
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6.4 Replacement Rates in Ireland and the UK
We now turn to a detailed analysis of replacement rates in Ireland
for different groups, embedded in a comparison with corresponding results
for the UK. The UK figures are drawn from supplementary tables in the
appendix to Duncan and Giles (1996), allowing us to extend their
comparison between Ireland and the UK in a number of directions. Before
presenting the results, it is important to set out clearly the basis on which
they were constructed. We continue to concentrate on replacement rates
rather than Average Tax Rates. For Ireland, the 1994 uprated version of
SWITCH is employed, while the UK results refer to 1993. Because of the
way in which state support for housing costs is provided there, Duncan and
Giles present UK results (a) including housing-related benefits in income
and not deducting housing costs, (b) including housing-related benefits in
income but deducting housing costs, and (c) excluding housing-related
benefits from income. In the Irish context, a significant element of state
support for housing expenditure is provided via reduced rents on local
authority housing rather than cash payments. For comparative purposes
here we adopt variant (c), where state cash transfers for housing are not
included in income. Also for comparative purposes, full take-up of means-
tested benefits, including FIS and Family Credit in lreland/UK respectively,
is assumed.
Finally, the assumptions made about the wage facing those not
currently employed in calculating replacement rates can be critical. While
we have made use of predicted wages for the unemployed at individual
level in the previous section, for comparative purposes a consistent and
necessarily more straightforward approach has now to be adopted. We
therefore follow Duncan and Giles ill employing the two counterfactuals
used by the OECD in recent work: the weekly gross earnings facing all
individuals not in work were assumed to be the median or, alternatively, the
tenth percentile of earnings of full-time males. (We will refer to the latter
for convenience as the low wage assumption.) Like them, we continue to
use means-tested income support for long-term unemployment as the
counterfactual for employees.
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We first look briefly at replacement rates for employees, before
concentrating on the more directly policy-relevant results for those not
currently at work. Table 6.3 shows the distribution of calculated
replacement rates in Ireland and the UK for all employees. Overall, 6
percent of Irish employees face replacement rates of over 80 per cent while
II per cent of UK employees are seen to be in that position, and the
proportion facing rates above 60 per cent is also higher in the UK.
Table 6.3: Distribution of Replacement Rates for Employees, Ireland and UK,
1993/1994
Rep~cement Rate Ireland UK
(%) (%)
negative 0 I
0<=20 19 II
20<=40 27 28
40<=60 28 30
60<=80 20 20
80<=100 6 II
>100 0 0
Table 6.4 then distinguishes three household types among
employees: single, married without children, and married with children.
This disaggregation by fmllily type shows that in both countries the
probability of facing a replacement rate above 60 per cent is highest for
those who are married with children, followed by married without children,
with only a small proportion of single individuals in that position. Within
family types, the proportion with replacement rates over 60 per cent is in
fact almost identical in Ireland and the UK: about 45 per cent of those who
are married with children, 30 per cent of the married without children, and
6 per cent of single individuals. Higher unemployment compensation where
there are dependents is thus clearly playing a crucial role in the pattern of
replacement rates across family types in both Ireland and the UK.
However, the distribution of employees by family type is rather different in
the two countries. A substantially higher proportion of Irish employees are
single, while more UK employees are married without children. Associated
with this is a different gender balance: 49 per cent of UK employees
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compared with 41 per cent of Irish employees are women. Duncan and
Giles point out for the UK that women have higher replacement rates on
average than men, and this is also true for Ireland. Since single people have
relatively low replacement rates and married women relatively high ones,
this helps to explain why the overall percentage of employees with high
replacement rates is higher in the UK.
Table 6.4: Distribution of Replacement Rates for Employees, Ireland and UK
1993/1994 b~, Famil), Type
Replacement Single Married, No Married with ChiMren
Rate Children
Ire~nd UK Ire~nd UK Ire~nd UK
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
negative 0 2 0 I 0 0
0<=20 41 29 2 6 I 5
20<=40 39 51 19 22 18 19
40<=60 13 11 49 41 47 31
60<=80 4 4 24 23 35 28
80<=100 2 2 6 8 8 17
>100 I 0 0 0 I 0
We now turn to replacement rates for the currently unwaged, and
following Duncan and Giles exclude the retired, self-employed, sick and
those in full-time education. Unlike them, within this group we look
separately at the unemployed and those not participating in the labour force
- the latter comprising for the most part married women who in labour
force terms are categorised as in home duties. The counterfactual wage
assumption now comes into play, so Table 6.5 shows the distribution of
calculated replacement rates for the unemployed in Ireland and the UK with
the median and the low wage assumption. With the median wage, we see
that 29 per cent of the Irish unemployed compared with only 10 per cent of
the UK unemployed face a replacement rate above 60 per cent. With the
low wage assumption, the corresponding figures are 74 per cent and 49 per
cent. This gap between Ireland and the UK is not however present for very
high replacement rates with the low wage assumption: 12 per cent of the
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Irish unemployed, as against 10 per cent of the UK unemployed, then have
cash replacement rates over 80 per cent.
Table 6.5: Distribution of Replacement Rates for Unemployed, Ireland and UK,
1993/1994, Median and Low Wa~e Assumption
Median Wage Low Wa~e
Replacement Ireland UK Ireland UK
Rate (%) (%) (%) (%)
negative 0 2 0 2
0<=20 II 16 7 I
20<=40 42 39 6 15
40<=60 18 33 12 33
60<=80 25 10 62 39
80<=100 4 0 11 10
>100 0 0 1 0
Table 6.6 shows the corresponding results for those not currently in
the labour force. With the median wage assumption, the percentage with
replacement rates of over 60 per cent is much higher for Ireland, at 48 per
cent compared with only 23 per cent for the UK. With the low wage
assumption the gap between the two countries is much less: the percentage
with replacement rates over 60 per cent is now 86 per cent for Ireland and
70 per cent for the UK.
Table 6.6: Distribution of Replacement Rates for Unoccupied, Ireland and UK,
1993/1994, Median and Low Wa~e Assumption
Median Wage Low Wage
Rep~cement lre~nd UK Ireland UK
Rate (%) (%) (%) (%)
0<=20 0 5 0 !
20<=40 12 27 0 5
40<=60 40 45 13 24
60<=80 43 21 61 54
80<=100 5 2 25 16
>100 0 0 0 0
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Taking Tables 6.4 and 6.5 together, then, we see first that in both
countries, the proportion facing high replacement rates is higher for those
not in the labour force than for the unemployed. Second, the proportion
facing high replacement rates is somewhat higher in Ireland than the UK for
both these groups.
Distinguishing different family types may again help in
understanding the pattern of replacement rates. Table 6.7 shows
replacement rates for the unwaged in Ireland and the UK by family type
with the median wage assumption, while Table 6.8 has the corresponding
results with the low wage assumption. With the median wage, very few
single people in either country face replacement rates of over 60 per cent.
For those who are married without children, the percentage with
replacement rates over 60 per cent is about 28 per cent in Ireland and 21
per cent in the UK. Replacement rates are much higher again for those who
are married with children, and here there is a striking gap between the two
countries. Almost two-thirds of the Irish unwaged who are married with
children face a replacement rate of over 60 per cent, even with this
unrealistically benign assumption about the wage they could command,
while the corresponding figure for the UK is below one-third.
Table 6.7: Distribution of Replacement Rates for Unwaged, Ireland and UK
1993/1994 b), Famil), Type, Median Wage Assumption
Replacement Single Married, No Married with ChiMren
Rate Children
h’eland UK Ireland UK Ireland UK
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
negative 0 5 0 I 0 0
0<=20 17 36 0 4 0 0
20<=40 79 57 9 34 0 6
40<=60 4 2 63 40 35 64
60<=80 0 I 24 18 57 29
80<=100 0 0 4 3 8 2
>100 0 0 0 0 0 0
With the low wage assumption, Table 6.8 shows that the difference
between the two countries in the percentage facing replacement rates of
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over 60 per cent is not now among those who are married with children,
simply because almost all this group are in that position in each country.
There is none the less a higher proportion of this family type facing
replacement rates of over 80 per cent in Ireland. None of the single
individtmls in either country face replacement rates this high, but almost
half face rates of over 60 per cent in Ireland compared with only 5 per cent
in the UK. For those who are married without children, there is a narrower
differential between the two countries: 88 per cent in Ireland versus 77 per
cent in the UK face replacement rates of over 60 per cent.
Table 6.8: Distribution of Replacement Rates for Unwaged, h’eland and UK
1993/1994 b), Family T),l)e, Low Wa~e Assumption
Single Married, No Married with Children
Children
Replacement lre~nd UK lre~nd UK Ire~nd UK
Rate (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
negative 0 5 0 I 0 0
0<=20 II 2 0 2 0 0
20<=40 10 36 I 2 0 0
40<=60 31 51 10 19 2 4
60<=80 48 5 57 56 71 73
80<=100 0 0 31 21 27 22
>100 0 0 0 0 I 0
The higher replacement rates facing the Irish unwaged clearly
reflect the fact that, as documented in Callan and Sutherland (1996),
support rates for the long-term unemployed are a good deal higher in
Ireland than the UK. There, it was shown that the rates paid in means-
tested support for the unemployed via Unemployment Assistance in Ireland
and Income Support in the UK in 1994 were very similar in nominal
(common currency) terms, despite the UK’s higher income per head. As a
result, UA paid to a single individual came to 35 per cent of average net
earnings around that date, whereas the corresponding figure for Income
Support in the UK was only 23 per cent. The impact of differences in social
welfare structures rather than rates is more difficult to identify because the
two countries in fact have rather similar structures. As far as income tax
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structures are concerned, however, there is a significant difference in the
treatment of married couples: the Irish income tax system in effect imposes
particularly high marginal tax rates on married individuals whose spouses
are in employment.
6.5 Conclusion
In this paper our aim has been to look in some depth at financial
incentives to take up or stay in work in Ireland, with a comparative
perspective provided by a comparison, on a consistent basis, with the UK.
This analysis has relied on cash replacement ratios calculated from
microsimulation models, in the Irish case the SWITCH tax-benefit model
developed at the ESRI. This model-based approach allows changes over
time and the first-round impact of actual or potential policy changes to be
assessed much more robustly than reliance on a small number of
hypothetical cases.
During the 1987 to 1994 period, the microsimulation results
suggest that the average replacement rate facing the unemployed in Ireland
was roughly constant, with a small rise in the mean for those on
Unemployment Assistance. Microsimulation analysis reveals that the
relevant wage for the unemployed is a good deal lower than the average
industrial wage, with the mean predicted wage being about two-thirds of
that average figure. The paper’s results show this to be important both for
tracking changes in replacement rates over time and assessing the impact of
policy changes. The impact on replacement rates of recent policy changes
such as improvements in FIS as well as alterations to income tax bands,
allowances and exemption limits does not always show up in calculations
which focus exclusively on the average industrial wage. Analyses based on
two-thirds of that figure, as well as those based on predicted earnings for
the unemployed taking account of their qualifications and labour market
experience, suggest that such policy measures have served to reduce the
incidence of replacement rates above 80 per cent, although the numbers in
the 70 to 80 per cent replacement rate category have increased.
The comparison of microsimulation-based replacement rates for
Ireland and the UK, using consistent definitions, showed a considerably
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higher proportion of the unwaged - whether unemployed or unoccupied -
in Ireland facing rates above 60 per cent. For employees there was a
different pattern, with a higher proportion of UK employees facing very
high replacement rates, of over 80 per cent. The replacement rate was seen
to be strongly influenced by family composition in each country, with single
individuals having much lower replacement rates than those who were
married without children, and married individuals with children having the
highest rates, primarily because of the impact of extra income support
payments for dependents. In understanding the lreland-UK comparative
picture, the fact that income support for the long-term unemployed in
Ireland is a good deal more generous relative to average earnings was the
single most important difference identified between the two tax/benefit
systems.
Microsimulation-based measures offer the best means of monitoring
the evolution of replacement rates and other measures of work incentives,
and of making consistent and meaningful comparisons across countries.
They can also contribute greatly to assessment of the likely impact of policy
changes on work incentives in advance of their implementation, though
such an assessment cannot of course be based entirely on static
microsimulation. The impact of the policy in question on behaviour must
also be taken into account, where possible using econometric estiil~ates of
the relevant parameters. This does not necessarily mean that such
behavioural responses have to be embedded in the microsimulation model,
but it highlights the complementary role of microsimulation modelling and
econometric analysis of key parameters in informing policy.
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